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NOV 2 B 2008 / 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M BECK, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
CANYON COUNTY 
Third Party Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
INTRODUCTION 
Case No: CV05-4848 
Plaintiff Guzman's Post-trial 
Memorandum in Support of 
Upholding the Validity of Canyon 
County's 1982 Herd District 
The issue at hand is whether Dale Piercy (Piercy) has sustained his burden of proof 
that Canyon County's 1982 herd district ordinance is invalid on the grounds that the 
County Commissioners failed to follow proper procedure in the enactment of the 
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ordinance. 
As the Court knows, the herd district is presumed to have been validly created. IC 
31-857. 
Piercy has presented to this Court nothing more than speculation and conjecture 
about the record before the Canyon County Commissioners 26 years ago. Not a single 
witness has testified that this herd district was created without an antecedent petition 
presented by landowners within the proposed herd district. Not a single witness has 
testified that the county failed to publish notice of the hearing on said petition. 
Piercy has an extremely high mountain to climb in order to meet his burden of proof 
on these issues. Piercy must prove the invalidity of the herd district ordinance by clear 
and convincing evidence. City of Lewiston v Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80 (1984). An ordinance 
will not be overturned absent "clear proof of "great force" that the ordinance is invalid. 
Simmons v. City of Moscow, 111 Idaho 14, at 19 (1986). The presumption of validity that 
attaches to an ordinance grows stronger the longer the ordinance remains in effect. 6 
McQuillin Muni. Corp., Section 20.06 Presumption of Validity, at p. 18 (1998 Rev. Vol., 3rd 
ed.). 
In his brief, Piercy incorrectly cites Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of 
Boise, 93 Idaho 558 ( 1970) for the proposition that the burden of proof is on the county to 
prove that the ordinance was properly enacted. In fact, as the Idaho Supreme Court stated 
in that case, "The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party attacking the validity of an 
ordinance". 93 Idaho, at 564. 
Finally, Piercy says in his brief that, 'The parties stipulated that none of the herd 
districts noted on Joint Exhibit #2 included the area designated by Mr. Piercy to be the 
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area where the subject bull was being pastured." Piercy's brief, p. 2. 
Actually, that's not quite correct. What the stipulation says is, "That prior to the 
enactment of the 1982 herd district order found in Joint Exhibit #4 none of the herd district 
descriptions referenced by or drawn upon Joint Exhibit #2 included the field where Mr. 
Piercy's bull was being pastured prior to the accident which is the subject matter of the 
underlying litigation." Stipulation, p. 3, paragraph 8(1) (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is Guzman's position that the white areas contained in Joint Exhibit #2 do 
depict a herd district that encompassed Piercy's pasture. The herd district at issue, the 
one created by the county in 1982, is depicted on Joint Exhibit #2, and it is comprised of 
the white areas shown on that map. 
Piercy attempts to muddy the waters by arguing that there were more than 3 areas 
that were not contained within a herd district prior to 1982. So, Piercy argues, there is no 
way to tell whether Piercy's land was included within the 1982 herd district. 
As is discussed below, the map that was originally attached to the herd district order 
no longer exists. Like the petition, and the Commissioners' resolution to create a herd 
district, the map referred to in the Order creating the herd district has gone missing. 
Piercy argues that it is impossible to know which 3 areas of the county were 
intended to be included within the 1982 herd district. But we do know the answer to that 
question. All areas of the county that weren't herd district before, were herd district after 
the 1982 Order. 
The commissioners could well have been referring in the Order to 3 general areas 
of the county, each of which contained one or more parcels of land that were not herd 
district. 
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Based upon the evidence presented, Piercy can not even legitimately claim he has 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the herd district was improperly created. 
Piercy certainly has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that this 26 year old 
ordinance (with it's ever stronger 26 years of presumptive validity) was improperly created. 
WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Much of the witness testimony in this case has been submitted to the court in 
deposition format. All of these depositions (with exception of Dale Piercy's) were noticed 
up and taken by counsel for Piercy. The deposition witnesses testified as follows: 
E. G. Johnson: 
Mr. Johnson is a long time rancher who ranches near Wilder, ID. Piercy offers up 
Mr. Johnson's testimony to prove no notice was published in the paper, and to prove no 
petition was circulated. His testimony proves neither. 
Johnson testified that if notice of hearing the petition had been published in the 
newspaper, he wouldn't have seen it as he doesn't read all the legal notices. He testified 
he did not know the County Commissioners published Joint Exhibit 10 (notice of creation of 
the 1982 herd district) in the December 20, 1982 edition of the Idaho Press Tribune. 
Johnson depo, pps. 24-26 (Exhibit D, attached). 
Johnson also testified that he has no knowledge that the County Commissioners 
failed to follow proper procedure in creating the 1982 herd district. Johnson depo, p 29-
30. 
Piercy claims that Johnson would have held meetings of his cattle associations to 
address the proposed herd district had it been properly publicized, but Johnson's own 
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testimony undercuts that argument 
While Johnson testified that he was in 1982 a member of and active in the Idaho 
Cattlemen's Association and the Cattle Feeder's Association, Mr. Johnson also testified 
that to his knowledge neither organization ever notified its members of the creation, or 
-
proposed creation, of any herd district. Johnson depo, p. 31. Further, Mr. Johnson 
testified that neither organization had any meetings about the 1982 herd district after it 
was created. Johnson depo, p. 32. 
Glenn Koch: 
Mr. Koch is the sole surviving member of the 3 County Commissioners who enacted 
the 1982 herd district. Piercy claims Mr. Koch testified that he did not recall a petition 
being presented to the county commissioners. Piercy brief, p. 10. This is an inaccurate 
summary of Mr. Koch's testimony. Rather, Mr. Koch testified that he doesn't recall if there 
was, or was not, a petition for the creation of the herd district, or whether notice of hearing 
the petition was, or was not, published in the paper. Koch depo, pps. 21 and 25. He 
simply does not recall, one way or the other, the events surrounding creation of the herd 
district. Koch depo, pps. 36-37 (Exhibit E, attached). 
Leon Jensen: 
Mr. Jensen began working for Canyon County in 1994. He has no knowledge of the 
events surrounding the creation of the herd district in 1982. Jensen depo pps. 8-9 (Exhibit 
F, attached). 
Linda Landis: 
Ms. Landis began working for Canyon County in 2005. Landis depo, p. 8-9. She 
has no knowledge of the events pertaining to the creation of the herd district. Landis depo, 
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H 
p. 32 (E hibit G, attached). 
; onica Reeves: 
s. Reeves began working for Canyon County 19 years ago. Reeves depo, p. 8. 
She h s no knowledge regarding the procedures utilized by the county at the time of the 
creation of the 1982 herd district. Reeves depo, pps. 30-31 (Exhibit H, attached). 
William Hurst: 
Mr. Hurst has been the Clerk of the District Court for the Third Judicial District for 18 
months. Hurst depo, p. 8 (Exhibit I, attached). He has no knowledge as to whether the 
county fol lowed proper procedure in 1982. 
Bill A. Staker: 
Mr. Staker was the Canyon County Clerk from 1978 until 1988. Staker depo, pps 4-
5. Again, Piercy mischaracterizes Mr. Staker's testimony by suggesting that Mr. Staker 
testified that he did not remember a petition being submitted to create the subject herd 
district. Piercy Brief, pps. 10-11 {Exhibit J, attached). In actuality Mr. Staker testified that 
he has no knowledge as to whether a petition was, or was not, submitted to the County 
Commissioners for the creation of the 1982 herd district. Staker depo, p. 17. Mr. Staker 
does not know whether notice of hearing the petition was, or was not, published in the 
newspaper. Staker depo, p23. 
A number of witnesses were also called to testify live at trial. As the Court had an 
opportunity to see, and hear those witnesses, only brief comment will be made on the 
testimony of the witnesses called to testify at trial. 
David Lloyd: 
Mr. Lloyd, is a former employee of Mr. Saetrum's firm. He is married to Karen 
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Whychell, a current employee of Mr. Saetrum's firm. Mr. Lloyd acknowledged that he 
looked at "thousands, upon thousands upon thousands" of microfiched Idaho Statesman 
newspaper pages at the Idaho historical Society while searching the Statesman editions 
from January 1, 1982 through August 1982, and that his eyes became tired while 
performing that job. 
Karen Whychell: 
Ms. Whychell testified that the newspaper print on microfiche at the Idaho Historical 
Society is small and difficult to read. She acknowledged that if the Idaho Historical Society 
did not have all of the editions of the newspapers she reviewed her review of the 
newspapers for 1982 would have been incomplete. She testified she did not check to see 
that she had reviewed every issue of the Parma Review newspaper for 1982. With respect 
to her review of the Idaho Statesman, she did not check to see if the Idaho Historical 
Society was missing any editions for the 1982 year. 
She acknowledged that searching the legal notices in the paper was a "tiresome 
job", and that whether she was able to review every legal notice in the newspapers 
reviewed depended upon how thorough she was in her research. She acknowledged that, 
given the sheer volume and conditions under which she researched the legal notices in the 
Idaho Statesman, the Idaho Press Tribune, and the Parma Review, that it is possible she 
did not observe every legal notice published for the time periods she reviewed. 
She did not recall how many hours she dedicated to this task of researching for 
legal notices in newspapers of general circulation in Canyon County, other than it took 
"several weeks". She testified that during this "several weeks", the Idaho Historical Society 
was only open Wednesdays through Saturday; that she did not do any research on 
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Saturdays (except maybe one); and that during the time she was doing this research she 
was also doing work on other cases in her office. 
Timothy Fox: 
Fox, a surveyor hired by Piercy, testified that the legal descriptions he used to draw 
a partial map of some of Canyon County's herd districts (Exhibit "A-1") were provided to 
him by Mr. Saetrum's office. He acknowledged that he could not testify that the "yellow 
areas" on the map he drew were not in a herd district, since he did no independent 
research to identify the county's herd districts. 
Dale Piercy: 
Piercy testified that he is an expert on ranching in Canyon County, as he has 
ranched there for 30 years. He ranches and farms some 800 acres, and has some 260 
head of cows, and another 20 head of bulls. He acknowledged that the 2001 motor vehicle 
accidents involving his livestock on Wamstad Rd. (like the subject accident involving his 
bull) occurred in an area that would be covered by the 1982 herd district (and the Court will 
recall that Piercy's insurer paid for the damage caused to the two motor vehicles as a 
result of that 2001 accident, just as it would do if the area was within a herd district). 
Though Piercy now contends that he believed all along that the pasture from which his bull 
escaped was open range, that is not what he testified to when he was first asked that 
question. When he was deposed, Mr. Piercy testified that he, "did not know for sure" that 
the pasture was in open range. Piercy depo, 91 :21-23 (exhibit K, attached). At the time 
this accident occurred, Piercy claimed that he did not even know what a herd district was, 
or what the words "herd districf' meant Piercy depo, 92:24-93: 11. Furthermore, Piercy 
testified that all livestock in Canyon County, including his livestock, is enclosed and 
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contained, and not permitted to roam free. Piercy depo, 40:18-41:3; 44:17-45:4. 
Michael Bruse: 
Mr. Bruse is in charge of Canyon County's "plat room". He is the "Geographical 
Information Systems" supervisor. He does not know who made the black and white map or 
the color map of the Canyon County herd districts (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2), nor when or 
why they were made. He prepared Exhibit "C-1", which is a large map of the county's herd 
districts. He testified that to the extent the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 created 
a herd district that did not encompass the herd districts identified on Exhibit "C-1", the 
white areas on his map, including the area where this accident occurred, would be in the 
herd district created in 1982. 
Paul Kosterman: 
Kosterman has a law degree from the University of Idaho, and works as a paralegal 
for Chasan and Walton. He testified that there were 10,367 pages published by the Idaho 
Press Tribune in 1982, and that Piercy's counsel produced in Exhibit "A-3" only 678 of 
those pages (or about 7% of the total pages published). 
Kosterman testified that there were 3 newspapers published in Canyon County in 
1982: The Idaho Press Tribune, the Parma Review, and the Canyon Herald. 
Kosterman described the tedious, tiresome process of reviewing a single page of a 
newspaper for legal notices. The pages are on microfiche. One cannot read the small font 
print without "zooming in", which then focuses the researcher in on a single column of 
newsprint, making it easy to become "disoriented" and making it easy to lose your position 
on the page (so that when you "zoom" out and then back in, there is the risk of skipping a 
column). 
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He estimated that it would take, on average, 3 minutes to read a page of a 
newspaper. 
He gave a first hand account of how easy it is to over look a leg~I notice. Citing 
Joint Exhibit 8, he described how he knew that on December 24, 1976 and January 1, 
1977 the County Commissioners had published in the Idaho Press Tribune notice of 
creation of a herd district in Canyon County (which herd district the county later rescinded). 
Even though he knew exactly what day, and in which paper the notices were published, he 
could not find either one until he was shown the December 24, 1976 notice. He then went 
back to the Historical Society and located the December 24, 1976 notice that he had 
previously over looked. He again attempted to find the January 1, 1977 notice, but could 
not. The December 24, 1976 notice was difficult to spot, because it was at the bottom of 
the page, next to a K-Mart advertisement that took up almost the entire page. 
Kosterman testified that doing this research was very tiresome, because the 
researcher is going through hundreds of pages, looking for one tiny little item. He 
described the task as looking for the proverbial "needle in the haystack". 
Finally, Piercy suggests in his briefthat Kosterman reviewed all pages of the Idaho 
Statesman, the Idaho Press Tribune and the Parma Review published in 1982 to attempt 
to find notice of hearing the petition for the 1982 herd district. Piercy brief, p. 14. This is 
completely false. 
While Mr. Kosterman did research notices published in newspapers pertaining to 
Canyon County herd districts, nowhere did Kosterman testify that he researched each 
page of each newspaper published in those 3 newspapers in 1982. Rather, Kosterman 
testified, he researched which newspapers were published in Canyon County in 1982 (as 
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noted above, he identified the Press Tribune, the Parma Review and Canyon Herald); and 
he attempted to locate the December 24, 1976 notice and the January 1, 1977 notice 
published regarding a herd district that is not at issue in this case. 
Though Mr. Kosterman was never asked to detail the scope of the research he 
performed when researching for publication of notice of hearing the petition at issue in this 
case, undersigned represents to the court that Kosterman reviewed the Idaho Press 
Tribune and the Parma Review for November and December 1982. It was simply too large 
a task to ask Kosterman to review every page of every newspaper that could have 
contained the notice of hea~ing the petition. As noted below, that task could easily take 
1500 hours or more, just to review the 1982 newspaper editions, and it would take another 
1500 hours or more to review those newspapers for each prior year that the notice might 
have been published. Moreover, it is Piercy's burden to establish the notice was not 
published. It was not Guzman's burden to establish that it was. 
The court will note that despite all of the witnesses called to testify, not a single 
witness testified that the County failed to follow statutory procedure in the enactment of the 
herd district. 
IT'S "OPEN SEASON" ON HERD DISTRICTS 
(OR, WHY THE FAILURE TO DESIGNATE A TIME 30 DAYS AFTER 
THE HERD DISTRICT ORDER WAS SIGNED FOR THE HERD 
DISTRICT TO TAKE EFFECT IS NOT FATAL TO THE ORDINANCE, 
AND A DISCUSSION OF ARGUELLO V. LEE, A CASE PIERCY 
INDICATED WAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO THE OUTCOME 
OF THIS CASE). 
As this Court knows, the insurers who insure ranchers in Idaho, perhaps fueled by 
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Millerv. Miller, 113 ldaho415(1987) have declared 
war on Idaho's herd districts. 
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Thus, Piercy's counsel attempted to invalidate the 1982 Canyon County herd district 
in the case of Gazzaway v. Johnson (Canyon County Case No. CV 07-2141 ). The 
defendant in that case, of course, was Piercy's witness in this case, E.G. Johnson. 
Piercy's counsel in that case raised precisely the same arguments that Piercy raises 
here. Judge Hoff upheld the validity of Canyon County's 1982 herd district in that case. A 
copy of her decision is attached as Exhibit A, and Guzman incorporates herein by 
reference Judge Hoff's legal reasoning as to the reasons Judge Hoff upheld the validity of 
the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
Piercy's counsel brought to this Court's attention the attack on the validity of an 
eastern Idaho herd district in the case of Arguello v. Lee. Attached as Exhibit B is a copy 
of counsel's letter to the court bringing the Arguello case to this Court's attention. 
Piercy's counsel obviously felt at the time that letter was sent that the Arguello case 
was an important case. Guzman's counsel agrees whole-heartedly with Piercy's counsel 
in this regard. 
Attached as Exhibit C is a copy of the Federal District Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order of October 8, 2008, in which the Federal District Court held that the 
herd district there at issue was validly formed. Because the defense in Arguello made 
many of the same arguments in that case that Piercy makes here, and because of the 
import Piercy obviously attached to the impending Federal District Court's decision in 
Arguello, the analysis of the Federal District Court deserves discussion in this brief. 
Guzman incorporates herein by reference both the legal authority cited by the Federal 
District Court in Arguello, and the legal reasoning advanced by that court in upholding the 
validity of the herd district under attack in that case. 
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In Arguello, the defense argued that "the herd district is invalid, and therefore the 
land is open range". Memorandum Decision, p. 5. 
Citing IC 31-857, Judge Winmilf noted that after two years, a presumption exists 
"that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such order have 
been properly and regularly taken ... " Memorandum Decision, p. 7. 
The Federal District Court noted that the defense in Arguello contended the herd 
district was invalid because (inter alia) the "County Commissioners did not comply with all 
steps preceding establishment of the herd district." Memorandum Decision, p. 7. 
Specifically, the defense argued that the County failed to publish notice of the hearing on 
the herd district petition in the newspaper, as required by the herd district statutes then in 
effect. The defense provided evidence that such notice was not published in the Rigby 
Star, the newspaper which ultimately published the commissioners' decision to create the 
herd district. However, plaintiffs presented evidence that in the year the herd district was 
created the county paid money to another newspaper, The Roberts Sentinel (though the 
record was devoid of any evidence showing why the county paid that money to that paper). 
Memorandum Decision, pps. 11-13. 
The Court concluded that the defense had failed to meet its burden of proof that 
proper notice was not published. 
Secondly, the defense in Arguello argued that the herd district was invalid because 
the commissioners failed to specify a time when the herd district was to take effect, which 
by statute must be at least thirty days after the making of the herd district order. It was 
undisputed that the herd district order failed to specify a date when it was to take effect. 
Memorandum Decision, p. 14. 
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Citing the treatise by McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations, Judge Winmill 
noted that "invalidity as to the effective date of an ordinance ... does not render the 
ordinance void", and that "The requirement of a certain period of time before an ordinance 
goes into effect 'is intended to enable the public to acquire knowledge of the ordinance 
before it becomes operative for any purpose'". Memorandum Decision, p. 14. 
Because the defense did not present any evidence that the rancher, or his 
predecessor-in-interest did not receive actual notice of the adoption of the ordinance, or 
that the defense was prejudiced somehow by the failure to give the statutorily required 30 
day grace period before the ordinance took effect, Judge Winmill upheld the validity of the 
ordinance, notwithstanding the undisputed failure of the county to provide for the thirty-day 
grace period before the ordinance went into effect. In so holding, Judge Winmill noted that 
"The power of the court to declare an ordinance invalid should be exercised cautiously, 
and, in fact, courts are reluctant to do so". (Citing the McQuillen treatise); Memorandum 
Decision, p. 15. 
Significantly, Judge Winmill attached great weight to the fact that the herd district 
had been in existence for many years. Again citing the McQuillen treatise, Judge Winmill 
said, "Significantly, '[c]ourts are loathe to construe an ordinance as invalid, where the 
ordinance has been in operation and unchallenged for many years, and where under it 
valuable rights have accrued which would be destroyed if the ordinance were held to be 
invalid.' " Memorandum Decision, pps 15-16. 
Judge Winmill then concluded, "The failure by the Commission to specify an exact 
time at which the herd district took effect is not sufficient reason for this court to invalidate 
the herd district." Memorandum Decision, p. 16. 
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Judge Winmill therefore held that the defense had "failed to carry their burden of 
overcoming the legal prima facie presumption of validity accorded an ordinance which has 
been on the books almost eighty years." Memorandum Decision, p. 16. 
Judge Winmill therefore rejected the defense's contention that the herd district was 
invalid, and held, as a matter of law, that the herd district was valid. Memorandum 
Decision, p. 17. 
As in Arguello, Piercy has failed to prove that he was prejudiced because the herd 
district ordinance went into effect less than 30 days after the order designating all of 
Canyon County herd district was signed. Perhaps if this car/bull wreck had occurred within 
30 days of the entry of the 1982 herd district ordinance Piercy could effectively argue he 
has been prejudiced. That, of course, is not the fact pattern this case presents to the 
Court. 
The ordinance has been on the books for 26 years. Notice of the creation of the . 
herd district was published in the Idaho Press Tribune on December 20, 1982. Joint 
Exhibit 10. 
Though now Piercy contends he did not know his land was in a herd district, such 
testimony is inherently not credible for a person who claims to be an "expert witness" on 
ranching in Canyon County, based upon his 30 years of ranching within the county. Even 
if such testimony were credible, ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
Piercy can claim he has always "known" his pasture was in open range, but that 
wasn't his testimony on this issue when first asked, and his conduct suggests that he well 
knew that all of Canyon County was subject to herd district status. 
Thus, Piercy has failed to carry his burden, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
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he was prejudiced by the failure of the county commissioners to specify a date more than 
30 days after entry of the order, when the herd district would take effect. 
Moreover, Piercy acquired the pasture from which his bull escaped some twelve 
years ago, and there is no evidence his predecessor-in-interest was unaware of the herd 
district ordinance. Piercy Depa, pps. 93-94, attached. 
Finally, it is undisputed that notice of the creation of the 1982 herd district was 
published in the Idaho Press Tribune newspaper on December 20, 1982 (at a time when 
Piercy was admittedly ranching in Canyon County} and Piercy therefore has, at the very 
least, constructive knowledge of the ordinance. See Joint Exhibit 10. 
Guzman urges this Court to apply the same analysis as Judge Winmill applied in 
the Arguello case. Piercy has not demonstrated the failure of the county to provide a 30 
day grace period caused him prejudice, so the failure of the county to provide for such 30 
day grace period does not invalidate the ordinance. Moreover, as in Arguello, and as 
discussed in more detail below, the evidence in this case falls short of establishing clearly 
and convincingly that notice of hearing the petition was not published. 
WHERE'S THE PETITION? 
At the start of the county's case at trial, this Court inquired of Mr. Saari, "Where's 
the petition?" 
The Court's inquiry was direct and directly on point. The answer to the Court's 
question is simple. That is not the type of documentation the county retains in its archives. 
Piercy presented no evidence that the County has kept the petitions for the 18 (or 
more) herd districts created by the Canyon County Commissioners since 1908. There is 
no testimony by any county employee that the county keeps such documentation in the 
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regular course of business. Simply stated, the inability of the parties to locate the petition, 
in the complete absence of any proof that the County should have the petition, is 
meaningless. The inability of the parties to locate the petition is not probative of any issue 
before this court in the absence of proof that the county has retained and can produce the 
petitions for the 18 (or more) other herd districts created by the Canyon County 
Commissioners. 
This simple truth, coupled with the fact that no witness has testified that there did 
not exist an antecedent petition, renders meaningless Piercy's arguments that, "We can 
not find the petition, therefore it must never have existed." 
Further, the absence of any reference to the petition in the County's records is not 
proof that there was no petition. In Garrett Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 
33 P.2d 743 (1933), Garrett attempted to argue Oust as Piercy argues here) that there 
were procedural irregularities in the enactment of a statute, and that the statute was 
therefore unenforceable. The Idaho Supreme Court identified Garrett's allegations, and 
resolved such issues as follows: 
The appellant claims that the law was not read on three separate days in 
each house prior to final vote; that no emergency existed warranting 
dispensing with such provision; it contained no emergency clause; was not 
read section by section; and no vote was taken by yeas and nays thereon; .. 
In re Drainage District No. 1, 26 Idaho, 311, 143 P. 299, L. R. A. 1915A, 
1210, announces the rule that it will not be presumed in any case from the 
mere silence of the journals that either house has exceeded its authority or 
disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of a legislative act, 
unless the Constitution has expressly required the journal to show the 
actions taken, as, for instance, where it requires the yeas and nays to be 
entered. 33 P.2d at 746. 
Garrett teaches that it will not be presumed that a legislative body exceeded its 
authority or disregarded a procedural step in the promulgation of a law, merely because 
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the records of that legislative body are silent as to whether such procedure was followed 
by the legislative body. Thus, Piercy's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, this 
Court must draw no conclusions from the failure of the County Commissioners' records to 
mention a petition for a herd district. 
Piercy attempts to argue that it must affirmatively appear in the County's records of 
the proceedings that the commissioners took all steps necessary to validly enact the herd 
district, and Piercy cites 2 cases in support of that claim: State v Caitlin, 33 Idaho 437 
(1921) and Smith v Canyon County, 39 Idaho 222 (1924). Firstly, the 2 cases cited by 
Piercy were over ruled by the Garrett Transfer case. 
Moreover, as Piercy as noted in his brief, after the Caitlin and Smith cases were 
decided the Idaho legislature enacted IC 31-857. The legislature is presumed to have 
knowledge of the holdings in Caitlin and Smith, and IC 31-857 (first enacted in 1935) is 
clearly the legislature's response to the holdings in those cases. IC 31-857 provides that 
after 2 years, it is presumed the county took all necessary action to properly enact the herd 
district ordinance. Thus, IC 31-857 and the Garrett case eliminate any need for the county 
records to document that the county complied with the requirements of the herd district 
statutes in the creation of the herd district. 
WAS NOTICE OF HEARING ON THE PETITON PUBLISHED? 
Piercy argues that the herd district is invalid because (he claims) no notice of 
hearing on the petition was published in a newspaper. As noted below, Piercy has simply 
failed to carry his ever-increasing burden that he has proved by clear and convincing 
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evidence that, twenty-six years ago, the county commissioners failed to publish such 
notice. 
In support of such claim Piercy offers the testimony of Karen Whychell (an 
employee of the Saetrum law firm) and the testimony of David Lloyd (a former employee of 
the Saetrum law firm; also, Mr. Lloyd is married to Ms. Whychell). 
Whychell and Lloyd testified that (between them) they read every page of the Idaho 
Press Tribune that was published from January 1, 1982 through December 20, 1982, that 
they read every page of the Idaho Statesman for the dates January 1 , 1982 through 
December 20, 1982, and that they read every page of the Parma Review for the dates 
January 1, 1982 through December 20, 1982. Further, they testified, they found no notice 
published in any of those newspapers of a hearing on the petition for the 1982 herd 
district. While Guzman does not dispute the sincerity or integrity of Mr. Lloyd and Ms. 
Whychell, Guzman does question the effectiveness and accuracy of their search. 
The court will recall that both Mr. Lloyd and Ms. Whychell testified that the search 
was very tiresome and difficult. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more tedious, coma-
inducing task than to read 30,000 pages. of fine print newspaper on microfiche in a 
historical society's office. To say that under such circumstances there is ample opportunity 
to over-look exactly that which you seek, is a gross understatement. 
A few simple comments on the evidence will illustrate this point more clearly. 
The court will recall that Paul Kosterman, an employee of Chasan and Walton and a 
graduate of the University of Idaho College of Law (Mr. Kosterman has not yet secured his 
license to practice law) also testified on the issue of publication of the notice of hearing on 
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the petition. 
Mr. Kosterman testified that in 1982 there was a third newspaper published in 
Canyon County: the Canyon Herald. This paper was published until August 25, 1982. 
Piercy presented no evidence that this paper was searched to determine whether notice of 
hearing the petition was published in this paper. 
Mr. Kosterman testified as to the difficulty of finding a single, specific legal notice in 
the Idaho Press Tribune. The court will recall that in January 1977 the Canyon County 
Commissioners entered an order declaring all of Canyon County a herd district (see Joint 
Exhibit 8). The County Commissioners soon thereafter rescinded that order. See Joint 
Exhibit 9. However, the county's records reflect that notice of the hearing on the proposed 
herd district was published in the Idaho Press Tribune on December 24, 1976 and January 
1, 1977. See Joint Exhibit 8. 
Paul Kosterman attempted to locate such notices in the Idaho Press Tribune by 
searching the Idaho Historical Society's copies of that newspaper. Despite the fact 
Kosterman knew the exact dates such notices were published, he could not locate either 
notice on his first read through of the Idaho Press Tribune for those dates of publication. 
After he was supplied with a copy of the December 24, 1976 published notice, Kosterman 
went back to the historical society and this time was able to locate the December 24, 1976 
notice. Interestingly, this notice was not published alongside the other legal notices 
published that day in that paper; rather, it was located in the bottom left corner of page A-
12 of the paper, next to a nearly full page K-Mart advertisement. See Joint exhibit 11. It 
was, for all intents and purposes, camouflaged, or hidden, by both its location and by the 
failure of the newspaper to group the notice with the other legal notices published that day. 
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Kosterman never was able to find the notice published in that newspaper on 
January 1 , 1977. 
There is good cause to believe that the January 1, 1977 notice was published. The 
county documented that such notice was published (Joint Exhibit 8). It is curious why one 
can not find the notice. Perhaps the historical society does not have every page of the 
newspapers in question (and in fact, there has been no testimony that the Idaho Historical 
Society does have on microfiche each and every page of each newspaper for the relevant 
time periods). Perhaps, like the December 24, 1976 notice, the January 1, 1977 notice 
was published in an obscure location of that day's paper, away from the other legal notices 
published that day. 
Which of course leads to the conclusion that perhaps notice of hearing the 1982 
petition was published in a Canyon County newspaper, but no one has found the notice, 
(1) because of the sheer volume of material that needs to be reviewed with a fine tooth 
comb, or (2) because the notice may well be published in an obscure location, or (3) 
because the notice was published in the Canyon Herald. 
The Court will recall that Ms. Whychell and Mr. Lloyd could not recall how many 
hours they expended looking for the published notice. But the testimony of Mr. Kosterman 
sheds some important light on the magnitude of the job Ms. Whychell and Mr. Lloyd faced. 
With regard to the Idaho Press Tribune alone, Kosterman testified that there were 
approximately 10,367 pages published in 1982. Piercy has admitted into evidence 678 
pages of that newspaper, or a mere 7% of the total pages published that year. Piercy 
failed to put into evidence 9,689 pages that the Idaho Press Tribune published in 1982. In 
other words, the evidence is lacking 93% of the pages the Idaho Press Tribune published 
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that year. 
Carefully reading a full page of newsprint on microfiche is a time consuming task. 
Kosterman testified that it takes a researcher three minutes, on average, to review a page 
of the newspaper. Certainly some pages will take longer than three minutes (those pages, 
for example, with legal ad after legal ad). The longer one attempts to read fine print on 
microfiche, the slower one reads. The eyes grow tired. The mind wanders. One must get 
up from time to time to take a break. Allotting three minutes per page, when reviewing 
over 10,000 pages, is a very conservative estimate. 
At three minutes per page, it would take a researcher 31, 101 minutes, or over 518 
hours, to review the 10,367 pages published by the Idaho Press Tribune in 1982. 
Assuming a 40 hour work week, it would take almost 13 weeks (12.96 weeks, to be 
precise) to review all10,367 pages of the Idaho Press Tribune. While Mr. Saetrum's 
employees were a bit coy about the amount of time expended reviewing the Idaho Press 
Tribune, a fair reading of the record discloses that they did not spend anywhere near that 
much time researching whether such notices were published in that newspaper. 
The task vis-a-vis the Idaho Statesman would be even greater, given that it is a 
larger (more pages) newspaper. 
It is reasonable to conclude that, between the Idaho Press Tribune, the Idaho 
Statesman and the Parma Review, Mr. Saetrum's employees were tasked with the job of 
reviewing some 30,000 pages of tiny newsprint on microfiche at the Idaho Historical 
Society. At 3 minutes per page, it would take 90,000 minutes to do a credible job of 
reviewing those pages. 90,000 minutes is 1,500 hours, or 37.5 work weeks at 40 hours 
per week. 
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However, since the Historical Society's offices are open only 3 work days per week, 
it would take a minimum of 21.5 weeks for a researcher to review all 10,367 pages of the 
Idaho Press Tribune published in 1982 (518 hours divided by 24 hours/week); and it 
would take 62.5 weeks to review all 30,000 pages of the Idaho Press Tribune, the Idaho 
Statesman, and the Parma Review (1500 hours divided by 24 hours of work perweek). Of 
course, such a scenario assumes the researcher worked only on this case 3 days per 
week for 62.5 weeks, and it also assumes the researcher is capable of working 8 hours per 
day without any breaks (though the evidence clearly establishes one must take regular 
breaks while doing this type of tedious research). The evidence reflects that Ms. Whychell 
did not work only on this case while researching the Canyon County newspapers; she also 
worked on other cases during the time frame that she researched for this case. 
In summary, the research effort put forth by Mr. Saetrum's employees was wholly 
inadequate to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the notice of hearing on the 
petition was not published in the 3 newspapers those employees reviewed. 
And, as pointed out, Mr. Saetrum's employees failed to even research a fourth 
Canyon County newspaper where the notice might have been published, the Canyon 
Herald. 
In summary, though an effort was made to determine whether notice was published 
in three of the four newspapers in which the notice could have been published, the record 
is cl ear that the effort extended fell far short of the Herculean effort required to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that no notice of hearing was published. 
Guzman submits that this court must reach the same result Judge Winmill reached 
in Arguello v. Lee. Because Piercy has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
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notice of hearing the 1982 petition was not pubfished, this Court must sustain the validity 
of the 1982 ordinance. As noted by Judge Winmill, the strength of the presumption 
favoring the validity of the ordinance grows over time, as the ordinance remains on the 
books and is actively enforced. 
Finally, the record is completely silent as to when a proper petition might have been 
submitted to the County Commissioners. For example, if the petition had first been 
presented to the County Commissioners in November 1981, notice of hearing the petition 
might well have been published in a newspaper in November 1981. Mr. Saetrum's office 
did not research the newspapers for notices of hearing published in 1981, or 1980, or 
1979. It appears from reviewing the 1982 Order that this was a topic the County 
Commissioners had been dealing with for some time, since the Order recites that, "The 
Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd District Boundaries ... " (emphasis 
added). Joint Exhibit 7. 
The record offered by Piercy is just as consistent with the notion that the 
Commissioners had wrestled with the issue of creating the subject herd district, pursuant to 
a proper petition, for years prior to the 1982 Order, and that a hearing had been held and 
notice thereof properly published years before December 1982. IC 31-857 requires the 
Court to presume such. Piercy has the nearly impossible task of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that no newspaper published the required notice in 1981, or 1980, or 
1979, etc. Piercy's proof falls far short of establishing by clear and convincing evidence 
that such notice was not published. 
METES AND BOUNDS DESCRIPTION 
Piercy argues the ordinance is invalid because it does not contain a metes and 
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bounds description of the herd district as (allegedly) required by IC 25-2402. It appears 
from the record that the order establishing this herd district was accompanied by a map, 
which map substantially satisfies the requirement for an accurate legal description of the 
herd district. 
Secondly, the ordinance had the effect of making the entire county subject to herd 
district status, and the legal description of the county is contained in the Idaho Code (IC 
31-116). Thus any court can take judicial notice of the land area subject to herd district 
status. 
Finally, the herd district statutes did not require the herd district order to contain a 
metes and bounds description; rather, the statute only required that the petition contain a 
metes and bounds description. See IC 25-2402. If this case is to be decided on 
technicalities (as advocated by Piercy), Piercy can not be heard to complain that the order 
does not contain a metes and bounds description when the statute does not require the 
order to contain a legal description. 
Similarly, Piercy challenges the validity of the herd district order by contending that 
since the order does not identify the animals regulated by the herd district the order is 
invalid. But, as Piercy himself notes, IC 25-2404 did not require that the order specify the 
animals to which the herd district would apply. 
Piercy contends that Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 are the map referred to in the 1982 order 
creating the herd district that encompassed Piercy's pasture. That can not be true. 
The Order (Joint Exhibit 7) expressly states that a "Herd District be established in 
the three remaining open range areas in Canyon County as shown on the attached survey 
map (marked in black)." Neither Joint Exhibit 1 nor Joint Exhibit 2 have any areas marked 
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in black, so neither map can be the map referred to in the order. 
The truth is, no one knows who made Joint Exhibits 1 and 2, or when or why they 
were made. Record, p. 142. Afso, while the 2 maps are similar, it is not clear that Joint 
Exhibit 1 is a copy of Joint Exhibit 2. 
At the end of the day, there is so much confusion from the status of the County's 
record that it can not be said that Piercy has conclusively established anything. 
THE CANYON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS DID NOT IMPROPERLY 
INCLUDE OPEN RANGE AREAS IN THE 1982 ORDINANCE 
At the time the 1982 herd district was created, Idaho recognized that land could 
either be within a herd district (or a city, town or village), or land could be within open 
range, or land could be in a hybrid area that was neither herd district nor open range 
(because the land was enclosed, or because the land was not historically used for grazing, 
etc). In the case of Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978), the Idaho 
Supreme Court, interpreting the 1963 herd district statutes that apply to this case said: 
Prior to 1963, herd districts could be created in any part of Idaho. It is 
clear the amendment of l.C. s 25-2402 by the inserting of a definition of 
"open range" was designed to protect the rights of livestock owners by 
prohibiting herd districts in areas where they historically grazed stock, rather 
than limiting the area where livestock owners were free to let their stock 
roam at large. Under our decision, herd districts may still be created in any 
area not within "open range" as defined in l.C. s 25-2402. 
Thus, at the time the County Commissioners created the 1982 herd district, it was 
permissible for the county to do so if the land was enclosed (Piercy testified all livestock in 
Canyon County is enclosed; Piercy depo, pps 40-45) or if the land had not historically 
been used for open range grazing. rn any event, Piercy has presented no proof that the 
1982 herd district order included lands that were unenclosed, or lands upon which 
livestock had historically grazed. 
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Finally, with regard to the argument that the County Commissioners themselves 
referred to the land to be encompassed by the 1982 herd district order as open range is of 
little consequence. Absent proof that the land in question was unenclosed and historically 
used for grazing, the commissioners' reference to the land as open range does not prove 
clearly and convincingly that it was open range. Rather, the commissioners simply used 
the phrase 'open range' to identify that the land was not in a previously established herd 
district. 
Thus the County Commissioners did not impermissibly include open range in the 
herd district. 
PIERCY'S CLAIM THAT THE ORDINANCE IS INVALID 15 BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IC 5-224 
Piercy attacks the validity of an ordinance that has been on the books for 26 years. 
In Canady vs. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company, 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830 (1911 ), the 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff's claim that the city of Coeur d'Alene's enactment 
of an ordinance was procedurally flawed and therefore invalid, was barred by the statute of 
limitations. In short, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled, nearly 100 years ago, that a 
landowner who believes an ordinance was improperly enacted can not simply sit upon his 
rights indefinitely. In Canady, the landowner only waited 9 years after enactment of the 
ordinance before suing to attempt to invalidate the ordinance. 
Of course, in this case, Piercy sat on his rights some 25 years before he asked a 
court to have the ordinance declared invalid. 
In Canady, the city enacted a series of ordinances that vacated certain streets and 
alleys, and granted a franchise to the lumber company so that the lumber company could 
build part of its manufacturing operations on the land occupied by those streets and alleys. 
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With complaints eerily similar to those raised by Piercy in this case, Plaintiff Canady 
complained that no petition had been circulated regarding the passing of such ordinances, 
as required by Idaho statute. 
With regard to the statute of limitations defense, the Court said: 
It is next contended that appellant's cause of action, if she had one, 
was barred by the statute of limitations ( subd. 1 of section 4054 and sections 
4037, 4038, and 4060, Rev. Codes). We think, under the facts of this case, 
that this action is barred by the statute of limitations: and that this action 
should have been brought at least within five years from the date such cause 
of action arose. We think it sufficiently appears that appellant sat by when 
Ordinances Nos. 71 and 75 were passed in 1900, and more than nine years 
before this action was commenced, and made no complaint of any damages 
having been sustained to her property by reason of said ordinances and the 
vacation of the streets. And, again, in 1905, when Ordinance No. 115 was 
passed, she made no protest or objection of any kind. She knew that the 
Ccaur d'Alene Lumber Company was expending a great deal of money in 
establishing its lumber plant upon said blocks and a portion of one of the 
streets, and made no protest of any kind whatever to the city, and made no 
claim for damages to her property as resulting from the passage of said 
ordinances. The first time she complained of damage to her property, so far 
as the record shows, was when she commenced this action, June 15, 1909. 
120 P., at 835. 
Despite his protestations to the contrary, Piercy knew his pasture was in a herd 
district. He testified he is an "expert" on ranching in Canyon County, having ranched there 
for 30 years or more. Everyone else knew the entire county was subject to herd district 
status, including E. G. Johnson, Piercy's witness and fellow Canyon County rancher. 
Moreover, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Finally, at the very least, Piercy had 
constructive knowledge of the creation of the herd district, as notice of the creation of the 
herd district was published in the Idaho Press Tribune on December 20, 1982. See Joint 
exhibit 10. 
One of the reasons courts recognize the statute of limitations defense (which both 
Guzman and Sutton have asserted in their Answers to Piercy's Complaint for Declaratory 
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) 
Relief) is to prevent litigation of claims, the outcome of which depends on evidence that 
has been lost to the mists of time. 
Two of the three commissioners who signed the herd district ordinance are dead. 
Neither the surviving commissioner, nor the Canyon County Clerk in 1982, have any 
recollection about the events surrounding the creation of the herd district. Piercy has not 
produced a single witness who can testify that the county failed to follow proper procedure 
26 years ago. Memories have faded, and documents have been discarded or gone 
missing. 
The County has enforced the herd district ordinance for 26 years. Piercy has 
benefited from the ordinance, both when he traveled the roads of the county, and because 
other ranchers' livestock were required to be fenced in so they would not damage Piercy's 
crops, or mix with Piercy's livestock. Guzman relied upon the law. Valuable rights were 
protected and advanced by the 1982 ordinance. 
IC 5-224 and the Canady case operate to bar Piercy's prosecution of this claim for 
declaratory relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. What is in dispute is (1) whether Piercy, or 
the County, has the burden of proof, and (2) whether Piercy has carried his burden by 
clear and convincing evidence that the herd district law under which Piercy has farmed, 
ranched, and traveled these last 25 years is invalid. 
Piercy would have this Court strike down that law. It would be easy under current 
law, Piercy argues, for the County to create a county wide herd district if the ordinance is 
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struck down. 
Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. Obtaining a petition for a herd 
district in this new millenium, signed by thousands of county residents, presents enormous 
logistical issues. 
Perhaps Piercy believes the functional equivalent of a herd district could be created 
using the procedure identified in 25-2401 (2), but if so, Piercy mis-reads that statute. 
Under that statute the county can control animals by ordinance only if a panel of 5 
(including 2 livestock association representatives) "concludes that the creation, 
modification or elimination of a herd district is insufficient to control or regulate the 
movement of livestock" in the area to be regulated. Exactly what this means is unknown. 
But it certainly does not mean that all a county has to do is slap a panel of 5 people 
together with instructions to create a county wide herd district. The 2 livestock association 
representatives will object to the herd district. If the 5th member of the panel (who the 
livestock representatives helped choose) concurs, the ordinance will fail. And, one 
wonders exactly how creation of a herd district would be "insufficient to control .... the 
movement of livestock" in the county; but that is exactly what IC 25-2401 says the panel 
must conclude before it can create the ordinance which Piercy says is so easily created. 
Thus, this Court's decision in this case is a significant event; one that will deeply 
impact the citizens of this county. 
There is a reason the Courts require Piercy to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the ordinance was not validly enacted. People die. Memories fade. 
Documents and records are lost. 
What kind of Pandora's box do we open when we force government to prove (as 
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Piercy claims the county must) that laws enacted 25, or 50, or 150 years ago, were validly 
enacted. 
Could the state of Idaho prove today, for example, that the state's constitution was 
validly enacted on that hot, sweltering day, the 3rd of July, 1890? Could the State prove 
that all procedures required to have been accomplished in the enactment of the 
Constitution were in fact accomplished? Does the requisite documentation even still exist? 
While we don't have the 1982 petition, we don't have a single petition for the other 
18 or so herd districts that exist in Canyon County. Are those 18 herd districts invalid? 
And while no one has located the published notice of hearing the petition, can it be 
seriously contended that there is clear and convincing evidence that the notice was never 
published? The Herculean task required to prove that the notice was not published 
certainly has not been completed in this case, based on the evidence before this court. 
Not a single witness has testified that there was no petition, or that no notice of 
hearing was published. 
In Gazzaway v. E.G. Johnson Farms, Judge Hoff rejected the precise arguments 
Piercy has raised in this case. If Piercy must carry his burden of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence, it does not seem possible that one judge could conclude the 
ordinance was validly enacted, while another could conclude it was not. 
Piercy is correct when he notes that Piercy noticed up and took a boatload of 
depositions of County personnel to try to track down the petition. The problem is, Piercy 
noticed up and took depositions of people who, for the most part, weren't there in 1982 
when the deed was done. Yet Piercy points to that pile of depositions and says, "Look. 
We deposed all these folks and they never heard of a petition." Of course, such evidence 
Plaintiff Guzman's Post-Trial Memorandum is Support of Upholding the Validity of Canyon County's 1982 Herd District Statement -31-
799 
proves nothing. 
And the two witnesses who were there at the time, Mr. Koch and Mr. Staker, don't 
know if a petition was, or was not presented; nor do they know if notice of hearing the 
petition was, or was not, published. 
So what has Piercy proved? Precious little. Only that he can make some clever 
arguments that "prove" there was no petition, or no notice published. But his proof is 
hollow. It is not clear and convincing. 
It is not clear and convincing because we cannot peer through the mists of time to 
that time in the late 1970s and the early 1980s when the events of this case occurred. So 
we can never re-create exactly what did occur back then. 
And if we can not know clearly and convincingly all of the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of this ordinance, Piercy's declaratory judgment suit must fail. 
Judge Winmill wisely concluded in the Arguello v Lee case that, ""The power of the 
court to declare an ordinance invalid should be exercised cautiously, and, in fact, courts 
are reluctant to do so". 
Guzman requests this Court to exercise its power cautiously. Guzman asks this 
Court to reject Piercy's Petition for Declaratory Relief, and hold that the County's 1982 
herd district ordinance was validly enacted. 
_'//-r--
DATED this \.XtD day of November, 2008. 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
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Case No. CV 07-2141 
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E.G. JOHNSON FARMS,. INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
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ORDER 
Defendant having filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and this Court having reviewed 
the parties' briefing memoranda and exhibits, and this Court having heard the parties' oral 
arguments on July 26> 2007 and on October 25, 2007, this oourt is prepared to enter its decision as 
follows: 
IT IS ORDERED JHAT Defendant> s motion for summary judgment js denied, based upon 
thi.s court's legal analysis contained in the October 25, 2007 hearing transcript. 
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CALDWELJ..1 l 
Thursday, October 25, 2.007, 9:12 a.m. 
4 THE COURT: The next matter, Gazzaway versus 
5 )ohnson Farms. This Is a case that I previously heard 
6 arguments from counsel. And that was on July 26. At 
7 that time the motion on the -- plaintiff's motion to 
8 strike affidavits essentially was no longer at issue and 
9 summary judgment was the remaining issue. I didn't rule 
10 on that case because there was a similar case pending 
11 before another judge. A decision was made on that case, 
12 and Mr. Gates, who's present on behalf of the defendant, 
13 had served that on me and on Mr. Gunnell, who's here on 
14 behalf of the plaintiff, 
15 Because of that document, I caused a 
16 conference call yesterday to be placed to both counsel 
17 to determine if they wanted to stay these proceedings 
18 and await further decision in that matter. I was 
19 advised by both counsel that neither party wanted to 
20 sl:ay this action and that both sides were ready to 
21 proceed with any further argument today and decision of 
22 the court. 
23 Is that your understanding, Mr. Gunnell? 
24 
25 
MR. GUNNELL: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gates? 
1 
1 MR. GATES; Yes, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: All right. In the meantime, there has 
3 been additional documentation provided by Mr. Gates, and 
4 I did have a chance to review that and prior arguments 
5 of counsel yesterday. I will permit counsel to comment 
6 further at this time. 
7 Mr. Gunnell -- or Mr. Gates? 
8 MR. GATES: Thank you, Your Honor. l don't know 
9 whether it would serve the court best If I went through 
10 the - all of our entire arguments again, but let me 
11 first address the issue of what were the boundaries of 
12 the Notus herd district at the time of the initial 
13 designation of their district and then after Gem and 
14 Payette counties were taken out of Canyon County back in 
15 1915 and 1917. 
16 THE COURT: That's actually what you had submitted 
17 as a -
18 MR. GATES: That's correct. 
19 THE COURT: -- supplement. It was a multiple-page 
20 document, not one page, actually, on the Notus herd 
- 21 district. 
22 MR.. GATES: That's correct. 
23 THE COURT: You may proceed, 
NO. 3946 p' 4 10/25/07 
1 northern part on County, basically rede.signated 
2 the herd districts in 19:1.S. The oniy change to the 
3 Notus herd district was that the northern part of it was 
4 lopped off at the county line. The western border, 
5 which is the one that we're concerned with, remained at 
6 Fountain Road, which is approximately one mile east of 
7 where the accident between the truck and the cow took 
8 place, and It's certainly outside the area of where the 
9 cow came from. 
10 So if the court has any other questions on 
11 that. That's the only argument, additional argument 
12 that we have, except to say that plaintiff has baslcally 
13 argued that the 1963 version of the Notus herd district 
14 which puts the west border about a mlle west of the 
15 original herd district western border is the true one. 
16 Your Honor, if we did that1 this herd 
17 district, which was unfortunately described by using a 
18 voting precinct as its boundaries, would become a moving 
19 target, and the herd district could be changed whenever 
20 the voting precinct borders were changed. And, frankly1 
21 if that happened there would be a lack of due process 
22 there because of the statute, Idaho Code Section 
23 25-2402, would not be followed with regard to any 
24 modification or change in herd districts. 
25 So it's our position, Your Honor, thatthe 
3 
1 1918 herd district redesignation which put the western 
2 border at Fountain Road is the correct one. And we 
3 still reiterate our previous arguments that the 1982 
4 Canyon County herd district was illegally adopted for 
5 the various reasons that we have gone over once before. 
6 And I don't want to take up the court's time with 
7 rearguing everything. But suffice It to say that there 
8 are at least eight difficulties with that particular 
a ordinance1 and it should be Invalidated. 
10 All those arguments aside, Your Honor, the 
11 Notus herd district does contain federal land which has 
12 been used for grazing based on the affidavits that we 
13 submitted quite some time ago. And under the statute 
14 regarding herd district as it now stands, we maintain 
15 that because it does contain ~Mera! grazing land that 
16 the Notus herd district Itself could be Invalidated if 
17 this court determines that the 1963 version of the Notus 
18 voting precinct is the correct one. 
19 So other than that, Your Honor, we renew our 
20 arguments requesting summary judgment on behalf of 
21 Johnson Farms and would request an order on that. Thank 
22 you. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gates. 
- 24 MR.. GATES: The Canyon County commissioners, after 24 Mr. Gunnell.? 
25 the state had created two new counties out of the 25 
2 
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1 to the latest argument by the mo arty for summary 
2 judgment, we'd ask the court to give more consiqeration 
3 to the most recent legal description of the Notus voting 
4 precinct which Included the area where this incident 
5 occurred and which was provided by the defense, by 
6 defense counsel, as the appropriate district in earlier 
7 affidavits for the -- that voting -- or the boundaries 
3 of that voting precinct. And it's cettalnly not -- a 
9 lot more recent than the 90-yearrold version of the 
10 Notus precinct. 
11 In any event, Your Honor, we believe that the 
12 court should reject the argument that the 1982 ordinance 
13 is invalid. Your Honor, Idaho Code Section 31-857 says, 
14 ''A legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared to 
15 exist, after a lapse of two years from the date of such 
16 order1' with regard to herd -- herd and other districts. 
17 Presumption of validity. 
18 And It's our argument, Your Honor, that this 
19 matter could have been taken up with the commission long 
20 ago. It's 25 years old. This county has known for 25 
21 years that it's a closed district. 
22 The -- I find it ironic that now the defendant 
23 is saying that if there had been a petition, he wouldn't 
24 have signed it. Well, he's known it's been a closed 
25 district for 25 years and has done nothing about it 
5 
1 until this incident occurred. 
2 In fact, the property damage claim was paid 
3 readily for my dient's vehicle, right away, as is 
4 usually the case and has been going on for years. And 
5 the commissioners did a good thing by dosing the --
6 this district based upon the growth of this area. 
7 People need -- people have relied upon that, that it is 
8 a closad district, for years. 
9 This is a strong presumption, and it requires 
10 clear and i:onvincing evidence to overcome. 
11 The Supreme Court has stated that the court 
12 will not presume a procedural irregularity in the face 
13 of silence as to procedures taken If the defense has not 
14 shown enough evidence to show that the irregularities 
15 existed. 
16 The Idaho Code Section 25r2404 says, 
17 "Commissioners shall make an order creating such herd 
18 districts, In accordance with the prayer of the 
19 petition, or with such modifications as it may choose to 
20 make." And we believe the defendant has failed to 
21 overcome that presumption. 
22 Also, Your Honor, we reiterate our argument 
23 that the current law as amended in 1996 clearly states, 
24 "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any 
25 herd district or herd ordinance In full force and effect 
6 
1 prior to Janua 
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990, but shall apply to any 
2 modification thereof." 
3 The Miller case simply does not apply. That 
4 was dealing with a herd district that was created after 
5 1983. This herd district was created In 1992. So with 
6 that, Your Honor, with what we've submitted, we'd ask 
7 that the court deny the summciry judgment motion. Thank 
S you. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 Did you want to respond, Mr. Gates? 
11 MR. GATES: Just briefly, Your Honor. With 
12 respect to the 1982 ordinance, essentially plaintiff is 
13 asking us to prove a negative. Plaintiff has come up 
14 with no supporting evidence of his own saying that this 
15 statute Is valid. We have to <:ome up with evidence 
16 showing that it's invalid. 
17 If the presumption M- the statutory 
18 presumption is so strong, then, Your Honor, not even an 
19 unconstitutional ordinance could ever be Invalidated, 
20 because you'd always be trying to prove a negative which 
21 is difficult, as the court knows. 
22 So we believe that the ordinance, number one, 
23 Is Invalid on its face, because it fails to meet the 
24 standards set out in the 1963 version of Idaho Code 
25 Section 25-2402 in that It included open range areas. 
1 
1 And it said right in the ordinance, we're going to 
2 include all of the rest of the open range areas in 
3 Canyon County. WeJI, the 1963 version of the statute 
4 says that open range -- that herd districts cannot be 
5 o-eated out of open range areas. So right there the 
6 statute is Invalid. 
7 Plus there was no enactment date when the 
8 statute was going to go into effect. The -- there's no 
9 description of the animals who are affected by the herd 
10 district. There was no notice that we could find either 
11 in the recorder's office or at the newspapers that were 
12 published at that time, There was no petition that we 
13 could find in the recorder's office. So we believe that 
14 there were adequate reasons for invalidating the 1982 
15 herd district ordinance. 
16 With regard to the 1990 amendment of Idaho 
17 Code Section 25M2402, we'd just remind the court that at 
18 the end of the -- or in the statute -- that's 
19 25-2402(2)(a), which says, "Notwithstanding any other 
20 provision of law to the contrary, no herd district 
21 shall: Contain any lands owned by the United States of 
22 America or the state of Idaho, upon which the grazing of 
23 livestock: has historically been permitted." 
24 That seems fairly clear and straightforward. 
25 It's this court's duty to interpret that statute. And 
8 
aring 
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1 we maintain that that ls clear. T district 
2 cannot contain either state or federai iands. 
3 And with that, Your Honor, we thank you again 
4 and again request that we be granted summary judgment. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. 
6 This is cm intriguing case. Both sides have 
7 spent a considerable period of time. We've been looking 
8 at old minutes from county commissioners meetings. 
9 We've been looking at maps, affidavits from 
10 commissioners from years ago, 25 years ago, at the time 
11 that the second herd district supposedly was set up In 
12 Canyon County. 
13 Factually, I find that on September 23, 2006, 
14 the plaintiff in this case was operating a pickup truck 
15 which collided with a cow on Highway 20/26 between Notus 
16 and Pcirma. And that location where that accident 
17 occurred, of course, is the focal point of the arguments 
18 before me. The plaintiff's truck was damaged, and the 
19 plaintiff suffered injuries and brought the instant suit 
20 i:lQainst the defendant, Johnson Farms, who had care of 
21 the cow at the time of this accident. 
22 The defendant livestock owner contends that 
23 the accident occurred in open range because the 1982 
24 Canyon County ordinance placing the subject property 
25 into a herd district was improperly adopted. 
9 
1 Essenticilly, I'm being called upon to analyze 
2 the appllcabllity of two statutes, the 1907 statute on 
3 herd districts and then the 1983 statute. 
4 The 1907 stcitute h;;id a mandate. Specifically 
5 the board of -- and this Is a quote. ''The board of 
6 county commissioners of each county in the state shall 
7 have the power to create herd districts In such county 
8 as hereafter provided." 
9 And it's kind or interesting, because in 
10 statutory construction the attorneys and myself are 
11 always looking to "may" and "shall." The caption 
12 heading for the statute says, "Commissioners may create 
13 herd districts." It does contain the "shall." 
14 The 1980 hei:d district that Mr. Gates 
15 continues to argue is applicable here would place the 
16 accident site outside a herd district and in open range. 
17 Is that correct? 
18 MR. GATES: If I understand Your Honor correctly, 
19 yes, the -- based upon what we were able to determine 
20 and based upon the herd district statute -- or, excuse 
• 21 me, the herd district map which was submitted with the 
22 1982 Canyon County ordinance, yes, that the location of 
23 the accident did occur in open range and, furthermore, 
24 the cow came from an area that was previously open 
25 range, 
10 
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THE CO All right. Okay. 
Now, that old statute required, then, a 
majority of the landowners in any -- and this is 
25-2402. A majorlty of the landowners in any area or 
district prescribe by metes and bounds, not Including 
open range, and/or also resident and qualified electors 
of the state of Idaho. And then it's may petition the 
bo1ird of county commissioners in writing to <:reate such 
area a herd district. 
So I view that -- and I'll talk a little bit 
more about statutory interpretation as a citizen option. 
The second statute which the plaintiff argues 
is applicable is the 1983 statute. And there had been 
some litigation, and that was discussed by both sides 
regarding whether BLM lands could be Included. But that 
amendment or that statute in 1983 essentially amended 
two matters. And that was that the herd district could 
not contain any lands owned by the United States and 
managed by the BLM and then, secondly, the subpart, not 
particularly relevant here, but was that the 
establishment of a herd district shall not result in a 
highway district being held liable. So there was a 
protection for liability of the highway district. 
This court concludes that the board proceeded 
to create a herd district in 1982, and ultimately I'm 
11 
required to apply the law that was In effect at that 
time. I'm called upon to interpret the statute as it 
existed in 1982. 
Under statutory interpretation, I cite Adamson 
versus Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, a 1999 Supreme Court 
case. And therein the file only quotes, "The court's 
primary duty in interpreting a statute is to give effect 
to the legislative intent and purpose of the statute. 
The leglslature's intent is ascertained from the 
statutory language, and the court may seek edification 
from the statute's legislative history and historical 
content at enactment.'' 
I ·also cite JQckson versus Hammersley, 72 
Idaho 301, a 1952 Supreme Court case. The rule -- the 
general rules of statutory construction also apply to 
the interpret of local ordinances. And obviously rm 
looking at the Canyon County ordinance at issue herein. 
Secondly I cite Lewiston versus Matthewson, 78 
ldaho 347 at page 351, a 1956 Idaho Supreme Court case, 
The rule, construction of an ordinance is a question of 
law for the court to determine. 
I also cite Ada County versus Gibson, 126 
Idaho 854 at page 856. This Is a Court of Appeals, 1995 
case. And I quote, "It is axiomatic that the objective 
in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the 
12 
Moti'H\t'taring 
1012~,q_~. 26. 2008 10: 55AM 
1 Intent of the legislative body that ted the act. 
2 Any such analysis begins with the ilteral language of 
3 the enactment. Where the statutory language is 
4 unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
5 legislative body must: be given effect, and there Is no 
6 occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
7 construction. Where the language of a statute or 
8 ordinance is ambiguous, however, the court looks to 
9 rules of construction for guidance.'' 
10 And I also cite for the aspect of presumption 
11 of validity the cases discussed by counsel. Boise City 
12 verstJs Better Homes, 72 Idaho 441 at page 447, a 1952 
13 Supreme Court case. Ordinances and resolutions of a 
14 municipal corporation are presumed valid until the 
15 contrary is shown. The burden is on the party who 
16 attacks such act to show the Illegality thereof. 
17 And then secondly with regard to the 
18 presumption of validity, Cole-Collister versus Boise, 93 
19 Idaho 558, a 1970 case at page 563. And therein the 
20 standard that Mr. Gunnell mentioned again this morning, 
21 that presumption has to be overcome by clearly, 
22 convincing, and uncontradicted evidence. 
23 With regard again to the presumption of 
24 validity statute, I cite 31·8S7, which addresses the 
25 presumption of validity of creation of herd districts 
13 
1 and provides that whenever any herd district be declared 
2 to be created by order of the board of county 
3 commissioners In any county of the state of Idaho -- and 
4 I stress -- a legal prima facie presumption is hereby 
5 declared to exist, after a lapse of two years from the 
6 date of the order. 
7 And finally with regard to presumption, I cite 
8 Benewah County Cattlemen's Association versus Benewah 
9 County, 105 Idaho 209, a 1983 case from the Supreme 
10 Court. And I quote. This is on page 214. "Within the 
11 legislative contemplation was a process whereby a 
12 majority of the landowners in an area could compel the 
13 county to create herd districts and thereby place upon 
14 livestock owners within such districts the duty to fence 
15 in their stock. We find nothing in that statutory 
16 scheme indicating counties may not exercise their police 
17 power to control rooming livestock, but rather must 
18 ignore any problems and wait until action is forced upon 
19 the county by presentation of a petition for the 
20 formation of a herd district." 
- 21 I conclude that the Canyon County Board of 
22 Commissioners followed the procedure set forth in Idaho 
23 Code 25-2402 as it was in 1982. lhey were not required, 
- 24 I conclude, to wait untll a majority of the landowners 
25 presented a petition. On the contrary, the board was 
14 
1 empowered b 
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case law and statutes to take the 
2 action they did in this case. 
3 Now, in addition to attacking the validity of 
4 the way that that proposition came before the county, 
5 Mr. Gates' clients also attacked further aspects in 
6 alleging there was a lack of publication, a lack of a 
7 description of livestock. And I am not convinced that 
8 he has overcome the presumption of validity, and I 
9 conclude he has not met his burden of proof In this 
10 matter. It's a high standard. And 25 years have 
11 lapsed. That's pretty compelllng In this case. 
12 So I don't see that -- and I have to indicate 
13 counsel did work very hard at bringing a lot of evidence 
14 In. But the evidence must be by clear, convincing, and 
15 I conclude at this time that has not been met. 
16 Further, there is no prohibition of BLM land 
17 on the 1982 statute. Therefore this court Is not 
18 empowered to lnvalldate the herd district as sought by 
19 the defendants. 
20 Idaho Code 31-857 states that after a herd 
21 district is created, I quote, "a legal prima fade 
22 presumption Is hereby dedared to exist, a~er a lapse 
23 of two years from the date of such order.n So we have 
24 well more than two years which nave lapsed. We have 25 
25 years. And, again, I don't find that the defendant has 
15 
1 overcome that strong presumption. 
2 The defendant has also argued that federal law 
3 preempts the field, and therefore the herd district is 
4 invalid. I do not find this argument to be compelling, 
5 because the federal statute that was relied upon does 
6 not cover the same subject matter as the herd district 
7 and applies to crimlnal prosecutions for trespassing on 
8 BLM land. So I did not find that argument to be 
9 compelling. 
10 I find the defendant has failed to meet its 
11 burden on summary judgment. The herd district is 
12 presumed valid. And although we did wait for the 
13 decision of one of my colleagues who is another district 
14 judge, I'm obviously not bound by that, so I guess I'm 
15 concluding differently. But both counsel Indicated that 
16 they prefer to have this court rule, and so rve gone 
17 ahead and ruled today. 
18 Now, what I'll have for my findings, formal 
19 findings and conclusions is the court reporter's 
20 transcript, and I'll be glad to sign that if nec~sary 
21 as written documentation. 
22 Mr. Gunnell, I will instruct you to prepare 
23 only an order indicating my final ruling in this matter, 
24 and then all of my legal conclusions will be contained 
25 of record. 
16 
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1 MR. GUNNELL: That'll be fi our Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Anything further from either side? 
3 MR. GATES: No1 Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, guys. 
5 MR. GUNNELL: Thank you. 
6 
1 (The proceedings concluded at 9:46 a.m.) 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
- 13 
14 
15 
- 16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
17 
Moti~aring 
NO. 3946 P. 8 1012s101 
NUV. :l6. :l008 10 : 56AM NO. 3946 P. 9 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
as. 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
I , KATHERINE J. KLEMETSON, RPR, CSR #436, one 
of the duly appointed qualified and acting official 
reporters of the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, do hereby certify that I reported in shorthand 
the evidence and proceedings adduced in the above and 
foregoing cause, and that I thereafter transcribed said 
shorthand notes into typewriting and that the within and 
foregoing pages constitute a fu l l, true and correct copy 
of the transcript of said evidence and to the best of my 
ability and according to my shorthand notes consisting 
of pages 1 through 18 , inclusive . 
I N WITNESS WHEREOF , I h a ve here unto set my 
hand this 5th day of No v ember , 2007 . 
lodged with me this day 
-----of , 2007. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk 
By : ------~~~--~~~~-' Deputy. 
18 
810 
. . 
. RYAN PECK'S SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 LETTER 
. . . REGARDING ARGUELLO v. LEE. , 
811 · .. · 
09/23/2008 16:37 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at law 
RODNBY R SAf?;IRUM 
ROBER.TR GATES 
KARYN WHYCHBLL 
DAVID W. LtoYD 
RYANB.P.Ecl( 
JEffREY S. HARR 
MICHAELA.POPE 
Via Facsimile: (208) 454-7442 
Honorable Gordon W. Petrie 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Re: Case Name: 
Case Number: 
Dear Judge Petrie: 
September 23, 2008 
PAGE 02/03 
101 S. CAPITOL.BLVD., SUITE 1800 
BOISE, lDAHO 83702 
P.0.BOX7425 
J30ISE, IDAHO 83707 
TEl.EPHONE: (208) 336-0484 
FACSIMll...E: (208) 336-0448 
E-MAIL: GENERAL@SAE1R.mvn:.AW.COM 
Rivera v. Piercy 
CV-05-4848 
This letter is to inform the Court of a case that is currently being litigated in U.S. District 
Court for District of Idaho in front of Judge B. Lynn Winmill. The case is named Perez-Robledo v. 
Lee, number CV06-485-E-BLW. This case deals with the Mud Lake/Terreton herd district in 
Jefferson County created in 1930. The defendants in that case have made the same arguments 
regarding the invalidity of the Mud Laketrerreton herd district as those submitted before your Court 
pursuant to Defendant Piercy' s motion to reconsider. The arguments made include that the inclusion 
of federal land in the boundaries of that herd district invalidate the entire herd district. The 
defendant's position also includes the due process argument of lack of published notice prior to the 
Jefferson County Commissioner's hearing to enact that herd district. The federal court has taken the 
matter under advisement. 
ATI'OlWEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO, MlNNEsOTA, OREGON ANb Ur AH 
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Judge Petrie 
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:LtH:kl:.:lbl:::l44!:l 
September 23, 2008 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES PAGE 03/03 
We thought to advise this Court, in the event that any ruling regarding federal land or due 
process issues by the federal court becomes precedential to this Court recognizing that this Court has 
not yet ruled on our motion for reconsideration. 
cc; Josh Evett (Via Facsimile) 
Chuck Saari (Via Facsimile) 
Tim Walton (Via Facsimile) 
Sincerely, 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
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IN TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
ROLANDOPEREZARGUELLO, ) 
) Case No. CV-06-485-E-BLW 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
0. LARRY LEE and CAROLYN ) 
LEE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court has before it Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 
81), Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 83), 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Testimony of Bryan Finkle 
(Docket No. 84), Plaintiffs' Objection to Additional Defense Expert Testimony 
(Docket No. 85), Plaintiffs' Motion to File Excess Pages (Docket No. 86), and 
Plaintiffs' Second Motion to File Excess Pages (Docket No. 104). The Court heard 
oral argument on the motions on September 11, 2008 and now issues the following 
decision. 
Memorandum Decision and Order - 1 
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BACKGROUND 
On December 4, 2004, Gabriel Gomez was killed and Rolando Perez was 
injured when their vehicle struck a cow owned by Larry and Carolyn Lee on 
Highway 33 in Jefferson County, Idaho. Plaintiffs contend that the Lees' 
negligence caused the accident. 
Earlier this year, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 
based in part on their admission in discovery that their land was in a herd district 
which, under Idaho law, obligated them to keep their animals fenced off from the 
public highways. In response to the motion, Defendants filed a motion to permit 
amendment of their admission concerning the status of their land. After hearing 
oral argument on the motions, the Court granted the Lees' motion seeking leave to 
withdraw their admission, and denied the motion for partial summary judgment. 
However, because the summary judgment motion relied heavily on Defendants' 
previous admission, the Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to do additional 
limited discovery and file a second motion for summary judgment. That motion 
and other related matters are now before the Court. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review 
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and 
Memorandum Decision and Order - 2 
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dispose of factually unsupported claims .... " Q?lotey_{;_grp,_y_,_Cq(Le(t.,_4JJ_fl,f;,_. 
317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the 
"principal tool[] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be 
isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwa.i-ranted 
consumption of public and private resources." [q._a! 'J'l.7- "(T]he mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute b.etween the parties will not defeat an otherwise 
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be 
no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Libe.rJ.y Lobb~. Inc.,_ 4 7.J_ l) .S_~.23b. 
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party,@.,_ ~t2~5_, and the Court must not make credibility findings. /{j._ On the 
other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from 
circumstantial evidence. Mr.LqZ[g_h]ip_v.: J,j71,Jl4.9J~._2gJ.2.9~,_ l:fQ.&_ (9~h_ Cix ,_ 12&.8). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. ld~~ergqlfX_V.:A.b_b_ey,_Z,Q.3_f Jg_I_OJ.9 ... lQ'ZQ. (~ti:Ci.r ... 
2001.)(en bane). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any 
affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply 
point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank 
y, Wunderman Cato Johnson. 2J2 F.3d 528, 532 {9th Cir.2000}. 
Memorandum Decision and Order - 3 
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Th.is shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence 
sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Id. at 256-57. The non-moving 
party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by her affidavits, or by the 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists. (;g[oJ~ ~]1 _ll..S ... ~t~i.4. 
II. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
In its earlier opinion in this matter, the Court explained in detail Idaho law 
regarding livestock areas. For ease of reference, the Court will give an overview of 
the law here. 
In Idaho, livestock areas outside of cities and villages fall into two categories 
- open range and herd districts. 4.c/..q_111s_op_v_, JJ]q11c_h_ar(l,_2.2.0_f!._2_d_l_2_1J~ 1217-
(l4.ali9J999}; see also kfgr.~lg714 y._4dqm~,_1_5)_£ . .39-5..:;.8:i. ~61(I..d.abQ29Q7}. 
Open range includes all areas of the state not within cities, villages, or already 
created herd districts. Animals may roam freely in open range areas without risk of 
owner liability. le/... "In herd districts, however, animals may not roam freely and 
owners incur a duty to keep livestock fenced." Id. 
Summarizing Idaho law as it relates to owners of animals which cause 
accidents on roads in either an open range or a herd district, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has identified six guiding principles: 
Memorandum Decision and Order - 4 
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( 1) the owners of domestic animals are not liable or 
negligent when the animals cause a highway collision in 
"open range" or when the animals are "lawfully on any 
highway," LC. . ..§.§_2.5_-211~, -2119; (2) ifthe "open range" 
or "lawful" conditions are not present, then the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur supplies an inference that the animal 
owner was negligent; (3) the inference can be 
supplemented by other evidence of the owner's 
negligence; (4) the inference can be rebutted by a 
satisfactory explanation or showing by the animal owner 
of proper care, enclosures, and any other evidence 
tending to negate the inference of the owner's 
negligence; (5) when properly placed at issue by the 
parties, the issues of lawful presence, inference of 
negligence, and rebuttal of the inference, are questions 
for the trier of facts; and (6), in any event, the vehicle 
owner may be liable for contributory negligence under 
various theories. 
is not defined in the statute, the Idaho Supreme Court has detennined that "its 
definition is not at issue in cases of nighttime vehicle collisions with unattended 
domestic animals running at large wherein we can presume the animals' presence 
on the highway does not fall within any reasonable definition of 'lawfully."' fcJ .. ; 
see also Adamson v. Blanchard, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216 n.2 (Idaho 1999). 
In this case, Plaintiffs contend that the accident occurred in the Mud 
Lake/Terreton herd ·district. The Lees argue, however, that the herd district is 
invalid and therefore the land is open range. ldaho Code__§1~.::ZAQJ_ et seq. 
provides the current mechanism for creating a herd district. 4.fiqmson_,_9._9..!)J~_,_2_d£1 
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12.ll. As relevant here,§ 25-2401(1) provides as follows: 
( 1) The board of county commissioners of each county in 
the state shall have power to create, modify or eliminate 
herd districts within such county as hereinafter provided; 
and when such district is so created, modified or 
eliminated, the provisions of this chapter shall apply and 
be enforceable therein. On and after January 1, 1990, no 
county shall regulate or otherwise control the running at 
large of horses, mules, asses, cattle, sheep or goats within 
the unincorporated areas of the county unless such 
regulation or ·control is provided by the creation of a herd 
district pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, except 
as provided by subsection (2) of this section. The 
provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any herd 
district or herd ordinance in full force and effect prior to 
January 1, 1990, but shall apply to any modification 
thereof. 
(2) A panel of five (5) members may be created in a 
county, the members of which shall be appointed as 
follows: two (2) members by appointment of the board of 
county commissioners; two (2) members by appointment 
of a local, county or state livestock association or 
associations; and the fifth member, by concurrent 
appointment of the first four ( 4) appointees. Only if a 
majority of said panel, after a public hearing held with 
notice as prescribed by law, concludes that the creation, 
modification or elimination of a herd district is 
insufficient to control or otherwise regulate the 
movement oflivestock in an area, the board of county 
commissioners shall have power to establish such control 
by ordinance, provided that the cost of construction and 
maintenance of any fencing or cattle guards required by 
said ordinance shall be paid by the county current 
expense fund. 
L.C~.§ _ _2_5::_2_4_QJ{lJ. Whenever a herd district has been created using the mechanism 
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described in the statute, a legal prima facie presumption exists, after a lapse of two 
years from the date of such order, that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps 
preceding the making of such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to 
warrant the board in making the order. I~C,_§ JJ-_8_5].. At that point, the burden of 
proof falls upon the party disputing the validity of the order to show that any of the 
proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken. Jg._ Such 
prima facie presumption is the rule of evidence in all courts in the state of Idaho. 
L4~ 
Here, Plaintiffs produced a copy of an order from the Jefferson County 
Commission dated March 10, 1930, creating the Mud Lake/Terreton herd district. 
(Boulter Aff., Ex. A). This raises the presumption that a herd district was created 
and that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps to create the district were properly 
and regularly taken. LC .. § )J:&.5]. Therefore, the burden of proof falls upon the 
Lees to show that any of the proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly 
or regularly taken. Jg._ The Lees contend that the Mud Lake/Terreton herd district 
is invalid because it includes lands owned by the United States and because the 
County Commissioners did not comply with all steps preceding establishment of 
the herd district. The Court will address each contention in tum. 
Memorandum Decision and Order - 7 
821 
Case 4:06-cv-0048 W Document 11 O Filed 10/0 Page 8of24 
A. Inclusion of lands owned by the United States, upon which the 
grazing of livestock has historically been permitted. 
In arguing that the herd district is invalid because it contains land owned by 
the United States, the Lees rely upon Id.a]l_p_Cqd.e_ § Z~:.2_4_0Z(2)!l!)· The statute 
provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no herd 
district shall ... [ c ]ontain any lands owned by the United States of America or the 
state of Idaho, upon which the grazing of livestock has historically been 
permitted." LC. § 25-2402(2)1a). Thus, the statute precludes the inclusion in a 
herd district of any lands (1) which are owned by the United States of America or 
the state of Idaho, and (2) upon which grazing of livestock has been historically 
permitted. 
In Yillf;!'_ "\!. . .Miller,_ 'Z4.5_l? J.d_2.9 .. :t(Jgaj.io_ l.~8_7), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that if a herd district is created which includes federal or state lands excluded 
by§ 25-2402(2)(a), the courts cannot simply excise the federal or state lands from 
the herd district, but must declare the entire herd district invalid. Relying upon 
this authority, the Lees contend that the Mud Lake/Terreton herd district contains 
federal lands and must therefore be declared invalid. The Court is not persuaded 
that the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Miller dictates this result. 
Jdaho Code §J_5_:-240U2)fo), which excludes federal and state grazing lands 
from herd districts, expressly provided that it applies to herd districts "established 
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before or after July l, 1983 ." Thus, when the herd district at issue in Miller was 
created in 1984~ the ordinance establishing the district conflicted with the general 
laws of the state and was therefore "an invalid exercise of the Bannock County 
Commissioners powers .... " lei. at 297. This, the Miller court determined, 
requires that the entire ordinance be declared invalid. 
The same cannot be said of the the creation of the Mud Lakefferreton herd 
district. When it was created in 1930 by the Jefferson County Commissioners, 
there was no prohibition on the inclusion of federal and state grazing lands· in herd 
districts. Thus, the Jefferson County ordinance, unlike the Bannock County 
ordinance at issue in Miller, was not in conflict with the general laws of the state in 
existence at the time of its enactment and was therefore a valid exercise of the 
Commissioners powers. Thus, the premise of Miller, that an ordinance adopted in 
conflict with the general laws of the state is invalid in its entirety, simply does not 
apply to the ordinance at issue here. 
Having determined that Miller does not require a finding that the Jefferson 
County ordinance establishing the Mud Lakeff erreton herd district is invalid, we 
must still consider the language in L(:_,_§._22=.24.92(2.)(!!) requiring the exclusion of 
federal and state grazing lands from all herd districts "established before or after 
July 1, 1983." The language of the statute, while clearly excluding federal.and 
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state grazing lands from herd districts established before July 1, 1983, does not 
reveal a legislative intent to invalidate au herd districts which lawfully included 
such lands prior to the effective date of the statute. Had they intended such a 
draconian result - retroactively invalidating any herd district which contains so 
much as one acre of federal or state grazing lands - it seems clear the legislature 
would have been more explicit. A more reasonable view of the statutory language 
would be to require that any federal or state grazing lands included in herd districts 
lawfully in effect on July 1, 1983 be excised from the district.1 This view, which 
the Court adopts, would require the exclusion of any such government-owned 
grazing lands from the Mud Lakefferreton herd district, but would leave the 
balance of the herd district, and the ordinance creating it, in full force and effect. 
Even if the Court were to adopt the Lees argument that l~C._§. 2~-~.:l-92(2)(a) 
requires that the ordinance be declared invalid if it includes federal or state grazing 
lands, they cannot rely upon the statute because they have presented no evidence 
establishing that the federal and state lands included in the herd district were 
historically grazed. As clearly stated in the statute, a herd district is not invalid 
simply because it contained lands owned by the United States. Those lands must 
be lands "upon which the grazing of livestock has historically been permitted." 
1 This view would also be consistent with the strong presumption in favor of the validity 
oflong-estab]ished herd districts expressed in LG..§,] 1-857. 
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LC .. § 22.:2-4.02!2)(11).. Without any evidence of pennitted historical grazing, the 
Lees cannot overcome their burden of disputing the validity of the herd district. 2 
B. Steps preceding establishment of herd district. 
The Lees next contend that the County Commissioners did not comply with 
all preceding and jurisdictional steps. Their argument is two-fold. First, the Lees 
contend that the commissioners did not comply with statutory notice requirements. 
Second, the Lees contend that the herd district is not valid because the order 
creating it did not specify the time at which it would take effect. 
1. Notice Requirements 
To establish a herd district, the Idaho law in effect in 1930 required the 
Board of County Commissioners to set a date for hearing a petition for a herd 
district, and give notice of the hearing by posting it in three conspicuous places in 
the herd district and by publishing it for two weeks prior to the hearing in a 
newspaper published in the county nearest the proposed herd district. (Coletti Aff., 
Ex. L, Docket No. 96). The Lees contend that the County Commissioners did not 
publish notice of the hearing in the newspaper. In support of their argument, the 
2 During oral argument on the pending motions, the Lees requested leave to re-open 
discovery in this matter in order to obtain evidence of grazing. The Court declined to re-open 
discovery yet again in this matter, as the parties have already had two attempts at summary 
judgment, and the Court is unwilling to continue down the slippery-slope ofre-opening 
discovery after the fact. 
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Lees provide evidence that the notice was not published in the Rigby Star, the 
newspaper which ultimately published the commissioners' decision to create the 
herd district. 
Plaintiffs counter by suggesting that there is substantial evidence that the 
notices were published in another Jefferson County newspaper, the Roberts 
Sentinel. The public record reveals that the petition for a herd district in the Mud 
Lake area was presented to the Jefferson Coup.ty Commission at their regular 
meeting on October 14, 1929. At that same meeting, the Commission specifically 
ordered that notice of a hearing on the petition be issued in conformity with Idaho 
law. (Barton Aff., ~ 3, Ex. B.). The Commission's minutes do not reflect that the 
Commission designated which of the Jefferson County newspapers should contain 
the notice. However, publishing. the notice in the Roberts Sentinel, rather than the 
Rigby Star, would be consistent with the spirit of the statutory requirement that the 
notice be published in the county nearest the proposed herd district, since Roberts 
is physically much closer to Mud Lake than is Rigby. Moreover, minutes of the 
commission meetings between October 14, 1929 and June 9, 1930 show an 
approved payment of a series of charges for printing from the Roberts Sentinel, 
including $15.00 on October 14, 1929, $45.65 on January 13, 1930, $11.75 on 
May 12, 1930, and $36.20 on June 9, 1930. (Barton Aff., ~~ 3-6, Ex. B, D, E.). 
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Unfortunately, copies of the Roberts Sentinel for 1929 and 1930 are no longer 
available from any known source. 
On balance, the Court finds3 that notice was given as required by statute. 
The Court is led to this conclusion by four undisputed facts: First, the Commission 
ordered on October 14, 1929 that notice of.the public hearing be issued as required 
by tdaho law. Second, Idaho law required that such notice be published in the 
county nearest to the proposed herd district. Third, although both communities are 
in Jefferson County, Roberts is closer in proximity to Mud Lake than is Rigby. 
Fourth, the County paid charges to the Roberts Sentinel for legal publications 
during the same time period when the notice would have been published. Against 
this evidence, the Lees' argument that publication was not made simply because 
there is no record of publication in the Rigby Star does not fulfill the Lees' burden 
of overcoming the statutory presumption that the herd district was validly created. 
- The validity of an ordinance is a judicial question for resolution by the court. Q. 
Mc_QujJli.g._@.Lf!.'Y _of M_urrisipf!.lCQI"J20J'!!tiop.~ § .GQ:J-_2,. This would include the resolution of 
factual disputes relevant to the validity of the ordinance. See ~Jlr.fLcl...J!,,_f;jtygf.B_qJeigh_,JZ~ 
~,E,2.4.-1:l£.ili,_C,_19Jll. Although the issue arises in the context of the Plaintiff's motion for 
slUllillary judgment, it is the Lees' burden, as the party challenging the validity of the ordinance, 
to establish that the procedural prerequisites to the adoption of the ordinance were not followed. 
They have not presented evidence from which the Court, as the finder of fact, can find that the 
required notice of the public hearing was not given. 
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2. Time of Effect Requirement 
The Lees next contend that the Mud Lake/Terreton herd district is invalid 
because the commissioners' order did not specify the time at which it would take 
effect. In 1930, when the herd district was created, Idaho law required the 
commission to issue an order which "shall specify a certain time at which (the herd 
district] shall take effect, which time shall be at least thirty days after the making of 
said order[.]" (Coletti Aff., Ex. L, Docket No. 96). It is undisputed that the order 
does not specify an effective date. (Boulter Aff., Ex.). 
However, "[t]he common rule in regard to legislation is that it shall take 
immediate effect unless otherwise provided, and this rule is applicable to 
ordinances." )_Mf;Q11illi!J.,_ Th~ L~w_q_f_M11rric.in.~l~o_rpgi;:_a:ti.9!.1~ §J.5.;lQ.. It is not 
uncommon for a statute to prescribe that certain types of ordinances not take effect 
until a certain time - for example, 10, 20 or 30 days - after its approval. ld~ 
Nevertheless, "invalidity as to the effective date of an ordinance ... does not 
render the ordinance void." I..9.:. 
The requirement of the passage of a certain period of time before an 
ordinance goes into effect "is intended to enable the public to acquire knowledge 
of the ordinance before it becomes operative for any purpose." Id. But, "the 
owners of property coming within the regulation of an ordinance are not entitled to 
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other than the due and proper general public notice of the enactment of the 
ordinance." Id. 
Here, the Lees have not presented any evidence that they, or their 
predecessors-in-interest, did not receive actual notice of the adoption of the 
ordinance, or that they were prejudiced in some fashion by the failure to give the 
statutorily-required thirty day grace period before the ordinance took effect. Under 
these circumstances, the failure to provide for an effective date in the ordinance, 
"does not render the ordinance void," id., but only invalidates the effective date of 
the ordinance so that the ordinance did not take effect for 3 0 days, rather than 
immediately upon enactment. 
This approach, to deem the ordinance valid but the effective date invalid, is 
consistent with general principles applicable to the interpretation and enforcement 
of ordinances. The power of a court to declare an ordinance invalid should be 
exercised cautiously, and, in fact, courts are reluctant to do so. Q.Mc.Ql!il.lin._,,J]1~ 
L_a:w. g:(M.uJliG..ip<J1-CQIJJ.9N.tio11.§_§_iQ:4 Thus, a court should not strike down any 
ordinance where that ordinance can be reasonably upheld, and the ordinance will 
be upheld if the validity of the ordinance is fairly debatable. 14~ When an 
ordinance can be interpreted in two ways, one of which sustains its validity and the 
other which defeats it, a court will adopt the sustaining interpretation, "even if that 
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construction is not the most obvious or natural." .Q_M£Q11.illin,_Th~L.f!.W_Qf 
Municipal Corporations 20:56. Significantly, "[c]ourts are loathe to construe an 
ordinance as invalid, where the ordinance has been in operation and unchallenged 
for many years, and where under it valuable rights have accrued which would be 
destroyed ifthe ordinance were held to be invalid." Isl-= 
With these guidelines in mind, this Court is unwilling, and, in fact, unable to 
invalidate the Mud Lakeff erreton herd district which has been unchallenged for 
almost eighty years. The failure by the Commission to specify an exact time at 
which the herd district took effect is not sufficient reason for this Court to 
invalidate the herd district. Under the above guidelines, the Court finds that it is 
reasonable to construe the ordinance to take effect thirty days after the order was 
issued in accordance with Idaho law in 1930. 
In summary, the Court rejects the .Lees' arguments that the Mud 
Lake/Terreton herd district is invalid. The inclusion of federal and state lands in 
the herd district did not invalidate the ordinance creating the district. In addition, 
the Lees have failed to establish that federal and state lands included in the district 
have been historically grazed by livestock. The Lees have also failed to carry their 
burden of overcoming the legal prima facie presumption of validity accorded an 
ordinance which has been on the books almost eighty years. They have failed to 
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establish that the statutorily-required notice of the public hearings leading to 
enactment of the herd district ordinance was not published in a Jefferson County 
newspaper. The Court has also concluded as a matter of law that the failure to 
include in the ordinance an effective date at least 30 days after enactment, as 
required by statute, does not invalidate the ordinance. In tum, the Court finds, as a 
matter of law, that the subject area was a herd district. 
C. Questions of fact remain. 
As explained above, a cattle owner's liability is materially affected by 
whether the area is open range or a herd district. In open range, there is absolute 
immunity. In herd districts, as is the case here, there is immunity only if cattle are 
legally on the road. M..orglflmf.,_ 1~2. P ,_3_cl_~t_5_9J. As the Court also pointed out in 
its earlier opinion, "[n]o person owning, or controlling the possession of, any 
domestic animal lawfully on any highway, shall be deemed guilty of negligence by 
reason thereof." r_,,_C._§.. 25-_2JJ.9. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court made clear 
in Griffith, we can presume that unattended domestic animals running at large on 
the highway does not fall within any reasonable definition of"lawfully." Grifjith 
715 P .2d at 909. Still, even if the accident occurs in a herd district, and lawful 
conditions are not present, the animal owner is not strictly liable. Rather, the 
doctrine of res ipsa ioquitur supplies an inference that the animal owner was 
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negligent, but that inference can be rebutted, and when properly placed at issue by 
the parties, the issues of lawful presence, inference of negligence, and rebuttal of 
the inference are questions for the trier of facts. Qriffjth_ y_._~cfr[Jijqt_,, 11~ .P_,2_4_g,t 
9_o9. 
That is the case here. The plaintiffs may find unpersuasive the Lees' 
explanation as to the care they provided their animals and the claim that they acted 
diligently to ensure that their fences were properly maintained. However, in 
resolving a summary judgment motion, "the evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court is not permitted to make 
credibility findings." AtJ..d..e.r.soJJ_Y:_Libg_r_ty_Lg]2]2J!,_Jnc_,~-4 7ZJ1.$:..24 ~.2..42:4..~ 
(1986). Moreover, direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however 
implausible. Lg_s]i_e_v_, _G.rypg J(;fJ._,, J98 .f_,3.411~2..JJ.59 _(9~ .C_ir.J.999}. Thus, even 
though the Court has determined that the subject land is a herd district, the question 
of liability must be left to the jury. Accordingly, this case must proceed to trial. 
ID. Motion for Reconsideration Standard of Review 
A motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling requires an analysis of two 
important principles: (1) error must be corrected; and (2) judicial efficiency 
demands forward progress. The former principle has led courts to hold that a 
denial of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment may be reconsidered at any 
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time before final judgment. £rgg.s_eau..J! .. ,.E.rnfigntig_Lfn§._1J.[_G..JJ£fl. __ c_o..:_,_5_9_LE_.2sL73~ 
79-80 (9th Cir. 1979). While even an interlocutory decision becomes the "law of 
the case," it is not necessarily carved in stone. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
concluded that the "law of the case" doctrine "merely ~xpresses the practice of 
courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their 
power." Ji-fg§.SjtJg~r_ ~ A_n_dgrs_o_n~ 2.2-~ Jl-S:. 4:i Q.._4_4_::1._(1912}. "The only sensible 
thing for a trial court to do is to set itself right as soon as possible when convinced 
that the law of the case is erroneous. There is no need to await reversal." [fJ...Ig 
4.iIJ2-QIT_C.qr_IJ.laifgl_fi11fitrY.~t1"'.itiggtiQn.,_5_2._lJ~_,Sl!IJJ.2._5_ 68~.5.12.iN.Jd~C.fil,_ 
19-8J..)(Schwartzer, J.). 
The need to be right, however, must be balanced with the need for forward 
progress. A court's opinions "are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to 
revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." Q.ugfs~r_41JQY. Cfl§.t.i11.g (:g,_ l'·. 
D_:uJ[cg _[rzef,ys_. ,_{nJ:.=..,_1_2)_£.F.)),_ :f ~Z:,_2_8~_(N.D .Jlt l9_8_8). "Courts have distilled 
various grounds for reconsideration of prior rulings into three major grounds for 
justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the 
availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) need to correct 
a clear error or to prevent manifest injustice." L04fill_y_Twedt)_2-_Q_O_]_WL,_9-J .. i2_2-~ 
QiD_.CfllMfl.rch_2.§,_2Q_Q1). If the motion to reconsider does not fall within one of 
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these three categories, it must be denied. 
The Plaintiffs ask that the Court reconsider its decision that the Plaintiffs 
would not be permitted to introduce evidence of past incidents of cattle roaming 
off the Lees' property in Clark County. The parties agree that the property in Clark 
County is open range. The Court determined that evidence of incidents on the 
Clark County property was irrelevant because animals may roam freely in open 
range areas without risk of owner liability. 4dqmJ'Q!1,_99_Q_f,2d.Jtt 12_1_7. 
Plaintiffs now assert that notwithstanding the immunity provided by statutes 
and case law, the Lees are somehow liable based on duties owed to government 
agencies to maintain fences. However, even if the Lees have some type of 
contractual or other duty toward government agencies, such a duty does not create 
liability toward Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider will be denied. 
IV. Motion to Exclude 
Plaintiffs filed two motions to exclude. At oral argument, Plaintiffs 
withdrew their second motion (Docket No. 85). Accordingly, the Court will deem 
that motion to be moot. The other motion seeks exclusion of the expert report and 
testimony ofBryan Finkle. 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of 
expert testimony, in conjunction with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
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Ln£~5Q.2JJ_,_s_,_S1-2il9-9-3_) and Ku_111hQ_Tirg__c_Q_,_.__Lt_4__y,__Carmic;hg_~£.5'2JiJLS .. 11'Z. 
(1999). Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Finkle's testimony fails the Daubert test. 
Daubert provides the following non-exclusive list of factors in determining 
the reliability of scientific evidence: "( 1) whether a scientific theory or technique 
can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication; (3}the known or potential rate of error 
and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's 
operation; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted." Cooper v. Brown 
~1Q_EJ_4~I0-:-2-12=-4J_(21h1:ir..._ 2007} (citing J2gyber.J,_~Q9-1J._,_S.,_c.il2.23.:9..4;_Ku..m..hQ 
Tir_g,_~2._6_U._S_, __ q,_1J _ _5J). However, this list of factors is meant to be helpful, not 
definitive. Id. at 943. "The goal is to make certain that an expert ... employs in the 
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an 
expert in the relevant field." fq._ (Internal quotation and citation omitted). The 
Court must ultimately employ an independent, flexible approach in order to 
determine whether Dr. Finkle's methodology is scientifically valid. [)_a_u]Jgr_ti 5Q2 
U. .. S.. J1.tS24.::92. 
Dr. Finkle is a forensic toxicologist. The Lees retained Dr. Finkle to 
determine the level of intoxication of the driver of the automobile involved in the 
collision in this matter at the time of the accident. Defendants provided Dr. Finkle 
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with medical reports showing a blood-alcohol content of 0.049 approximately one 
hour and 3 8 minutes after the collisio~ as well as police reports and notes 
indicating that the driver had been drinking alcohol prior to the collision. Based on 
this information, the time of the accident, and the general physical attributes of the 
driver, such as height, weight, and age, Dr. Finkle made a retrograde determination 
as to the driver's alcohol level at the time of the accident. 
According to his Curriculum Vitae, Dr. Finkle has written several toxicology 
articles for peer-reviewed journals. Additionally, although Dr. Finkle admits that 
there would be some variation in results if a clinical study analyzed the particular 
alcohol clearance of a group, he testified that the typical rate is .02 per hour, which 
does not suggest the possibility of a significant potential error rate. 
A review of Plaintiffs' concerns with Dr. Finkle's testimony and report 
reveals several statements likely taken out of context in an attempt to rebut the 
overall findings. Based on these argument, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not 
provided the Court with a sufficient basis to conclude that Dr. Finkle' s 
methodology is so unreliable as to justify exclusion under Rule 702. The Court 
may be open to a pre-trial Daubert hearing to flesh out the issue before trial if 
Plaintiffs request one. At this point, however, the Court will deny the motion to 
exclude. 
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The Court will note for the record, however, that the Court will not.allow Dr. 
Finkle to testify about issues where he has no personal knowledge or expertise. 
Specifically, as discussed during oral argument, Dr. Finkle will not be allowed to 
give expert testimony about the speed of the vehicle. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration (Docket No. 81) shall be, and the same is hereby, DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 83) shall be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED 
in part and DENIED in part. The motion is granted to the extent it seeks a finding 
that the subject land was a herd district. It is denied to the extent it seeks a finding 
of liability at this point. That issue will be addressed at trial. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert 
Report and Testimony of Bryan Finkle (Docket No. 84) shall be, and the same is 
hereby DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Objection to Additional 
Defense Expert Testimony (Docket No. 85) shall be, and the same is hereby, 
DEEMED MOOT. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to File Excess Pages 
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(Docket No. 86) shall be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that and Plaintiffs' Second Motion to File 
Excess Pages (Docket No. 104) shall be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall set this case 
for a status conference for the purpose of setting a trial date. 
DA TED: October 8, 2008 
~-~W~ 
Ho~ Lynn Winmill 
ChiefU. S. District Judge 
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1 EXAMINATION 
2 QUESTIONS BY MR. WALTON: 
3 Q. Mr. Johnson., my n.ame is Tim Walton. I 
4 represent Mr. Guzman in this litigation. Have 
5 you ever been to Hawaii ever? 
6 A. Yeah. 
7 Q. Did you go in '82'? 
8 A. I don't bel ievc so. I think the first 
9 time I went to Hawaii would have been in about 
0 1998 or'99. 
1 Q. Okay~ It's an interesting question 
1 A. No, l'm sorry. They -- well, they 
: 2 represented our insurance company. 
· 3 Q. Okay. And in fact they represented you 
4 and your ranches in connection with --
5 A. That's correct. 
: 6 Q. -- a collision involving a car and a 
: 7 livestock; right? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. Okay. I'm kind of interested in this 
l 0 notion that had you been aware of the herd 
i 1 district tl).at was created in '82 or had you 
1 
2 just because my paralegal, in looking at the 12 gotten notice of it, you would have done 
3 newspapers from back then, noticed that Mr. and 13 something about it: is that what you're saying? 
4 Mrs. Johns.on went to Hawaii in '82, l think it 14 A Well, I'm not sure what comes with the 
5 was November of '82. So I was just wondering if f 5 petition, you knm.v. I'm assuming there's some 
' 
6 that could have been you. ~ 6 explanation that comes with the petition and I'm 
' 
7 A. l don't believe so. i 7 assuming that would be a copy of the proposed 
8 Q. Okay. 18 ordinance --
9 A. The last -- you know, I'm quite certain 19 Q. Okay. 
0 it was quite a while after that, but I've been 2o A. -- for you to sign. And so having read 
1 there several times, but ... .i 1 the ordinance. you know. recently, I think there 
2 Q. All right. Are you a client of 2 2 would have been some red flags. 
3 l\.1.r. Saetrurn's law finn? 23 Q. Okay. So how would you anticipate that 
4 A. (Head shake.) 2 4 you would have gotten notice of the proposed herd 
5 Q. Has this law firm ever represented you? 2 5 district? 
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1 A. Wel1, I assume that it comes from the 
2 County and it affects out property. 
3 Q. And •vhen you say "a:>sume it comes from 
4 the County," arc you referring to County --
5 
6 
A. County commissioners. 
Q. -- something published in the paper or 
7 how? 
8 A. We11, you know, if it was just 
9 published in the paper. then there's a good 
0 chance I wouldn't - you know, tlierc's a chance I 
1 wouldn't have seen it. 
2 Q. Right. Right. Because - are you 
3 av..-are that this herd district. il was noticed 
4 published in the paper about this herd district 
5 in December of 1982 that the County Commissioners 
6 had decided to go ahead and create this herd 
7 district. Are you aware of that notice that was 
8 published in the newspaper? 
9 A. No. 
0 Q. Okay. So if there'd been a notice 
1 publisht,xl in the newspaper prior to the hearing 
2 where the herd district \Vas created, you're 
3 saying you probably wouldn't have lmo'.¥n about 
that any11<)w; rig.ht? 
5 MR. PEC'K: l object to that question. 
1 Q. {BY MR. WALTON) Is that what you're 
2 saying? 
3 MR. PECK: Misrepresents prior 
· 4 testimony. 
5 Q. (BY MR. WALTON) ls that what you're 
6 saying? 
7 A. What I'm saying is. I was not aware 
8 that a herd district was being established. And 
9 I have not been contacted relative to the 
i O establishment of the herd district. 
ll Q. And 1 understand that. And as we just 
i 2 discussed, it hadn't been published in the 
13 newspaper: I think you just testified you 
l.4 probably wouldn't have seen it in the paper 
15 anyway. right? 
l 6 A. I -- well, again --
l7 
i8 
MR. PECK: Object io the qm.>stion. 
Q. (BY MR. WALTON) It's a simple ''yes'' or 
i9 "no" question. 
~o 
21 
22 
A. You know, we get the paper. 
Q. Right. 
A. But whether -- but do I read all the 
2 3 legal notices, I don't. 
24 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Now. you don't 
2 5 remember how you learned that your property was 
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1 looking for a copy- I wanted to review this 
2 affidavit before I came in here today. And I 
3 asked her to ~- if she knew where it was at in 
4 the files and we went through them and didn't 
5 find it. But anyway, she was -- everybody in the 
1 proper pr~ure when they created the 1982 herd 
2 district ordinance we're talking about today'! 
3 A. No. I didn't know what procedure it 
: 4 was. 
:5 Q. Okay. Do you have any proof that a 
6 area -- we know the Piercys and we know the ~ 6 notice of hearing was not published in the 
7 Suttons and we know the -- you know~ the people · 7 newspaper pertaining to the hearing for the 
8 that were involved in that. And so -- because 8 aeation of this herd district that we're talking 
9 we've all lived there for a long time, and the . 9 about today? 
0 Guzmans. But anyway, her comment to me \vas "I :J. 0 
l thought Canyon County was open range." i 1 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any proof that a petition 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. Now, they've been there three 
4 generations. But I haven't had a conversation 
5 with other ranchers. There .aren't many ranchers 
6 left in Canyon County. 
7 Q. This person that you spoke with today 
8 thought that the entire Canyon County was open 
9 range'! 
0 A. Well. that's what her comment -- that's 
1. what she said, l think. 
2 
3 
4 
Q. Okay. 
A. Canyon County was open range. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any knowledge that 
+ 2 was not circulated amongst the landowners of the 
13 area affected by the herd district that we're 
14 talking about today? 
i 5 A. I don't have any proof, no. 
i 6 Q. Okay. Have you ever talked to 
1 7 Mr. Piercy about this case? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. When was the last time you and he 
:20 spoke? 
~ 1 A. Gosh, I don't recall. Because l see 
2 2 him. you know --
23 
24 
Q. Sure. 
A. - from time to time. 
5 the Canyon County Commissioners failed to file a 2 5 Q. Sure. 
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2 
A. But it's probably been a year or two. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever had a discussion 
3 with !v1r. Piercy about herd districts in Canyon 
4 County? 
5 
6 
A. No. 
Q. The Mo organizations that you belong 
7 to that you mentioned, I think it was the 
8 Cattlemen's Association and the Cattle Feeders 
9 Association? 
0 
1 
A. Um-hnun, yeah. 
Q. Has there ever been an occasion when 
2 either organization, to your knowledge, has 
3 notified its members of the creation of a herd 
4 district? 
5 
6 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Okay. Has there ever been an occasion 
1 legislative things and things that are -- changes 
· 2 in the - those are printed and they are sent out 
3 to their members. I don't specifically remember 
, 4 . receiving that. but that doe..<rn't say that they 
~ 5 didn't send it out. 
!vfR. WALTON: l understand. Thank you. 
. 7 
: 8 EXAMINATlON 
. 9 QUESTIONS BY MR. EVETT: 
i 0 Q. l have just a fow questions, 
11 Mr. Johnson. 
12 
13 
A. Sure. 
Q. Did the Cattlemen's Association or the 
14 Cattle Feeders Association have any meetings 
15 about this herd district after it was enacted? 
16 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
7 where either organi7.ation notified its ni.embers of 1 7 Q. The Boone Ranch, have there been any 
8 the proposed cTeation of a herd district? 
9 A. Not that r -- not that I recall. 
O MR. WALTON: Nothing further. Thanks 
l verymuch. 
2 THE \VlTNESS: You know, we get -- you 
3 know, just to clarify that a little bit. We get 
4 newsletters ahout every month or every week or 
5 when they come out. And so -- and you know 
iB benefits to your ranch because it has been in a 
19 herd district? 
2 0 MR. PECK: And I'll object to the 
2 1 relevance. 
2 2 THE WITNESS: There's -- sure there's a 
2 3 benefit, you know. We don't want cattle getting 
2 4 ouc on the road or getting hie by the -- there's 
2 5 a railroad track going along there, too, you 
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l5 
l6 
l7 
l8 
l9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
hereinafter provided; and when such district is 
so created the provisions of this chapter shall 
apply and be enforceable therein." 
Q. As you look at this statute do you 
remember -- does anything about it sound 
familiar? I mean, does that help at all after 
reading through the statute to help you remember 
if you read it at that time or not? 
A. It does not. 
Q. Now, in the next section, 25-2402, it 
talks about petition for district. And it says, 
"A majority of the landowners in any area or 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
district is described by metes and bounds not 13 
including open range and who are also resident 14 
in, and qualified electors of, the State ofldaho 15 
may petition the board of county commissioners in 16 
writing to create such area a herd district." 17 
Now, in 1982, in conjunction with what 
I'm going to call the '82 ordinance, do you 
recall there being a petition that was submitted 
to create a herd district? 
A. I'm sorry, I do not recall that. 
MR. WAL TON: Same question. Does that 
mean that you don't know if there was or wasn't a 
petition? Is that what you are saying? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
. 25 
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says, "Resolution passed regarding herd districts 
in Canyon County.". And if you could read that . 
portion to yourself. And let me know when you 
are done. 
A. (Complying). I have read it. 
Q. Now, in reading through those minutes 
do you recall at all having a meeting on 
December 2, 1982 regarding this resolution that 
Commissioner Hobz.a made? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember discussing the issue 
regarding having confusion existing due to the 
overlapping lines of the herd districts in Canyon 
County? 
A. Way back in the back of my mind I just 
recall that there was an issue regarding a herd 
district. And that a portion of it was not -- a 
portion of Canyon County was not in the herd 
district. And that's about the extent of what I 
remember. 
Q. Now, I take it that you remember 
Commissioner Hobz.a; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just solely based on what it says here 
in the minutes it sounds as ifthis was his 
Page 22 I 
1 THE WITNESS: That's what I'm saying. I 1 motion. 
Page 24 
2 MR. WAL TON: Thank you. 2 Do you recall Commissioner Hobza 
3 (Exhibit 2 marked.) 3 talking to you or representing to you that he 
4 Q. (BY MR. PECK) I have handed you what I 4 wanted to create a county-wide herd district? 
5 have marked as Exhibit No. 2. Now, in looking at 5 A. I just remember that they explained to 
6 Exhibit 2, down there towards the bottom, there 1
1 
6 me what a herd district was. And that there was 
7 is a caption "Canyon County Board of County 7 a problem. I think the discussion was held with 
8 Commissioners Public Hearing Minutes." And I'll II 8 both Commissioner Hobza and Commissioner Bledsoe. 
9 just represent that this is from Book 22. This j 9 Q. So when you say that they explained to 
10 came out of the recorder's office from the I 10 you what a herd district was, does that mean 
11 minutes that are kept there. And if you could l 11 prior to this time you weren't familiar with the 
12 just read that for me. Not out loud. But to I 12 idea of a herd district? 
13 yourself. That section there. Those public j 13 A. I had no concept of what a herd 
14 hearing minutes. I 14 district was. 
15 A. (Complying). ! 15 Q. Do you recall what their explanation of 
16 Q. Well, wait a second. That is not the \ 16 a herd district was? 
17 one I want.-· Hold on. I apologize. This is the i 17 A. The way I recall it they said a herd 
18 one I wanted. I 18 district is where you have to keep your animals · . 
19 (Exhibit 3 marked.) l 19 contained. 
20 Q. (BY MR. PECK) We have marked that as i 20 Q. Now, let's go back to Exhibit I for a 
21 Exhibit 3. This is the same thing. These are I 21 minute. Section 25-2403 says, "Notice of hearing 
22 minutes. And I guess the date up there is \ 22 petition. It shall be the duty of the board of 
23 December 2, 1982. Do you see that? i 23 county commissioners, after such petition has 
24 A. Yes. j 24 been filed, to set a date for hearing said 
25 Q. And then we have in the middle that I 25 petition, notice of which hearing shall be given 
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by posting notices thereof in three conspicuous 
places in the proposed herd district, and by 
publication for two weeks previous to said 
hearing in a newspaper published in the county 
nearest the proposed herd district." 
Now, having read that language would it 
be correct, based on your prior testimony, that 
with regard to notice of this hearing for a herd 
district that that would be the job of the 
secretaries to put that notice in the paper? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall with regards to the 
herd district discussions that you have had that 
there was a -- whether or not there was a notice 
published for the hearing on the herd district 
ordinance? 
A. No, I do not recall anything. 
MR. WALTON: Again, you don't recall if 
one was or was not? 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
MR. WAL TON: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, looking at Exhibit 
No. 3 in the minutes there. Based solely in 
looking at these minutes I don't see any language 
I ! 
I ~ I 9 
110 
I u I 12 
I 13 
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I 16 
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(Exhibit 4 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) Mr. Koch, do you 
recognize Exhibit No. 4? 
A. It's an Order Establishing Herd 
District. 
Q. If you could just review that and let 
me know when you are done reviewing that order. 
A. I have read it. 
Q. When was the date of this order? 
A. December 9, 1982. 
Q. And looking down in the body of the 
order just above the signatures. That last line. 
"It is hereby ordered." 
What is the date contained there in the 
body? 
A. December 10, 1982. 
Q. And then in the signature portion, that 
bottom signature above Glenn 0. Koch, is that 
your signature? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Do you recall signing this order? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Now, in the body of the -- well, let me 
do this first. 
Page 26 j Page 28 
1 sent out. l 1 Q. (BY MR. PECK) Mr. Koch, have you had a 
2 . Would it be your typical practice in 2 chance to review No. 5? 
3 this type of meeting to have included in the 3 A. Yes. 
4 minutes that a published notice had been sent 4 Q. Now, in Exhibit 4, the Order 
5 out? 5 Establishing Herd District, under No. 1, it says, 
6 MR. SAARI: Objection. Lack of 6 "A survey map attached hereto, prepared by the 
7 foundation. 
1
1 7
8 
Planning and Zoning Administrator, designates the 
8 MR. WAL TON: Join. I believe he has three small areas within the county which remain 
9 testified the secretaries did that for him. I 9 open range." 
10 Q. (BY .MR. PECK) You can go ahead and 1
1
1
1
0
1 
Do you recall whether or not you saw 
11 answer the question. that survey map? 
12 A. State the question again. i 12 A. I don't remember seeing it. . 
13 Q. Let me have the court reporter read it 113 ?v1R WALTON: Are you saying you don't 
14 back. 114 remember if you did or you didn't see it? Or are 
15 (Record read.) 1 15 you saying you don't think you did see it? 
16 THE WITNESS: I guess I can't answer \ 16 THE WITNESS: I don't remember seeing 
17 that. I just don't recall one way or the other. I 17 it. That is what rm saying. 
18 Whether those were attached or whether they I 1s Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, looking at Exhibit 
19 weren't. I 19 No. 5. Do you recall having ever seen that map 
20 Q. (BY MR. PECK) So let me make sure I 120 before? 
21 understand you. You are not sure whether or not i 21 A. No, I don't recall ever having seen it. 
22 it was your typical practice to include that in j 22 I probably did, but I don't recall. 
23 the minutes or not? Or have that included in the !,· 
2
2
4
3 Q. Let's go back just for a minute to 
24 minutes? 1 Exhibit No. 2. Again, down there where it reads, 
25 A. That's correct. i 25 "Canyon County Board of County Commissioners 
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THE WlTNESS: Well, it says that it is 
hereby ordered by the Board of Canyon County 
Commissioners that on the 10th day of December, 
1982, that a herd district be established. 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) And so as being part of 
the panel that signed this document is it your 
understanding that that was intended to be the 
date it was to commence? 
MR. SAARI: Objection. He earlier 
testified he doesn't have the recollection of the 
events. You are asking him to speculate, 
guesstimate on matters many, many years ago that 
he has no independent memory. 
THE WlTNESS: I don't recall. 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) Do you recall ever 
having any conversations with your fellow 
commissioners, Commissioner Hobza and 
Commissioner Bledsoe, regarding what type of 
animals they wanted the herd district to apply 
to? 
MR. SAARI: Objection. We supplied 
discovery, Counselor, to you indicating both of 
those people are dead and deceased. Having him 
testify as to people who are no longer here to be 
I 1 
2 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
\ 11 
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1 Q. (BY :MR. PECK) You can go ahead and l 1 
2 answer the question. j 2 
3 A. No, I don't recall any conversations 
1
1 3 
4 specifying animals. 4 
5 Q. You had stated that you were unfamiliar 5 
6 with the concept of a herd district. At the time 6 
7 this order was put out there did you have a 7 
8 concept of what the term "open range" entailed? 8 
9 A. That is pretty self-explanatory. Open 9 
10 range is open range. 10 
11 Q. Now, do you recall it being the intent J 11 
12 of this order to place a herd district over the i 12 
13 open range areas in Canyon County? I 13 
14 MR. SAARI: Objection. The document \1 14 
15 speaks for itself. 15 
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 1 16 
17 MR. PECK: That is all the questions I I 17 
18 have. Oh, wait. One more. I guess this is just I 18 
19 to see ifl can spark your memory at all. I'm j 19 
20 not going to make it an exhibit. But I'm going \ 20 
Page 35 
something as an exhibit. You just can't put it 
out there and say, "I want to spark your memory." 
MR. PECK: I don't think I have to make 
it an exhibit. 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) If you would just go 
ahead and review that. This is essentially --
MR. WALTON: We'll make it an exhibit, 
then. I mean, I agree. If you are going to ask 
him questions about a document, then the only way 
we can possibly know what we are talking about a 
month from now is if we have that document at 
hand. 
MR. PECK: Okay. I mean, I don't mind 
making it an exhibit. I just don't want to make 
that an exhibit, because that is the only copy I 
have. Do you have a color copier here? 
MR. SAARI: I believe there is one in 
the courthouse. We can take a recess and have it 
copied. 
MR. WALTON: Let's go ahead and finish 
the questioning and make the copies afterwards 
so we are not delaying Mr. Koch any longer than 
we need to. 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) So we'll just call this 
that we are going to make color copies of that 
and include one as Exhibit 6 in the record. 
Does that sound good? 
MR. WALTON: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, looking over 
Exhibit No. 6 there, Mr. Koch. Do you recall 
seeing that particular map before? What is 
represented there? 
A. No, I don't. I thought there was just 
one area in Canyon County that was not included 
in the herd district. In my mind, before coming 
here today, I felt there was only one area in 
Canyon County that was not included in the herd 
district. And coming here today I find that 
there were three. And I assume that these white 
areas are the three areas that were not included. 
MR. PECK: That is all the questions I 
have. 
MR. SAARI: I just have a question or 
two. 
21 to have you look at it. ! 21 
22 Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, in reviewing that i 22 EXAMINATION 
23 map -- ! 23 QUESTIONS BY MR. SAARI: 
24 MR. SAARI: If you are going to ask him j 24 Q. Mr. Koch, based upon your testimony 
25 to try to spark his memory you need to mark 1 25 here today, with the events having occurred so 
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long ago, it's true, is it not, that you don't ii ~ 
have a recollection one way or the other what the 
events were surrounding the adoption of that herd I ! 
ERRATA SHEET FOR GLENN KOCH 
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ___ _ Reads _____________ _ 
Should Read ___________ _ 
district order referenced in Deposition Exhibit I 
No. 4? ! 5 
MR. PECK: I object to the form of the I 6 
question. \ 7 Page_Line_ReasonforChange ___ _ I Reads _ _____  _ 
Q. (BY MR. SAARI) You can answer. ' a Should Read ! 9 ~~~~~~-~~-
A. No, I do not recall. I Page_Line_Reason for Change 
Q. One way or the other? i 10 Reads ----
A. One way or the other. I u Should Read ___________ _ 
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ___ _ 
Reads ____________ _ 
Should Read ___________ _ 
MR. SAARI: I have nothing further. I 12 Page_Line_ReasonforChange ___ _ 
MR WALTON I h t
. j Reads _____________ _ 
. : ave no ques ions. ! 13 Should Read 
MS. SULLIVAN: I have no questions. I 14 -----------
MR. PECK: Thanks for coming in. I Page_ Line_ Reason for Change ___ _ ! 1s Reads _________ _ _ 
(Deposition concluded at 4:45 p.m.) 1 Should Read ___________ _ 
(Exhibit No. 6 marked.) 1
1 
:; Page_Line_ReasonforChange ___ _ 
(Signature requested.) Reads--------------11a Should Read ___________ _ 
I
I 19 
Page _Line_ Reason for Change ___ _ 
j 20 Reads 
1 
Should:-::Read-.,------------
1 21 
l 22 Page_Line _Reason for Change ___ _ 
! Reads I 23 Should'""Read-,-------------
1 24 You may use another sheet if you need more room. 
Page 38125 WITNESS SICNATIJRE 
CERTIFICATE OF WITNESS REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
Page 39 
age 40 
I, GLENN KOCH, being first duly sworn, 2 
depose and say: 3 
I, MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR No. 471, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify: 
That I am the witness named in the foregoing 4 
deposition, consisting of pages l through 37; 5 
that I have read said deposition and know the 6 
contents thereof; that the questions contained 7 
therein were propounded to me; and that the I 8 
answers contained therein are true and correct, I' 9 
except for any changes that I may have listed on 10 
That the foregoing proceedings were taken 
before me at the time and place therein set 
forth, at which time the witness was put under 
oath by me; 
That the testimony and all objections made 
were recorded stenographically by me and 
transcribed by me or under my direction; 
the Change Sheet attached hereto: ' 11 
2 DATED this __ day of , 2008. I 12 
3 ---- !13 
0 
1 That the foregoing is a true and correct 
record of all testimony given, to the best of my 
ability; 
4 I 14 
5 GLENN KOCH ! 15 
6 IIB 
7 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 17 
s day of , 2008. I 1s 
9 1~ 
I further certify that I am not a relative 
or employee of any attorney or party, nor am I 
financially interested in the action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal 
this __ day of , 2008. 
~ i~ 
'.l NAME OF NOTARY PUBLIC j 21 MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471 
'.2 ! 22 Notary Public 
'.3 NOTARY PUBLIC FOR I 23 P.O. Box 2636 
4 RESIDING AT j 24 Boise, Idaho 83701-2636 
5 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES [ 25 My commission expires August 3, 2012 
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Page 5 Page 7 
1 LEON K. JENSEN, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 
3 said cause, testified as follows: 
1 you need a break at any time or for any reason, 
2 tell me or tell your attorney and we'll finish 
4 MR. PECK: Please let the record 
5 reflect that this is the time and place for the 
6 deposition of Leon Jensen. This deposition is 
7 taken pursuant to notice and the Idaho Rules of 
8 Civil Procedure. 
9 I think originally we had noticed this 
lO up for 3:30. Luckily Mr. Jensen was available 
l1 for this earlier setting. 
l2 Once again, we have Mr. Tim Walton with 
l3 us on behalf of Luis Guzman. We have Megan 
l4 Sullivan on behalf of co-defendant Jennifer 
l5 Sutton. Mr. Saari on behalf of Canyon County. 
l6 And my name is Ryan Peck, and I'm here 
L7 representing Mr. Dale Piercy. 
18 EXAMINATION 
l9 QUESTIONS BY MR. PECK: 
20 Q. Now, would you please state your full 
21 name and spell your last name for the record. 
22 A. My name is Leon Keith Jensen. My last 
23 name is spelled J-e-n-s-e-n. 
24 Q. Have you ever had your deposition taken 
.... o..-~.-o? 
3 your answer if we're in the middle of it and then 
4 we'll have a break. 
5 A. Okay. 
6 Q. Now, sometimes after answering a 
7 question to the best of your knowledge, you will 
8 remember additional information later in the 
9 deposition. If you do, just inform us that you 
10 would like to add something to an earlier answer, 
11 and we can do that before going forward. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
j 19 
120 
121 
122 
, 23 
I 24 
i 
Q. Now, are you taking any medications or 
drugs of any kind which might make it difficult 
for you to understand and answer my questions? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you had anything alcoholic to 
drink in the last eight hours? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you sick at all today? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there any reason you can think of 
why you will not be able to answer my questions 
fully and truthfully? 
Page s I 
1 A. Yes, sir. 1 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
2 Q. And when was the most recent occasion? 2 Now, if you could just let me know what 
3 A. About two years ago as I recall. I 3 your job title is. 
4 Q. It's been a little while. As part of I 4 A. I'm the executive director of 
5 the deposition process, f ll be asking you .
1
, 65~ development services for Canyon County. 6 questions, as well as the other attorneys. Q. And how long have you had that job? 
7 You're under oath today, and this oath has the A. I'm in my second year as the director. 
8 same force and effect as if administered in a Q. And what position did you have prior to 
9 court of law. I 9 that? 
.0 As you answer the questions, the court I 10 A. I've worked in -- for Canyon County as 
.1 reporter will take down everything that we say; ' 11 code enforcement officer, zoning officer, current 
.2 therefore, we need to speak up and you need to I 12 planner, long-range planner, assistant director. 
.3 give oral answers to my questions. j 13 Q. Well, when did you first start working 
.4 Do you understand? 1 14 for Canyon County? 
5 . I 15 M h f 994 . A. Yes, sir. . A. arc o 1 . 
. 6 Q. I may ask you a question that I don't 116 Q. And what was your initial title? 
.7 state very well or that for some reason you don't ! 17 A. Code enforcement officer. 
8 understand. If that happens, don't answer the i 18 Q. And how long did you do that? 
.9 questions. Just tell me that you don't I 19 A. About one year. 
~O understand the question, and I'll try to ask a I 20 Q. Excuse me? ~1 better question. I 21 A. About one year. 
~2 A. (Nods). ! 22 Q. One year. And then what do you move on 
~3 Q. Do you understand? i 23 to? ~4 A. I do. j 24 A. And then I went to becoming a zoning 
~5 Q. Now, I want you to understand that if ! 25 officer . 
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1 Q. And how long were you a zoning officer? I 1 directly for -- as a shock absorber between them 2 A. Approximately four years. I 2 and the public. 3 Q. And then what was your position after I 3 Q. And what records are maintained in your 4 that? I 4 office? 
5 A. We had some changes internally in the I 5 A. We keep all records of public hearings. 6 office, and we then started calling some of our 6 We keep a record of the findings, conclusions, 
7 zoning officers "planners," and I became an i 7 and order for all public hearings, both at the I 
8 assistant planner. I 8 planning and zoning commission or hearing 
9 Q. How long were you an assistant planner? I 9 examiner level, as well as copies of the FCOs --
10 A. Probably about two years. I 10 findings, conclusions, and order -- for the Board 
I 
11 Q. And then did you become an assistant i 11 of County Commissioners. We don't generate 
12 director at that time? I 12 those, but we get copies of them and they become 
13 A. Actually, I forgot one spot that I I 13 part of our record. 
14 probably fulfilled -- probably -- I did fulfill. I 14 We keep copies of all the files for 
15 It was called principal planner. I 15 public hearings. We are currently scanning those 
16 Q. Okay. 16 into electronic format for the last several 
17 A. The person who was my supervisor went j 17 years. We keep all zoning compliance copies. We 
18 to becoming the assistant director, and I became I 18 keep building permit copies, application permits. 
19 the principal planner. I 19 Code enforcement information we keep. 
20 Q. Okay. And then at some point you 20 We've had to store some of that offsite, but 
21 became the assistant director? 
' 121 we -- we're -- now with this scanning capability 
22 A. That's correct. 22 we're bringing those back and starting to scan 
23 Q. And do you recall when that was? 123 those as well. 
24 A. 2000 -- probably about 2003, 24 Q. Okay. Now, when you say you keep all 
Page 10 Page 12 
1 Q. Now, as the executive director of 1 "public hearings"? 
2 development services, what are your 2 A. The land use hearings.· Specifically it 
3 responsibilities? 3 can be rezones. It can be variance hearings. 
4 A. My responsibilities are to manage the 4 When people want to divide their land, if they 
5 department staff. Fully staffed, there's about 5 have no administrative outlet to divide their 
6 30 of us, including building departments and 6 property, then we put them through the hearing 
7 officials -- building department official and 7 process. If they want to rezone their property, 
8 clerical staff for the building department, as 8 it's a public hearing. If they have a need for a 
9 well as clerical staff for our own department, 9 variance, that requires a public hearing. If 
10 our own development services department. Also 10 businesses come in and want to put in certain 
11 building inspectors. There are five or six of 11 business, those generally entail a public 
12 those gentlemen. And code enforcement officer is · 12 hearing. 
13 one of the people who work in my office as well. 13 Q. And who's involved in the public 
14 We have current -- we now have people 14 hearing? 
15 that work in current planning, and they meet the 15 A. Usually myself or One of my 
16 public every day about regular issues, such as 16 representatives. I have a long-range planning 
17 getting a zoning compliance permit, applying for 117 administrator who works that. We have a 
18 building permits. And then we have long-range 118 recording secretary who's there. We have a staff 
19 planners who deal specifically with the public ! 19 member or members who may represent various cases 
20 hearing process, the writing of ordinances. I 20 that night, and members of the planning and 
21 Those are their main duties, plus public hearing. ! 21 zoning commission. 
22 We go to hearings -- we've been going 22 Q. Okay. So this isn't hearings in front 
23 to hearings virtually every Thursday night for 23 of the Canyon County Commissioners? This is just 
24 the last four or five years. 24 within your office? 
25 I also report to the board of directors . 25 A. That's correct. Appeals are different. 
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1 LINDA L. LANDIS, 1 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 2 
3 said cause, testified as follows: 3 
4 MR. PECK: Please let the record 4 
5 reflect that this is the date and place for the 5 
6 deposition of Linda Landis. 6 
7 We are starting about approximately an 7 
8 hour after we had originally determined to take I 8 
9 this deposition, but we are all here now and ,. 9 
0 we're beginning. 1 10 
1 This deposition is taken pursuant to 11 
2 notice and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 12 
. 3 EXAMINATION 13 
.4 QUESTIONS BY MR. PECK: 114 
.5 Q. Ms. Landis, if you would please state 115 
.6 your full name and spell your last name for the l 16 
.7 record. 117 
.8 A. Linda Louise Landis, L-a-n-d-i-s. I 18 
.9 Q. Thank you. 119 
20 Have you ever had your deposition taken j 20 
21 before? 21 
22 A. No. 1
1
22 
23 Q. Well, I'm going to be asking you 23 
24 questions, and you're under oath today, and this I 24 
Page 61 
1 administered in a court oflaw. 1 
25 oath has the same force and effect as if I 25 
2 As you answer the questions, the court 2 
3 reporter will take down everything that we say; 3 
4 therefore, we need to speak up and you need to 4 
5 give oral answers to my questions. The reporter 5 
6 cannot record a shake or a nod. 6 
7 Do you understand? 7 
8 A. Yes, I do. I 8 
9 Q. And we also like to avoid certain II 9 
.0 colloquialisms like "uh-huh" and "uh-uh." So 1 10 
.1 even though the court reporter will actually take j 11 
.2 those down, it doesn't produce a very good I 12 
.3 record. j 13 
. 4 Do you understand that? 114 
.5 A. I understand. , 15 
.6 Q. Now, I may ask you a question that I I 16 
.7 don't state very well or that for some reason you I 17 
8 don't understand. If that happens, don't answer 111
1
8
9 9 the question. Just tell me that you don't 1 
!O understand the question and I'll try and rephrase I 20 
!1 it. Is that fair? I 21 ~2 A. That's fair. I 22 I 
Page 7 
will finish your answer, if we are in the middle 
of it, and then we can take a break. 
Do you understand? 
A I understand. 
Q. Okay. Now, if you want to speak with 
your attorney, that's fine. I'd just ask that 
you finish your answer if we are in the middle of 
an answer, and then you may speak to your 
attorney. 
Do you understand that? 
A Yes,ldo. 
Q. Thank you . 
Now, sometimes after answering the 
question to the best of your knowledge you will 
remember additional information later on in the 
deposition that's responsive to the previous 
question. If that happens, just stop me where 
I'm at. We'll go back and fill in the additional 
information that you remembered, and then we'll 
proceed from that point. 
Do you understand? 
A. Yes, Ido. 
Q. Thank you. 
Now, a few background questions, just 
some other things --
MR. WALTON: May I just make a comment. 
MR. PECK: Oh, go ahead. 
MR. WALTON: Just so know, you can talk 
to your lawyer anytime you want, whether it's 
before or after you answer the question, just so 
you know. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. WALTON: You're welcome. 
Q. (BY MR PECK) Are you taking any 
medications or drugs of any kind which might make 
it difficult for you to understand and answer my 
questions? 
A No . 
Q. Have you had anything alcoholic to 
drink in the last eight hours? 
A No . 
Q. Are you sick at all today? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there anything reason you can think 
of why you will not be able to answer my 
questions fully and truthfully? 
A. No. 
~3 Q. I also want you to understand that if 123 Q. Now, if you could, just tell me what ~4 you need a break at any time or for any reason, j 24 your employment is. 
5 you should tell me or tell your attorney, and we I 25 A. I'm a legal secretary with the Canyon 
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1 County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. · 1 
2 Q. And how long have you worked in that l 2 
3 position? I 3 
4 A. I've been there since October of2005. ;1.! 4 
5 Q. And did you work with the County prior 5 
6 to that? 6 
7 A. No, I did not. I 7 
8 Q. Okay. Where did you work prior to 1 8 
9 working for the prosecutor's office? I 9 
10 A. I was the city clerk/treasurer for the I 10 
11 City ofNotus. 111 
12 Q. And how long were you in that position? , 12 
13 A. Just shy of20 years. \ 13 
14 Q. And if you could just describe for the 1 14 
15 record where the City of Notus is. j 15 
16 A. It is between the cities of Caldwell 16 
17 and Panna on Highway 20/26. 17 
18 Q. So that's also in Canyon County? 18 
19 A. Yes, it is. 19 
20 Q. And what were your responsibilities 20 
21 w.ith the city clerk's office there in Notus? 21 
22 A. Maintain all records of the council. I 22 
23 maintained the records of all of the financial 11 23 
24 elements of the City. I billed all water and 24 
25 sewer accounts for the City Those are the 25 
Page 10 
Page 11 
try to keep them in order, make sure things are 
in their proper places. 
Q. And what, I guess, typically warrants a 
file being created? How does it come to be that 
a file is created, and what warrants that? Is it 
an action against the County or -- or what kind 
of things generate files, I guess, what kind of 
matters? 
A. Issues that the County will have to 
make a decision on. It is not limited to a 
filing against the County. It is what issues 
that our department is working on could create a 
new file. 
Q. Okay. And so typically when -- I guess 
a hypothetical example, ifthe County 
Commissioners wanted advice on some particular 
issue and requested legal advice from the civil 
attorneys, would that warrant a file being 
created on that issue? 
A. It could; yes. 
Q. Okay. And when you say, "it could," 
sometimes it doesn't? 
A. A lot of those are determined by the 
attorneys, not determined by me. So if -- if an 
issue, the attorney wants a file created, that's 
Page 12 
1 primary things. There's smaller things that come 1 when we will create a file. 
2 from those. 2 Q. So you don't independently create a 
3 Q. Okay. And what are your present 3 file unless an attorney requests that a file be 
4 responsibilities as a legal secretary for the 4 created? 
5 prosecutor's office? 5 A. Ifthere is not an existing file -- as 
6 A. I'm a legal secretary with the civil 6 a civil secretary if-- if we are given an issue 
7 division, and that job includes assisting all the 7 that does not have an existing file to it, we can 
8 attorneys in preparation of correspondence, 8 create a file, but the majority of the files are 
9 preparation of contracts, the -- maintaining the 9 created at the request of an attorney. 
10 records, keeping files of all of the issues that 10 Q. Okay. And when you say you can create 
11 the civil attorneys work on. 11 a file, is that just a discretionary thing on 
12 Q. Any other responsibilities? And I 12 your part? 
13 recognize that's a lot, what you've said, so -- 13 Let's say an issue comes in and you 
14 A. Without going into specific details, 114 don't have an existing file on it, yet there's 
15 I -- maintaining the files, assisting in the 15 been no request from an attorney to create a 
16 preparation of the documents that -- that they 16 file, would there be circumstances where you 
17 are working on. I don't know how else to answer, ! 17 would create a file anyway? I'm just trying to 
18 I guess. 118 get the protocol here. 
19 Q. Okay. And that's fine. Let's talk a • 19 A. We will not create a file unless one of 
20 little bit about your responsibility of j 20 the attorneys comes to us and maybe they have 
21 maintaining records. i 21 given us a packet of paperwork that if they have 
22 What records do you typically maintain? j 22 not actually filled out a file request form, it 
23 A. Any of the issues that our civil i 23 is possible that we will open a file and give 
24 attorneys do that will create a file in our I 24 that paperwork back to them. 
25 office, I am one who will maintain those records, I 25 So it's -- it is possible that we would 
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1 documents that are currently being maintained in I 1 EXAMINATION I 2 the prosecutor's office? I 2 QUESTIONS BY MR. WALTON: 
I 
3 A. Yes, I believe they are. 
I 
3 Q. Ms. Landis, Exhibit Bin front of you, 
4 Q. So let's see. Do you know -- let's see 4 page 1, I think you said that was a 1977 motion, I 5 here. To your knowledge -- it looks to me from I 5 is what you described it as. Do you remember 
6 reviewing the documents that you received a I 6 saying that? 
7 response from -- let's see -- Mr. Wynkoop with I 7 A. Yes, I do. I i 8 regards to that letter on October 4, 2005; I 8 Q. And I just wanted to kind of establish 
9 correct? I 9 one thing. Would it be more accurate to say that 
.0 A. Yes. I 10 that's what that purports to be in tenns of what I ll Q. And do you know of any other written In you know from your own personal knowledge, 
l2 response by Mr. Wynkoop regarding the I 12 whether it is or not? Do you know what I'm 
l3 correspondence of September 1, 2005? ! 13 asking you? I l4 A. Not without reviewing every document in 114 A. I'm just reading it right off of the 
l5 the file, no, I do not. I 15 paper. It describes itself as a motion. 
lG Q. Let's see. And ifl understand it -- 116 Q. Yeah. Were you here in 1977? I L7 and then we also have a written response on 17 A. No. No, I was not. 
L8 October 19, 2005, by -- it's the last page there 1 1a Q. So it purports to be what you called 
L9 of Exhibit A -- by Mr. Gigray; is that correct? I 19 it; correct? I 20 A. Yes .. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Are those the only two written 21 Q. Whether or not it actually is or what 
22 responses that are contained in Exhibit C from 22 it is, it's just a document that was in the file; I 23 the -- correspondence from the prosecutor's 23 is that a fair statement? 24 office? 24 A. That is true. 
Page 30 I I 
I 
1 this Exhibit C packet; yes. 1 about that document, do you? 
2 Q. And do you have any knowledge regarding 2 A. No, I do not. I 3 whether there are any other written responses to 3 Q. In fact, other than the two letters 
4 these correspondences in Exhibit C elsewhere in 4 that you mentioned that you were involved in on 
5 the prosecutor's file? I 5 October 7 of2005, do you have any personal I I 6 A. Again, I would have to go through each I 6 knowledge about any of the documents that we have 
7 file and check every document. I do not know I 7 looked at today? 
8 that answer now. I a A. No. I 9 Q. Okay. How many legal secretaries are l1~ l\1R. WALTON: No further questions. LO there for the civil division? MS. SULLIVAN: I have no questions. 
L1 A. Two. 1 n l\1R. SAARI: I have no questions. I 12 Q. Yourself, and then who is the name of 112 l\1R. PECK: That's fine. I don't have 
13 the other person? I 13 any further questions either. 
14 A. Jodi Ruhs, R-u-h-s. ! 14 (Deposition concluded at 10:53 A.M.) I 15 Q. And what was the name of the person I 15 (Signature requested.) 
16 that you replaced, I guess? Do you know? I 15 
17 A. Suzi White. I 17 I 18 Q. And do you know the names of any of the I 18 
19 legal secretaries for Canyon County that were i 19 
20 employed in 1982 with the civil division? I 20 I 21 A. No, l do not. I 21 ! 22 l\1R. PECK: Okay. I think that's all ! 22 
23 the questions I have. I 23 I 24 l\1R. WALTON: I'll go. 124 25 MR. PECK: Go ahead. '25 
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I 
1 MONICA N. REEVES, I 1 A. Okay. I 2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to I 2 Q. Do you understand? I I 
3 said cause, testified as follows: I 3 A. I do. I 
4 MR. PECK: Please let the record I 4 Q. Thank you. I I 5 reflect that this is time and place for the I 5 Now, I may ask you a question that I i 6 deposition of Monica Reeves. This deposition is l 6 don't state very well or that for some reason you 
7 taken pursuant to notice and the Idaho Rules of I 7 don't understand. And ifthat happens, don't I l 8 Civil Procedure. I a answer the question. Just tell me that you don't 
9 I believe the notice in this case i 9 understand it, and I'll try and ask a better 
. 0 actually had this deposition occurring at 1 :30, I 10 question . I .1 but because of time with the shortness of the i 11 A. Okay. 
.2 prior deposition, we're doing this one a little I 12 Q. I also want you to understand that if 
.3 bit early. !13 you need a break at any time or for any reason, I .4 Is that everyone's understanding? I 14 you should tell me or tell your attorney, and I 15 .5 MR. WALTON: Yes. we'll finish your answer if we're in the middle 
l6 MR. PECK: Great. I 16 of it and then we'll have a break. I l7 MR. WALTON: Thanksforwakingmeup. I 17 A. Okay. l8 MR. PECK: For the record, we have Tim r 18 Q. Now, sometimes after answering a [9 Walton with us on behalf of Mr. Guzman, Meghan I 19 question to the best of your knowledge you will I 20 Sullivan on behalf of co-defendant Sutton. My 20 remember additional information later in the 21 name is Ryan Peck, and I'm here on behalf of 121 deposition. If you do, just let us know that you 22 Mr. Piercy. And Mr. Saari is here with us on 22 want to add something to a previous question, and 
23 behalf of Canyon County. . 23 we'll go back and fill in the additional I 24 MR. SAARI: Yes, sir. 124 information. 
Page 6 I I 1 EXAMINATION 
\ 
1 Q. Now, are you taking any medications or 
2 QUESTIONS BY MR. PECK: 2 drugs of any kind which might make it difficult I 3 Q. All right. Now, Ms. Reeves, if you I 3 for you to understand and answer my questions? I I 4 could please state your full name and spell your 
I 
4 A. No. 
5 last name for the record. 5 Q. Have you had anything alcoholic to I 6 A. Okay. Monica Nicole Reeves, I 6 drink in the last eight hours? I 7 R-e-e-v.,.e-s. 7 A. No. 
I 
8 Q. (BY MR. PECK) And have you ever had I a Q. Are you sick at all today? I 9 your deposition taken before? I 9 A. No. 
10 A. No, not that I recall. I 10 Q. Is there any reason you can think of --
11 Q. We're doing a lot of first-timers 11 ·or -- let me rephrase it. I 12 today. 12 Is there any reason you can think of 
13 A. Yeah. 113 why you will not be able to answer my questions 
14 Q. Well, I'm going to be asking you 114 fully and truthfully? I 15 questions, and you're under oath today, and this I 15 A. No. 16 oath has the same force and effect as if 16 Q. If you could tell me what your job 
17 administered in a court oflaw. 117 title is. I 18 As you answer questions, the court 18 A. I'm a deputy clerk in.the Canyon County I 19 reporter will take down everything that we say; I 19 Commissioners' office. 
20 therefore, it's important that we speak up and 120 Q. And how many deputy clerks are there?· I 21 that you give oral answers to the questions that ! 21 A. There are three in that office. 22 I ask. ! 22 Q. And how long have you had this job? I 
23 Now, the court reporter, even though I 23 A. I've been in that office 19 years. 
24 he'll write down that you shook your head, that i 24 Q. Nineteen years as a deputy clerk? I I 25 doesn't make a good transcript. I 25 A. Yes. 
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1 :MR. PECK: You can go ahead and answer I 1 
2 the question. 
1
1 2 
3 THE WITNESS: Could you restate it? 3 
4 :MR. PECK: Let me have the court I 4 
5 reporter read it back so we have the exact 1
11
_,.I! 5; 
6 question. 
7 (Record read back.) 
8 :MR. WALTON: Okay. Nowwaitaminute. I 8 
9 So you're saying you're not asking her about what ii 9 
0 was going on in 1982? 1 10 
1 :MR. PECK: No. 111 
2 :MR. WALTON: Okay. So we're I 12 
3 stipulating that you're asking her about I 13 
4 procedures that occurred since she began \ 14 
5 employment here; true? 115 
.6 :MR. PECK: Yes. i 16 
.7 :MR. WALTON: Okay. ,. 17 
.8 THE WITNESS: Okay. Since I began 18 
.9 employment it would be typical that, yes, if a 19 
20 map was attached to some -- or if there was a map 20 
n that was adopted, it would be attached to the 21 
22 minutes for ease of reference so that you can I 22 
23 have in front of you what you're looking at. I 23 
24 :MR. PECK: Okay. Thank you. And I I 24 
detailed notes and files than -- in my opinion 
than they did when I first started because --
well, just because you have so many people asking 
to see things. 
Q. So in reality there have been 
progressions and changes in your job since you 
began working here 19 years ago; true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, actually, you do do things 
differently today than what did you 19 years ago; 
true? 
A. True. 
Q. Okay. Now, ifl understood correctly, 
there was a search conducted looking for herd 
district stuff? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that search was conducted by 
Claudia Amaral? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you didn't conduct the search? 
A. I did a search on my own. It's a 
limited -- it's not as broad of a program that 
she has, but I looked for things on my computer 
to see if there were minutes from meetings a 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 :MR. WALTON: I just have a few, if you 1 I came up with nothing. 
2 don't mind. 2 Q. Okay. I 
3 EXAMINATION 3 A. And I asked her to do a more extensive 
4 QUESTIONS BY:rv.tR. WALTON: 4 search. 
5 Q. What you've talked about today is how I 5 Q. Okay. But you don't know what search I 
6 procedures have been conducted in the County J 6 she did, do you --
7 Commissioners' office, to your knowledge, since i 7 A. No. 
8 you began working there; true? I 8 Q. -- exactly? I 
9 A. That's true. I 9 A. Exactly, I don't. 
10 Q. It's correct to say, is it not, that 10 Q. You don't know how she searched? 
11 you have no knowledge of procedures as they were · 11 A. No. I 
12 carried out in 1982? I 12 Q. Okay. For example, would it be your 
13 A. That's true. J
1
1
1
3
4 
understanding that ifthere was a herd district 
14 Q. Okay. And I think a question was asked created in 1908, that the herd district search I 
15 of you whether there have been any changes since I 15 that Claudia did should have turned that up? 
16 you began working for the commissioners' office 1116 A. I don't know that her program goes back 
17 in how you deal with commissioners' files, and I 17 that far, so I don't know how she would -- I 
18 think you said there was no change; is that I 1a Q. My point exactly. Do you know if her 
19 correct? j 19 program even goes back to 1982 from your own. 
20 A. That's right. I 20 personal knowledge? I 
21 Q. But in fact there have been changes, I 21 A. I do. not know that. 
22 haven't there? Didn't you start out working with i 22 Q. Yeah. So the effectiveness of her 
23 a steno pad and began using computers? ! 23 search as respects what might have occurred in 1 24 A. Yes. You're right. I would say that I 24 1982, you just don't know; fair? 25 we are more -- more detailed. We keep more ! 25 A. That's fair. 
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1 WILLIAM H. HURST, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 
3 said cause, testified as follows: 
4 MR. PECK: Please Jet the record 
5 reflect that this is the time and place for the 
Page 5 
1 your answer if we're in the middle of it, and 
2 then we'll have a break. 
3 Do you understand? 
4 A. I do. 
5 Q. Not that I anticipate that we'll need a 
6 break. 
Page 7 
6 deposition of William H. Hurst. This deposition 
7 is taken pursuant to notice and the Idaho Rules 
8 of Civil Procedure. 
9 Once again, we have Mr. Tim Walton here 
lO on behalf of Luis Guzman. And Ms. Meghan 
.1 Sullivan here on behalf of co-defendant Jennifer 
.2 Sutton. And Mr. Charles Saari on behalf of 
7 
8 
9 
Sometimes after answering a question to 
the best of your knowledge you'll remember 
additional information later in the deposition. 
10 If you do, just inform us that you'd like to add 
11 something to an earlier response, and we'll stop 
12 right there and do that while it's on your mind . 
.3 Canyon County. And myself, Mr. Ryan Peck, on 
. 4 behalf of Dale Piercy. 
.5 EXAMINATION 
6 QUESTIONS BY MR. PECK: 
7 Q. Mr. Hurst, ifl could have you state 
8 your full name and spell your last name for the 
9 record. 
~o A. Okay. It's William H. Hurst, 
~1 H-u-r-s-t. 
~2 Q. Have you ever had your deposition taken 
~3 before? 
~4 A. Yeah, I have, several years ago. I 
Page 6 
13 Is that all right? 
14 A. That's okay with me . 
15 Q. Are you taking any medications or drugs 
16. of any kind which might make it difficult for you 
17 to understand and answer my questions? 
18 A. No. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Q. Have you had anything alcoholic to 
drink in the last eight hours? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you sick at all today? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there any reason you can think of 
1 Q. So it was a long time? 1
11
1 1 fully and truthfully? 
2 A. It was a long time ago. 2 A. No. 
3 Q. Okay. Well, I'm going to be asking you 3 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
4 questions today, and you're under oath today, and I 4 Now, ifl could just get your -- what 
5 this oath has the same force and effect as if 1 5 is your job title? 
6 administered in a court of law. '
1
1 6 A. Do you want an informal, semi-formal, 
7 As you answer my questions or answer 7 or formal? 
8 the questions from the other attorneys, the court I 8 Q. Let's start with the formal. 
9 reporter will be taking down everything that we ,. 9 MR. WAL TON: He's going to want all 
O say. And, therefore, it's important that we 1 10 three before we're done. 
1 speak up and that you give oral answers to my j 11 THE WITNESS: The formal? 
2 questions so the court reporter can take those I 12 Q. (BY MR. PECK) Yes, sir. 
3 down. l 13 A. Okay. I am the Clerk of the District 
4 Do you understand? l 14 Court for the Third Judicial District, in and for 
5 A. Yes, I do. \ 15 the County of Canyon, ex officio auditor and 
S Q. Now, I may ask you a question that I 1 16 recorder. Then there are subtitles to that, too. 
l don't state very well or that for some reason you ! 17 THE WITNESS: How did I do, Chuck.? 
g don't understand. If that happens, don't answer ! 1a MR. SAARI: Fine. 
9 it. Simply state that you don't understand, and l 19 MR. PECK: Sounds good to me. 
O I'll try to ask a better question. \ 20 Q. (BY MR. PECK) And how long have you 
1 Do you understand that? I 21 been a clerk? 
2 A. I do. I 22 A. Eighteen months. 
3 Q. I also want you to understand that if I 23 Q. And did you work with Canyon County 
4 you need a break at any time for any reason, you ! 24 prior to that? 
5 should let me know or your attorney and finish I 25 A. Not -- not immediately prior. I worked 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 1 
2 BILL A. STAKER 2 
3 was called as a witness, having been first duly 3 
4 sworn, was examined and testified on his oath as 4 
5 follows: 5 
6 --oOo-- 6 
7 BY MR. POPE: 7 
8 Q. Mr. Staker. my name is Michael Pope and 8 
9 l represent Dale Piercy in this lawsuit in Canyon 9 
10 County. ldaho. l appreciate you taking the time to · 10 
11 meet with us today. : 11 
12 Have you ever had your deposition taken ; 12 
13 before? i l3 
14 A. Yes, I have. ; 14 
15 Q. When was that? 15 
16 A. J can't remember, but I've had more than 1 6 
17 one deposition taken. l ~ • J 
1 ~ 
.L ti Q. Okay. Just a couple of background 18 
19 things before we get started. As you know. we've 19 
2 {) ,, got a few attorneys on the telephone. we've got a 20 
21 court reporter. so if you would be so kind as to 2 1 
22 wait until l've finished asking the question, and l 22 
23 will try and do the same as you answer the question. 23 
24 so we have a clear n..-cord with the court repo1ter 24 
25 and so that the other attorneys can hear what's 25 
869 
being said in case they need to make any objections 
or ask any questions. Okay? 
A. Unders[Ood. 
Q. Thank you. 
Where is your current residence? 
A. Salt Lake City. 
Q. Okay. And how long have you lived here'? 
A. About eight years. 
Q. Okay. Where did you live before that? 
A. Nampa. Idaho. 
Q. And how long did you live in Nampa'? 
A. Forty plus years. 
Q. And what did you do while you were in 
Nampa? 
A. I was in the insurance business, I was a 
county clerk, and I owned a bus company. 
Q. How old are you, Mr. Staker? 
A. Seventy-three. 
Q. Anything preventing you from answering 
questions today? Are you on any medication or -
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Great. Thank you very much. 
How long were you the county cferk in 
Canyon County? 
A. From 1978 to 1988. No. Yeah, 1978 to 
1988. 
Q. And how did you come to become the 
county derk? 
A. I replaced Walter Fry and then I was 
elected. 
Q. So did you serve two terms? 
A. A little bit more than two terms. They 
were four-year tenns, so l basically got in two and 
a half tenns. 
Q. What were your primary responsibilities 
as the county clerk? 
A. The county clerk's job was a pretty big 
one. He was clerk of the district court. elections 
official. clerk of the board of county 
commissioners. recorder. auditor. Did I say 
elections? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. That's about it. · 
Q. What kind of support staff did you have 
in the clerk's office'? 
A. About 40, 4 l deputies. 
Q. And how were the responsibilities 
divvied up? 
A. Basically they were assigned to the 
various divisions. You know, there was court 
2 {Pages 2 to 5) 
?ag~ l ·1 : 
l that's howl remember it. They wanted to take the 1 where herd districts were discussed'? 
parcels that were not herd district and make them 2 A. No, I don't. but this does look like one 
herd district so the whole county would be one. 3 of our -- an entry out of one of our minute books. 
-
2 
3 
4 That's how I recall it anyhow. 4 Q. Would this have been one of those 
5 Q. Do you recall being approached by any of 5 hearings, then. that you stated earlier where one of 
6 the commissioners during that time for your input or ~ 6 your support persons, deputy clerks, would have 
7 any instructions on how to proceed? 7 attended? 
8 A. No. No. They would have probabty gone 8 A. Yes. 
9 to the prosecuting attorney who also acted as their 9 Do you mind if I take time to read this? 
10 civil anomey. : 1 O Q. No. Please do. 
11 MR. POPE: Let's have that marked was : 11 (Mr. Staker reviews document.) 
12 Exhibit I. : 12 Mr. Staker, the first tine of that 
13 (Exhibit I was marked.) · 13 particular paragraph says, ''The following Resolution 
14 Q. Mr. Staker, I'm handing you what's been ; 14 was considered and adopted by the Canyon County 
marked as Exhibit 1 for your deposition. This is i 15 Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of December. 
part of the Idaho Code, 1968 edition. 'Iltis is ! 16 1982." Do you remember what the resolutions were as 
15 
16 
17 entitled 25, Chapter 24, concerning Herd Districts. : l 7 far as how the county commissioners acted on those? 
18 I'm going to have you look at a couple of sections, i 18 I know that's a really bad question. Let me try 
l9 and we'll talk aboul these for a moment. If you . 1 9 that again. Whal was a resolution as far as the 
20 will look at the bottom of the page I've opened to. ! 2 O county commissioners were concerned? 
21 which is Page 436, entitled -- I'm sorry- : 21 MR. SAARI: Objection to the form of the 
Section 25-2402. "Petition for district," do you : 22 question. It's very confusing. 
have any personal knowledge of a petition for a herd ' 2 3 THE WITNESS: I agree with that. l 
district being submitted in l 980. '81, or '82? · : 2 4 don't qutte understand what you're asking. 
22 
23 
24 
25 A. No. ! 2 5 . . _f?· .. ~.Y .~:-~~~~.!?.:~-~~-~!=~~~~~~Y- _ .. .. e ·----···-----·- -----·-·---··-·--··· ·---· ·~~ge 15 ! 
1 Q. Would the clerk's office have received i 1 
2 any type of petition for a herd district? l,1!'. 2 
3 A. l don't know. 3 
4 Q. Would lhat have been a normal matter ' 4 
' 5 filed with the clerk's office for any reason? 5 
6 A. I don't know that either. 6 
7 Q. Okay. If you'd look across the column 7 
8 there on what is Page 437, Section 25-2403, ''Notice 8 
9 of hearing petition,'' it states that the board of 9 
1 o Canyon commissioners after a petition for a herd ~ l O 
11 district is filed set a da\e and publ.ished a notice : 11 
12 of hearing. Do you have any personal recollection 12 
13 of a notice of hearing being published by the county 1 3 
14 commissioners in the early '80s concerning herd 14 
1 5 districts? : 15 
1 6 A. No, T don't : 16 
1 7 MR. POPE: Okay. Thank you. . l 7 
18 Let's mark that Exhibit 2, please. 18 
19 (Exhibit 2 was marked.) 19 
2 o Q. l'm handing you what's been marked as 2 0 
21 Exhibit 2, which are minutes from December 2. 1982. 21 
2 2 f n the center of the page there it states. : 2 2 
2 3 ''Resolution Passed Regarding Herd District in Canyon · 2 3 
2 4 County." Do you recall being present at a hearing 2 4 
2 5 of the county commissioners in December of 1982 2 5 
870 
here that this was a resolution which was 
considered. Do you have any .knowledge or 
recollection of what resolutions were as far as 
how - I'm still not getting that Let me try il 
different 
Petitions would be tiled by members of 
the public for the commissioners' consideration. 
This Exhibit 2 talks about a resolution. Do you 
know if there was any difference between the two? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. And l believe you've already testified 
that you were not personally aware of any petition 
for herd districts by anyone in the early '80s. 
A. I can't slllte whether there was one or 
whether there was not one. I don't have any memory 
of it. 
Q. Do you know whether or not a resolulion 
of the board of county commissioners would require a 
notice of hearing for the public's infonnation? · 
MR. SAARI: Objection to the form of the 
question. Tbe witness is being asked to express a 
legal opinion thal's beyond his ability to do so. 
Q. {BY MR. POPE} You can go ahead and 
answer it. 
A. 111e board of county commissioners would 
5 {Pages 14 to 17) 
1 that type of stuff. r would assume it was done l MS. SULLIVAN: l don't have any 
2 questions. 2 then. l read it in the newspaper now, so I assume 
3 they're following what [was doing then. 3 rv1 R~ POPE: !\1r. Saari? 
4 Q. Okay. Do you have any recollection of 4 MR. SAARI: I have no questions. 
5 this particular order being published in the 5 MR. POPE: Mr. Staker. thank you very 
6 newspaper in Canyon County? 6 much. 
7 A. No, f don't 7 THE Wl1NESS: You're welcome. 
8 Q. Would this be something that is also 8 MR. POPE: We will conclude this 
9 stored in some fashion in the clerk's office in 9 deposition. Counsel, thank you very much for your 
l 0 Canyon County? 10 time. 
11 A. It would have been in the commissioners' 11 MR. SAARI: You're welcome. 
12 minutes, yes. 12 (Concluded at f 1:38 a.m.) 
1 3 Q. How much did you associate with the 
1 4 three members of the commissions listed here in 
15 Exhibit 3, Carlos Bledsoe. Del Hobza, and Glenn 
l 6 Coke {phonetic). 
1 7 A. Koch. 
18 Q. Koch. ['m sorry. 
19 MR. SAARI: Objection to the fonn of the 
2 O question as to "associate with.'' 
2 l MR. POPE: In his professional capacity 
2 2 as Canyon County clerk. 
2 3 THE WITNESS: We would see each other on 
2 4 a daily basis. We were in the same building. l 
2 5 considered all three of those people to be friends. 
il3 
:14 
: 15 
·16 
:17 
'18 
: 19 
120 
121 
122 
)23 
l24 
~25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
We also were all from the same party, so when there ; ; 
was a party function, all of us would be at that. 
As far as personal associations after business 
CERTIF!C ATE Of 0El'ONE1'.T 
STATEOfl.ITAH 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
: 1 ) 
COUNTYOFSAl.T L .. KE l 
hours, z.ero. 
MR. POPE: Okay. Great. 
Mr. Staker, that's all the questions J 
have. l thank you very much for your time. 
I. Bfl..t A. STAKER. dcpunern. liEREBY 
: ~ ('fRTT~Y lhatl !me roatf ll..-fore;o1vg tcstunony, 
inunbered Ii-om 3 "' 24, ir1elu;;n.>o. a!ld f1i.: same IS• 
• & =and con<d tr.>•scnpll01t <1f said R:Wmony 
wllh aietxteplm11 ofll!t: lblfowmg;:onocti<n"' 
li>le<I below g1v1ug tny rcasoos tl-.:rcfor. 
Counsel, does anybody have any questions ; a 
for Mr. Staker? : 1 
MR. WAL TON: Just one question. . :~ 
This is Tim Walton. Mr. Staker~ and I · · 
think you answered this que~tion. but r just w-anted ::; 
the record to be clear. The question was posed to ; : 
you whether or not a notice of hearing was published ' : , 
in the newspaper with respect to the herd district ~ ;:-. 
that was created by the county commissioners in .. 
1982. Do you recall that question? 
THE WlTNESS: Yes. 
MR. WALTON: And as I understood your 
answer, you don't know if a notice of hearing was or · 1 ' 
was not published in the paper about that hearing. .:. 
Is that your testimony? . J! 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. 
DATf.OTH!S ....•.. DAY QI'.·-·-··· 
;~>t.3.1) PuM1c; MR. WALTON: That's all f have. 
MR. POPE: Mr. Saari? Ms. Sullivan? • ., ~'"1)- f'11ttmw,'l..f<ttt ~mrcs 
2008 
Page 25 
7 (Pages 22 to 25) 
871 
' ' .. . 
... RELEVANT PA~E$FROM MAY.10, 2006 
.. DEPOSITION OF DALE W. PIERCY 
872 
. . . . . . . , .. 
1-,. _ ,·:.:·i:,:_-
' . 
1 
''.~ ;-._ 
I 
I-'-'· -. ___ . _ .' --
·· .. ; 
I , 
.. .... 
, · ·. · . . 
i 
I · ·_ : ~. 
1·-
. " ·.' 
l~c- -_ 
. · .' 
':\~ " 
I-
I 
''· 
I 
... •. 
_··· : ____ : ·:: '._. 
• ~ .• . :: . . . l_. . . .... • ·• 
. . .. ~ . . . ' 
.. ·. 
. A4A}< '. 
IN - TH~ _ DI,STRICT COURT. OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D.ISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, . IN AND FOB.THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
·. ERIKA . L ;, RIV.ERA, by and thr.ough 
.. LOREE RIVERA "-her mother and natural 
'gi.19-rdiah, e~· al.' 
Plaintl.f:E s ,: 
vs. 
DALE w. _PIERCY, individually, and 
. JENNIF~R S.UTT_ON, indi_vidual_ly, . . 
Defendants. 
MAY 10, 2006 
/ . 
REPORTED BY: 
\ . . 
DEANN MORRIS, CSR No. 7 4 7, ,RPR 
Notary Public /' 
J 
) . 
) 
) . 
. - ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
. ) 
) 
) 
. ) 
.. ~ . 
. No. CV05-4S48 
CWL.L.O. 
1-_ -_· . ~CANNiD ho+ Lith,; bits 'iY 
IJo'fd indU.- · . )-_ / - . 
· 'utt ~ I~~~~~~~~~~~~-
r 
I. 
I 
·court --
Report_ing 
·service, Inc. 
Since 1970 
Regis tered ProfessiOnal Reporters 
SOUTHERN 
1 ~soo-234~~11 
•BOISE, ID 
208-345-9611 
• POCATELLO, ID 
208-232-5581 
8 TWIN FALLS, ID Ii ONTARIO, OR 
208-734-1700 541-881-1700 
873 
NORTHERN 
1-800-879-17oo' 
. . . 
• COEUR D'ALENE, ID 
208-765-1700 
• SPOKANE,WA 
. 5.09-455-4515 
Page 37 
I lands, we're talking about your cattl rations; 
2 rigl1t? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q. Just so that we're on the same page. All 
5 right. 
6 Do you use different fences for pastures that house 
7 bulls than pastures that --
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Same fencing? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. You don't use stronger fences for bulls, for 
12 example? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Are you connected with Fort Boise Cattle 
15 Company? 
16 A. Don't understand the question. 
17 Q. Do you have any relationship with an outfit 
18 called Fort Boise Cattle Company? 
19 A. No. 
20 MS. :MEIKLE: Objection to the form. 
21 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Do you know who that is? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Who is that? 
24 A. Don Weilmunster. 
25 Q. And you don't have any interest in that 
Page 38 
1 operation, I take it. 
2 A No. 
3 MS. MEIKLE: I just want to say that Mr. Piercy can 
4 take a break at any time, can't he, ifhe needs to? 
5 MR. WALTON: Absolutely. 
6 MS. MEIKLE: I don't think you told him so --
7 Q. (BY :MR. WALTON): Please, if you get to a point 
8 to where you've got to take a break, that's not a 
9 problem, sir. 
10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. How do you keep track of your cattle?· 
12 A. Don't understand the question. 
13 Q. Yeah, it was kind of a bad question. 
14 I understand that there are some outfits now that 
15 use, like, digital scanners, almost like a grocery 
16 checkout, for example, to keep track of where the cattle 
17 are and if they've got the right number and that sort of 
18 thing. Do you use anything like that? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Does that exist? Do you know? 
21 A. Not in beef cattle. 
22 Q. Okay. 
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I you want to keep of is you want to know have I got 
2 all my cattle and do I have some cattle that aren't 
3 mine. Isn't that something you're interested in? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. So how do you do that? 
6 A. I know where my cattle are. 
7 Q. Okay, 
8 A. I know what my cattle look like. 
9 Q. Because of the brand or for other reasons? 
IO A. You know your cattle if you're there every day. 
11 Q. You kind of know each and every one is what 
12 you're saying? 
13 · A. Close .. 
14 Q. Is it because your cattle are a different breed 
15 than the other guy's cattle? 
16 A. Some of them. 
17 Q. And what other ways are you able to distinguish 
18 your cattle from somebody else's? 
19 A. Brand. 
20 Q. Anything else? 
21 A. Ear tags. 
22 Q. Tell me about an ear tag. What's your ear tag 
23 all about? 
24 A. It's a number you put in the cow's ear so you 
25 can distinguish her from the rest of the heard. 
1 Q. And you know your numbering system, which is 
2 probably different from the next guy's? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. The lands upon which you kept livestock in 
5 Canyon County were all enclosed by fences; correct? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. The lands upon which you kept livestock in 
8 Canyon County were not lands _upon which cattle were 
9 permitted to roam by custom, license, lease, or permit; 
10 correct? 
11 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
12 And it calls for a legal con.clusion. 
13 Are you asking, Counsel, for him to come to a legal 
14 conclusion? 
15 :MR. WALTON: I'maskingjustwhatlasked. 
16 THE WITNESS: I don't understand. 
17 Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): Yeah, let me ask it again. 
18 The lands upon which your cattle were pastured were 
19 all enclosed, as we've established; correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Byfences. 
22 A. Yes. 
23 A. To my knowledge it doesn't exist in beef 23 Q. And none of those lands were lands upon which 
24 cattle. 24 cattle were permitted to roam free; correct? 
~5 Q. But as a cattleman, I assume one of the things 25 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form. 
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l Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): In ner words, outside of the I 1 MS.ME And it calls for a legal conclusion, 
2 enclosures. 
3 . A. I try to keep my cattle in the pasture. 
4 Q. It's accurate to say, is it not, that you've 
5 been a cattleman in Canyon County for -- what did you 
6 tell me -- 50 years; right? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. **As of March 20th, 2005, all lands upon which 
9 livestock are pastured in Canyon County are lands which 
10 are enclosed by fences; correct? 
11 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question 
12 and calls for a legal conclusion. 
13 Counsel, if you're asking him all lands in Canyon 
14 County, you're asking for a legal conclusion. And I'm 
15 going to object --
16 MR. WAL TON: Go ahead. Have at it. 
17 
18 
MS. MEIKLE: -- and ask him not to respond. 
MR. WAL TON: Well, you're going to take a risk 
19 because I'm going to take this before the Court .. 
20 
21 
So you're instructing him not to respond? 
MS. MEIKLE: I'm objecting to --
MR WAL TON: You're free to object. 
MS. MEIKLE: It calls for a legal conclusion. 
MR WAL TON: It actually doesn't. It's a factual 
question. 
~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~-;:: 
1 Q. **To your knowledge are all lands upon which 
2 livestock are pastured in Canyon County enclosed by 
2 "enclosed." 
3 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Go ahead and answer. 
4 A. Should I answer? 
5 MS. MEIKLE: And, again, I'm going to instruct you 
6 not to, because I think you're asking for a legal 
conclusion as to enclosed-- if the livestock are 
enclosed within Ada County. 
7 
i 8 
I 9 
! 10 
I 11 
I 12 
i 
! 13 
I 14 
l 1s ; 
I 16 
i 17 ; 
i 18 
! 19 
I 20 
!21 
I 22 
i 
l 23 
Ji4 
I 2s 
!ii· 
MR. WALTON: First of all, it's Canyon County. 
MS. MEIKLE: Canyon County, I'm sorry. 
MR. WAL TON: I think "enclosed by a fence" is 
something a third-grader understands, Sandra. It's a 
factual issue, and I'll ask the Court to rule on this . 
We can come back another day, Mr. Piercy, and rm 
sorry we'll have to do it. But that's fine . 
MS. MEIKLE: Are you asking a different question · 
than the one you asked before? 
MR. WAL TON: I asked what I asked. You objected. 
You instructed him not to answer. rm moving on. 
MS. MEIKLE: Well, I'm asking you to clarify your 
question. 
MR. WAL TON: What was difficult about it, Sandra? 
Really, honestly, what was difficult about that? 
MS. MEIKLE: You're asking Mr. Piercy --
Q. (BY MR WALTON): Mr. Piercy, let me ask you 
1 this question. 
2 All the cattle in Canyon County are fenced in, 
3 fences? It's that simple. i 
4 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. I 
5 And I'm instructing him not to answer. It calls for a 
3 aren't they? 
4 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
5 THE WITNESS: Should I answer? 
6 legal conclusion. 6 MS. MEIKLE: Do you know the answer to the 
7 MR. WALTON: Okay. 7 question? 
8 Q. Mr. Piercy, are you aware of any lands in 8 THE WITNESS: No. 
9 Canyon County where livestock is pastured that is not 9 Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): What cattle are not fenced in? 
1 O enclosed by a fence? I 10 A. There's different boundaries and fences on 
11 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. I 11 other different ranches. 
Again, it calls for a legal conclusion. J 12 Q. Well, when you say "not fenced in," you mean 
MR WALTON: Whether or not there are lands that ! 13 like there's sometimes rivers that keep the cattle in; 
livestock are pastured that is not enclosed by a fence j 14 right? 
in Canyon County is a legal conclusion? That's a I 1s A. Yes. 
factual issue. i 16 Q. Let's rephrase it then. 
! 
MS. MEIKLE: It depends on the definition of each i 17 You're not aware of any cattle in Canyon County · 
i 
one of those words. "Enclosed" --you're asking for I 18 that roam free, are you? 
Mr. Piercy to -- ! 19 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
MR WALTON: Okay. Let me rephrase. Let me i 20 THE WITNESS: I don't understand what1yoiftfueai:i by 
rephrase. J 21 "roam free." Where? . : 'Jt.' rJ,i . _,_·, 
Q. **To your knowledge, is there any livestock in I 22 Q. (BY MR.WAL TON): Outside of B'o~~~~ttucb~iis 
Canyon County that is not enclosed inside of a fence? I 23 fences rivers or natural barriers thatcoi1taf . . . /\ 
• • • 1 • ' ' _:: ·:ff~r~<· ~- · .'~~- '1'~l · 
MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. J 24 hvestock. , :" . ~- .;:' _,r..:·I;,;}h~'.::" 
. Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): Go ahead and answer. j 25 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the toill(Qriii . ,. 9ij:: 
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You can answer if you unde 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Q. (BY MR. WAL TON): What do you mean "no"? 
A. Everything is contained. 
Q. Okay. That's what I thought. Thanks. 5 
6 MR. EVETT: Would this be a good time to take a 
7 break? 
8 MS. MEIKLE: I'd like to take one. 
9 MR. WALTON: Fine by me. 
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1 A. Northof l on Highway 95. 
2 Q. The lands to i:he west of W amstad Road are 
3 leased lands, you've told me. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And approximately how many acres are colored in 
6 by you to the west of Wamstad? 
7 A. Approximately 150. 
8 Q. And how many lands -- how many acres do you 
9 lease for ranching? 
10 (Recess taken.) I 10 A. Approximately 200. 
MR. WALTON: Let's go on the record. I 11 Q. So where is the other 50 acres? 11 
12 Would you mark that as an exhibit for me. ! 12 A. It's on the Snake River. 
I 
13 (Exhibit 8 marked.) i 13 . Q. South of here -- south of that map? 
14 Q. (BYMR. WALTON): Mr.Piercy, I'mhandingyou j 14 A. Itwouldbenortheast. 
15 Exhibit 8. On Exhibit 8 there is a road going down the I 15 Q. Oh, northeast. Okay. 
16 middle of the photograph that's colored in orange that I 16 Now, the pasture from which this bull escaped is 
17 is Wamstad Road; correct? ! 17 part of the orange that you've colored in on Exhibit 8, ! 
18 A. Correct. I 18 is it not? 
19 Q. And then there's a road colored in yellow that j 19 A. Yes. 
20 is Lee Lane; correct? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. And you have been kind enough to color in for 
23 me some lands both to the east and to the west of 
24 W amstad Road and north of the Boise River; correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
120 
. 21 
I 22 
I 23 
l 24 
j 25 
Q. Where were the rest of your cattle on March 20, 
'05? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Would they have been in some of the lands 
depicted on Exhibit 8? 
A. No. 
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1 Q. And what are those lands that you've colored in 
2 for me in orange? 
3 A. Those are pasturelands. 
4 Q. And are those lands then where you run cattle? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And how many acres of that is owned by-what 
7 portion of that is owned by you? 
8 A. The east side of the road. 
9 Q. And do you lease the west side of the road? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And approximately how many acres are on the 
12 east side of the road? 
13 A. The pasture alone is 60 acres. 
14 Q. You say "the pasture alone." Is there 
15 something aside from the pasture on the east side of the 
16 road that you owned? 
17 A. River and wildlife area. 
1 Q. You're sure of that? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And when you say you don't know, what other 
4 possible locations could they have been in? 
5 
6 
7 
i 11 
' 112 
I ~! 
! 15 
I 16 
117 
A. On the 50 acres that we referred to earlier. 
Q. By the Snake River? 
A. Yes. And on the home place and --
Q. Your home place is north of Parma; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. How many acres do you have there? 
A. Four short 80s; approximately 300. 
Q. So your belief is they were either on the 
50 acres by the Snake River or on the home place, as you 
referred to it? 
A. Not all of them. There may have been other 
pastures and hayfields that I had rented from other 
farmers and --
18 Q. And I forget how many acres you told me you own ! 18 Q. I see. But were the pastures that you've 
19 that you ranch. ! 19 colored in on Exhibit 8 devoid of any livestock aside 
20 A. I'm thinking it was approximately 120. 120 from the nine bulls that were in this one pasture that 
21 Q. So this is about half of the land that you own i 21 we've referred to this morning? 
22 that you ranch is shown on Exhibit 8? i 22 A . There could have been mules and horses down 
A. Yes, sir. I 23 there too. 23 
24 Q. And the other lands that you own are where in I 24 Q. I see. In some of the pasturelands that you've i 
25 relation to these lands? i 25 colored in on Exhibit 8? 
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1 MS. :MEIKLE: Of the law. 
2 l\1R. WALTON: No. I'm asking what his understanding 
3 .is as to whether this bull was pastured in a heard 
4 district. 
5 MS. :MEIKLE: A heard district is a law. You're 
6 asking Mr. Piercy to tell you whether he believes his 
7 cattle are within a legal heard district. 
8 I\1R. WAL TON: It's kind of like asking somebody who 
9 is going 90 in a 50-mile-an-hour zone as to whether they 
1 O have an understanding what the speed limit is, Sandy. 
11 MS. :MEIKLE: I know. You're asking him what the 
12 law is in that district and-
13 l\1R. WAL TON: Look. I'm not going to fight with you. 
14 We're going to come back and do this depo later anyway, 
15 we will finish it later anyway. So you're instructing 
16 him not to answer. Fine. 
17 MS. MEIKLE: I'm saying if you're asking him--
18 l\1R. WAL TON: I asked him what I asked him. Are you 
19 instructing him not to answer? 
20 MS. MEIKLE: My understanding what you're asking 
21 him is -- are you asking him whether his cattle are 
22 within a legal heard district? 
23 I\1R. WALTON: That's not what I'm asking. 
24 MS. MEIKLE: What are you asking? 
25 l\1R. WAL TON: I just told you. I'm asking is it his 
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1 understanding that this bull was pastured in a heard 
2 district. That is not the same as asking him the 
3 ultimate legal question that you just suggested. 
4 
5 
6 it. 
MS. :MEIKLE: I'm going to object to the form. 
But if you understand the question, you can answer 
7 THE WI1NESS: There is a question as to whether 
8 this is a legal-heard district, which we are --
9 Q. (BY :MR. WAL TON): Let me rephrase it. 
10 At the time this accident occurred on March 20, 
11 2005, was it your understanding that this bull was 
12 pastured in a heard district? 
13 A. No, I didn't know he was. 
14 Q. You've only learned about a heard district 
15 since then, I take it. 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. At the time this accident occurred, you didn't 
18 know what a heard district was? 
19 A. I didn't know Wamstad and Boise River was a 
1 took place. 
2 Q. When you say it was open range down along the 
3 river, what does that mean to you? 
4 A. Well, it would be a legal but --
5 MS. MEIKLE: And I'm going to object if you're 
6 asking for a legal conclusion. 
7 :MR. WALTON: Go ahead and object. 
8 THE WITNESS: Ask me the question again. 
9 Q. (BY :MR. WALTON): Yes, sir. 
10 What does that mean to you? You said you thought 
11 it was an open range down along the river. Is that what 
12 you told me? 
13 A. Okay. Some of the old-timers that had cattle 
14 down there said that so far from the Boise River was 
15 still open range. 
16 Q. What did that mean to you? 
17 A. It meant that cattle that got out that did get 
18 hit, they were required to pay for the animal. 
19 Q. The car owner? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So the pasture that this animal escaped from, 
22 was it your understanding that that was open range? 
23 A. I did not know for sure. 
24 Q. But you thought it was? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 Q. There's one thing that I've been thinking about 
2 is that the bulls that were in that pasture could get to 
3 that highway through the river, couldn't they? 
4 MS. :MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
5 THE WITNESS: I'd say no. 
6 Q. (BY :MR. WALTON): Because why? 
7 A. Because of the boulders and the steepness, the 
8 water. 
9 Q. But if they can negotiate down to the water, 
10 they can get up ·on the highway from there, couldn't 
11 they? 
12 A. If they could negotiate to the water. 
13 Q. One reason you didn't fence that because you 
14 thought it was open range; true? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. It wasn't fenced because you felt it was a 
17 sufficient barricade to keep the animals enclosed in the 
18 pasture? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 heard district. 20 Q. And when I say "it," I was referring to the 
21 Q. What was your understanding what it was? 21 riverbank and the boulders that you've referenced. 
22 A. That was open range along the river. 22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Where did you gain that understanding? 23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. It was just an understanding we had, the 24 At the time this accident occurred, did you know 
25 neighbors down there. We found out different after this 25 what a heard district was? Did you have an 
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1 understanding what a heard district 
2 A. No. 
I ; wires,oneofwhic 
_ A. Yes. 
electrified. 
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3 Q. Would those words have made any sense to you at 3 Q. The spaghetti piece is five wires plus an 
4 the time of this accident? Let me rephrase'. 4 additional wire that's electrified. 
5 MS. IvlEIKLE: Objection. 5 A. Yes. 
6 fv1R. WAL TON: 6 Q. And ifl'm -- do I recall correctly you never 
7 Q. Had you heard of those words before at the time 7 did figure out how those calves escaped the southeast 
8 of this accident? 8 pasture that we just referred to on that 2001 incident? 
9 A. Yes. 9 A. No. 
10 Q. But you didn't quite know what it meant? j 10 Q. Was that land completely enclosed in fence? 
11 A. That's correct l 11 A. Yes. 
12 MR. WALTON: Let me take a two-minute break. I ! 12 Q. There was no boundary that was the Boise River 
13 think I may be done, Mr. Piercy. I 13 that was used to contain the animals? 
14 (Recess taken.) ! 14 A. No. 
15 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): What do you call this pasture j 15 Q. You know, I'mjustnoticing here, I'm looking 
16 where the bull escaped? Do you have a name for it? I 16 at the interrogatory answers that your attorney filed 
17 A. Spaghetti piece. j 17 yesterday. And you had mentioned to me you don't 
18 Q. Spaghetti piece. J 18 remember that after Ms. Hansen hit your calves on 
19 A. Uh-huh. I 19 October 5, 2001 along came Mr. Allen and got another 
20 Q. Because it's a little twisty? ! 20 one. It's mentioned in these interrogatory answers 
21 A. Uh-huh. I 21 that's what occurred. 
22 Q. Have you ever had any livestock escape that I 22 A. I never knew that person until yesterday -- or 
I 
23 pasture before? 
24 A. Not that I recall. 
25 Q. And how long have you owned that? I think you 
1 told me you don't remember, ifl'm recalling. 
2 A. I don't remember for sure. Approximately ten 
3 years. 
4 Q. And I think you told me -- am I remembering 
5 correctly all of your fences on all of the land you use 
6 for ranching are .the same as the fences on this 
7 spaghetti piece? 
8 A. No. I have open wire. Some are four strand, 
9 some are five. Some are electrified, some aren't. 
10 Q. I see. Okay. Let's go at it this way then. 
11 The March - excuse me, the October 5, 
12 2001 incident involving Jamie Hansen, do you remember 
13 thatone? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And that was from the pasture just east of the 
16 spaghetti piece, wasn't it? 
17 A. It would be southeast. 
18 Q. Southeast of it. 
19 What kind of fencing was involved with that pasture 
20 at that time? 
i 23 day before yesterday. 
I 24 Q. There's another incident referenced in your 
I 2s interrogatory answers. It says in appEoximately 
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1 April 2005 one cow belonging to Mr. Piercy was found in 
2 a barrow pit eating grass on the side ofWamstad Road. 
3 Where was that on Wamstad Road? Was it near this 
4 inc'ident that we're here --
5 A. Yeah, it was right at the bridge. 
6 Q. And what pasture had that animal been in? 
7 A. That was a pasture that I rented from another 
8 person to hold them until grass.· 
9 Q. And where was that pasture located in relation 
10 to the bridge and Wamstad Road? 
11 A. It's on the southwest side of the bridge. 
12 Q. I'm looking at Exhibit 8. Can you kind of 
13 point with a pen to where that was. 
14 A. It would be right in here (indicating). It 
15 goes all the way back in (indicating). 
16 Q. So it would be bordering the Boise River. 
17 A. Yes. 
18 
19 
20 
Q. On the south side of the river. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just west ofWamstad Road. 
21 A. That's five wire electrified fence. 21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Like the spaghetti piece? 22 Q. And this answer says that you found someone had 
23 A. No. The center wire is electric. 23 cut five wires on your fence in an attempt to steal your 
24 Q. Got you. So five wires -- on the pasture that 24 calves. 
25 involved the October 5, 2001 incident, that was five 25 A. That was an assumption. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Dale Piercy has failed to shoulder the strong burden imposed by on him by 
Idaho Code§ 31-857 in his attempt to overturn Canyon County's December 10, 1982 herd 
district order. Idaho Code § 3 l-857's strong prima facie presumption burden is in place 
concerning the validity of the creation of school, road, herd or other districts. Herd districts are 
specifically called out in the statute. This serious presumption burden placed on Piercy is 
understandable because after the passage of time, the citizens of Canyon County, Idaho, regard 
by custom, practice or norm the validity of the longstanding creation of herd or other districts. 
II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case began with a complaint filed by Erica Rivera and Luis J. Guzman against 
Defendants Dale Piercy and Jennifer Sutton. On October 9, 2007, the Court issued an order 
denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, who argued that no herd districts 
existed in the areas in question, thereby excusing Piercy from any liability. At this time, the 
Court also ordered the joinder of Canyon County as a third party defendant on the issue of 
whether a herd district was located at the place where Piercy's bull escaped and where Piercy's 
bull collided with the vehicle driven by Sutton. In accordance with the Court's order, Sutton 
filed an Action for Declaratory Relief naming Canyon County as a Third party Defendant. 
Sutton asked the Court to uphold the 1908 and 1982 Canyon County herd district orders. 
As a result of the stipulation of the parties and approval of the Court, Defendant Piercy on 
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) 
September 10, 2008 filed an Amended Action for Declaratory Relief against Canyon County, 
Luis Guzman and Jennifer Sutton which was answered by the defendants. 
III. 
IDAHO CODE § 31-857 IMPOSES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIVE BURDEN AND 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AGAINST THOSE WHO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY 
OF THE CREATION OF HERD DISTRICTS. 
Under Idaho Code§ 31-857, Defendant Piercy carries the presumptive burden imposed 
by this statute and the burden of proof always remains with him in this action. Piercy shoulders 
the onerous burden of garnering enough cogent evidence to dissipate the prima facie presumption 
that supports the validity of the creation of Canyon County's 1982 herd district order. Idaho 
Code § 31-857 is set out below: 
§ 31-857. School, road, herd and other districts--Presumption of validity of 
creation or dissolution 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other district has 
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, 
disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county 
commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho, a legal prima facie presumption 
is hereby declared to exist, after a lapse of two (2) years from the date of such order, 
that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such order have 
been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant said board in making said order, 
and the burden of proof shall rest upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or question 
the validity of said order to show that any of such preceding proceedings or 
jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such prima facie 
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state of Idaho. (Emphasis 
added.) 
S.L. 1935, ch. 79, §I; S.L. 1989, ch. 73, § 25. 
Time clouds the memory of past events and documents may be discarded over time. Can 
it be said 100 years from today that the records of current events will be fully maintained? See 
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_) 
also Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. This Rule states: 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings· 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings, unless otherwise provided by statute, 
by Idaho appellate decisions or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party 
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or 
meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the 
sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party 
on whom it was originally cast. The burden of going forward is satisfied by the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the 
presumed fact does not exist. If the party against whom a presumption operates fails 
to meet the burden of going forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved. If 
the party meets the burden of going forward, no instruction on the presumption shall 
be given, and the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the 
presumed fact without regard to the presumption. 
(b) Jury Instructions. When any presumption operates, the court shall instruct the jury 
that the fact has been proved without using the term "presumption." 
[Adopted January 8, 1985, effective July 1, 1985. Amended March 18, 1998, 
effective July 1, 1998.] 
All of Canyon County is a herd district. By norm, custom, and practice, the citizens of 
Canyon County recognize all of the county to be in a herd district. Against this recognized norm, 
custom, and practice, Piercy's onerous burden was to try to convince the Court that the 1982 herd 
district order was invalid. Decisions of various Idaho courts strongly favor upholding the validity 
of statutes and ordinances. See City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 
(1956). 
In Mathewson, the Court stated: 
"There is always a presumption of the validity of an ordinance. Continental Oil Co. 
v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353; Boise City v. Better Homes, 72 Idaho 
441, 243 P.2d 303." 
Id. at 350. 
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Additionally, efforts should be undertaken by a Court to provide interpretation to a 
statute, and arguably to an ordinance or regulation of the county commissioners, that would not 
render such a promulgation a nullity. The same deference to statutory enactments should apply 
to county ordinances or regulations. For example, the County Commissioners' herd district order 
of 1982 should be given every possible view of interpretation so as not to render it a nullity. See 
Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission where the Court stated: 
"Second, it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will not 
render it a nullity. Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 917, 920, 556 
P.2d 1197, 2000 (1976)." 
Id. at 151. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948) 
emphasized that when construing statutes, the purpose is to "save and not destroy." Canyon 
County would argue the same maxim applies to county ordinances, rules or regulations. See 
Idaho Code§ 31-714 which provides: 
§31-714. ORDINANCES --PENALTIES. The board of county commissioners 
may pass all ordinances and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by 
the laws of the state of Idaho, and such as are necessary or proper to provide for the 
safety, promote the health and prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, 
comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof, and for the 
protection of property therein, and may enforce obedience to such ordinances with 
such fines or penalties, including infraction penalties, as the board may deem proper; 
provided, that the punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to exceed six (6) months, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment. 
The Court in Keenan, supra, focused on the Court's role in construing statutes: 
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"The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not destroy. State v. 
Enking, 59 Idaho 321, at page 345, 82 P .2d 649; and it is incumbent upon a court to 
give a statute an interpretation which will not nullify it if such construction is 
reasonable or possible. Intermountain Title Guaranty Co. v. Egbert, 52 Idaho 402, at 
page 410, 16 P.2d 390; NorthemP. R. Co. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, at page 
40, 116 P.2d 221; Bel. v. Benewah County, 60 Idaho 791, at page 796, 97 P.2d 397." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 437. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Hendricks v. City of Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 456 P.2d 262 
(1969) dealt with a challenge to the validity of Nampa's annexation ordinance. The Court 
declared that the "primary issue in this appeal goes to the quantum and nature of proof necessary 
to overcome the presumed validity of the annexing ordinance." Id. at 264. 
The Hendricks Court discussed the rebuttable presumption concerning the validity of the 
enactment of a municipal ordinance possesses: 
"There exists a rebuttable presumption in favor of the validity of a municipal 
ordinance. White v. City of Twin Falls, 81Idaho176, 338 P.2d 778 (1959); City of 
Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 (1956); Boise City v. Better 
Homes, Inc., 72Idaho 441, 243 P.2d303 (1952); Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin 
Falls, supra. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party attacking the validity 
of an ordinance. Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., supra; cf. City ofldaho Falls v. 
Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941)." 
Id. at 98, 99. 
The Court also discussed the burden of going forward, which a municipality bears in 
defending its ordinance when a presumption is overcome, but the Court emphasized that the 
"ultimate burden or persuasion that the ordinance is invalid, of course would remain with he 
[sic] person attacking the ordinance." Id. at 99. 
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It is notable that Idaho Code§ 31-857 was originally enacted in 1935 and amended in 
1989 to reduce the number of years from five to two years which must pass before proceedings 
concerning the establishment of the listed districts would be cloaked with a rebuttal presumption 
of validity. 
In Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 759 P. 2d 77 (1988), the Court dealt with the undue 
influence presumptions concerning the procurement of a deed and discussed the gate keeping 
function of presumptions: 
"Normally, the party asserting that a deed was procured by means of undue influence 
has the burden of proving such influence. McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho 313, 272 
P.2d 298 (1954). 
[Al presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with the evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to 
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which 
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 82. 
The Court in Mauldin v. Sunshine Mining Co., 61 Idaho 9, 97 P. 2d 608 (1940) analyzed 
the use of negative evidence as opposed to the cogent evidence required to dispel the marriage 
presumption and stated: 
"The evidence offered by respondents to rebut the presumption of marriage 
appears to be negative in character, consisting of evidence of acts of appellant and 
John Mauldin purportedly indicating that the parties did not hold themselves out 
to the public as husband and wife. 
The evidence offered by respondents to rebut the presumption of marriage, or all 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
PIERCY/SUTTON CASE NO. CV05-4848 
N:\CVL LIT\2007\Piercy-Sutton\PostTrial Brief.wpd 
Page 7 of 27 
886 
the evidence in the record which may be said to tend to rebut the presumption, is 
not so cogent and satisfactory as would rebut this strong presumptiOn. It does not 
make plain against the constant pressure of the presumption of marriage the truth 
of law and fact that it is void." (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 612, 613. 
Defendant Piercy has failed to provide cogent evidence compellingly showing that the 
1982 herd district was not validly created. 
IV. 
DEFENDANT PIERCY FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT CANYON COUNTY DID NOT 
VALIDLY CREATE A HERD DISTRICT IN 1982. 
A. The Herd District Petition. 
Piercy complains that there is no herd district petition. The county is not required to keep 
herd district petitions. Idaho Code§ 31-708 describes the duties of the clerk and the only records 
the clerk is supposed to preserve are "accounts acted upon by the board" and "petitions and 
applications for franchises." 
Idaho Code§ 31-709 describes the records the board must keep. No where in Idaho Code 
§ 31-709 does it state that counties are required to keep herd district petitions. The herd district 
statutes governing the creation of a herd district in 1982 are found in the 1963 version of the 
Idaho Code. There, Idaho Code § 25- 2402 described the requirements of a herd district petition 
but was silent about preserving or keeping the petitions. Idaho Code§ 25-2403 describes the 
herd district order and contains no requirement that counties preserve herd district petitions. 
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B. Publication Notice for Board's December 10, 1982 Herd District Hearing. 
Considering the number of years that have passed since 1982, it is not surprising that a 
hearing notice advertising the December 10, 1982 public hearing of the board has not yet been 
found. Moreover, there was no requirement to keep or maintain a hearing notice informing the 
public of the hearing date and time. 
Jackie Germain, a long time county employee, was Defendant Piercy's first witness. Her 
lack of knowledge is indicative of others who presented testimony by deposition on the events 
surrounding the enactment of the County Commissioners' December 10, 1982 herd district order. 
Germain testified she had no knowledge of the publication notice procedure in the County 
Commissioners' office in December of 1982 when the order of the County Commissioners 
establishing the herd district for the remainder of the County was issued. 
"Q. So would you say that in December of - December of 1982, you had become 
familiar with the process of publishing notice and public hearings? 
A. No, sir." (Tr. p. 54, L. 16-19) 
Defendant Piercy' s witness, David Wagner Lloyd, formerly employed by Saetrum Law 
Offices, stated that he looked for legal notices in the Idaho Statesman advertising the Board's 
December 10, 1982 hearing on the creation of a herd district. From his research, he found that 
legal notices can be located in different places in the newspaper. He also noted also that your 
eyes will become quite tired during the process of looking for these notices: 
"A. You know, I had to, Chuck, actually. I started going through them, and being 
familiar with papers, I saw the public notices were in just one location. Within a 
week or two in January, I noticed that there was a paper that had public notices in 
separate locations, so I actually went back and looked through every page. I can't say 
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that I looked at every advertisement, but I recall being quite shocked at the price of 
cars in 1982 as compared to today." (Tr. p. 63, L. 15-23) 
"Q. How many pages did you look at? 
A. You know, I couldn't say. I didn't count the pages. Thousands upon thousands 
upon thousands, certainly. 
Q. Yeah. If I understand correctly, most of the legal notices are kind of grouped 
together? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But sometimes they've got one kind of sitting off by its side on a page where 
there are no other legal notices? 
A. What I saw it was a group, usually like half a page or something else, and that 
occurred maybe once or twice a month. It looked like it was a type of overflow. 
Q. Are you looking at microfiche? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did your eyes ever get tired while you were doing that? 
A. Absolutely." (Tr. p. 65, L. 18-25; p. 66, L. 1-11) 
Karen Whychell, currently with Saetrum Law Offices, talked about how small the 
newsprint was and that she could research only newspapers that were received by the Idaho State 
Historical Society in her search for the legal notices: 
"Q. Now, with regard to this particular page, it is true, is it not, that the legal notices 
that appear on this page, like the remainder in the exhibit, are extremely difficult to 
read and don't know exactly what is there because the print is very small; isn't that 
correct? 
A. The print on this particular page is small, that is correct. 
Q. With regard to the newspapers that you reviewed at the Idaho Historical Society, 
you talked about in your direct testimony about the papers that you reviewed are 
those that were made available to you by the Idaho State Historical Society; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So whatever newspapers the Idaho side received from the newspapers, you would 
have had the ability to review on the microfilm with regard to the time and date 
requested; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. If by chance the newspaper did not have your particular editiion for a particular 
part of the newspaper for the time period in question for the Idaho State Historical 
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Society, you have not had the ability to review that; is that correct? 
A. If that were the case." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 75, L. 25; p. 76 L. 1-24) 
Whychell mentioned she used a calendar to track the Idaho Press-Tribune daily editions 
but she could not rule out the possibility that not all the pages of the paper were received by the 
Idaho Historical Society. Whychell also admitted that she did not check for gaps in the Idaho 
Statesman with regard to any missing editions and noted: 
"Q. What about with regards to the Idaho Statesman, did you do that with respect to 
the Idaho Statesman? 
A. No, I did not, because I did not print those out. 
Q. I'm sorry, because why? 
A. I didn't print those out. I didn't have the hard copies. But to my knowledge, 
there weren't any gaps in the newspaper. 
Q. But you didn't check to see if there were or weren't gaps; correct, in that paper? 
A. There didn't appear to be any, no. I had all of these. 
Q. Yes, but as I say, you did not check to see if there were any gaps? 
A. No." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 83, L. 15-25; p. 84, L. 1-3) 
Whychell related how tiring it was searching for legal notices in the newspaper. She 
described the microfiche spools and said the whole process is tiresome on the eyes. 
"Q. Okay. Now, how to you look at these newspapers when you are doing this 
research? Is it on microfiche? 
A. It is on a spool of film. 
Q. Are you looking at an illuminated screen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it a tiresome job in terms of your eyes? 
A. I would say yes." (Tr. p. 84, L. 4-10) 
Whychell also indicated that legal notices were grouped together, sometimes on separate 
pages in the newspaper: 
"Q. How many pages of newspaper do you believe you reviewed taking into 
consideration the Statesman, the Idaho Press-Tribune, and the Parma Review? 
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A. I couldn't speculate. 
Q. Would it be tens of thousands of pages? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Were the legal notices grouped together? 
A. There were groups together, but then there were some that were on separate 
pages." (Tr. p. 84, L. 11-19) 
Whychell also stated that she did not keep notes of the copies that she made of the 
newspaper editions at the Idaho State Historical Society: 
"Q. How did you make notes on a scratch paper? 
A. They do provide pencils for you and their scratch paper. 
Q. I see. 
A. So I would make notes as to what I would need to go back and copy. So to that 
extent, yes, I did make notes. 
Q. Did you keep any of the notes that you made? 
A. No. Once I printed out the pages that I needed to, then, no, I didn't." (Emphasis 
added.) (Tr. p. 89, L. 7-16) 
Finally, Whychell admitted that she did not know when she reviewed the last page of a 
newspaper because there was no notation on a page that it was the last page: 
"Q. I'm curious, how did you know that the last page you were looking for, for a 
given day, was really the last page of that newspaper? 
A. It was the last page that was provided. 
Q. But there is not something on the last page that says "the end"? It is kind of a 
silly question, but there is nothing on a given day for the Idaho Press-Tribune that 
indicates that this is the last page in the newspaper? 
A. Not that I recall." (Tr. p. 91, L. 4-13) 
C. Searching for Canyon County Herd District Records. 
Herd districts are created over time and require a thorough search of old county records. 
Memories of events surrounding the creation of the 1982 herd district are nonexistent. Glenn 
Koch is the only surviving member of the Board of County Commissioners that signed the herd 
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district order. He had no recall of the events regarding the adoption of the herd district order. 
See Glenn Koch Deposition Transcript, p. 36, L. 24-25; p. 36, L. 1-11. 
Considering the evidentiary burden shouldered by Piercy, it is vital for Piercy to 
demonstrate and verify through independent research the location of herd districts in Canyon 
County. For example, Tim Fox, a licensed surveyor, testified at trial and stated that he performed 
no independent research of the status of the yellow areas on Defendant's Exhibit A-1. 
"Q. Just so I understand, the - well, first off, you did not go to Canyon County 
records and pull legal descriptions for the herd district you drew on this map, A-
l? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. You relied upon some documents given to you by Mr. Peck- those are 
the documents from which you obtained the legal descriptions for the herd district 
you drew on this map, A-1? 
A. That is correct." (Tr. p. 105, L 10-18) 
In considering Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Canyon County herd district order, it is 
important to determine the location from where the bull escaped. Dale Piercy testified at the time 
of the accident that he owned 260 cows, 20 bulls and ranched and farmed approximately 800 
acres. See Tr. p. 34 L. 19-25; p. 35, L. 1-25; p. 36, L. 1-21. It is fair to say with such a large 
operation that consideration must be given as to how precisely at a particular point in time, any 
livestock owner would know where each of his cows or bulls were located. 
Michael Bruse, a GIS supervisor in the plat room of the Canyon County Assessor's 
office, testified how difficult it was to find individual documents regarding herd districts in 
county records: 
"Q. Now, if one has to go look for legal descriptions, what does one have to do? 
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Looking for legal descriptions for a herd district, how does one go about doing that? 
A. Sir, I can answer that because I did that. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I pulled out a hundred year old book, and I sat there and I read six or 700 pages 
until I accounted for every herd district. When I ran out of books, I went to 
microfiche and I did the same thing with microfiche. 
Q. Is it hard work? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it tiring? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it difficult to find what you are looking for? 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. p. 139, L. 11-25; p. 140, L. 1-2) 
Bruse also testified that some Canyon County herd districts were no longer in Canyon 
County because of the creation of Payette and Gem Counties out of Canyon County. Bruse also 
determined there were ten herd district numbers missing and he was able to account for quite a 
few of the missing sequential numbers. The herd district research was exhausting and very tiring 
on his eyes. He could find nothing in the legal descriptions in county records verifying how 
"Herd District #3" was assigned the number "3", even though the designation "Herd District #3" 
appears on the map legend on Joint Exhibit #1. 
"Q. What did you say? I missed that. I didn't understand what you just told me. 
A. In our legal description, this particular herd district right here, our map indicates 
and so does the original map that that was herd district No. 3. When I went back and 
I personally did all the research, when I pulled this legal up and ran this, there was 
no indication in the legal description that it was herd district No.3. 
Q. Let's talk about that for a second. Do we know who named or labeled these herd 
districts as herd district No. 4 or herd district No. 9? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That's lost to time? 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. p. 140, L. 19-25; p. 141, L. 1-8) 
Bruse described the difficulties he encountered in searching for herd district records, 
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including records for missing sequential herd district numbers: 
Q. Okay. We've got on this Exhibit C-1, we have got herd districts 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, 24 and 26; right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There is a bunch of numbers missing out of there. Do we know where those herd 
districts all are? 
A. No, sir, we don't, and that's when the prosecuting attorney asked me to start 
taking a look at the missing herd districts. And so the only way that I could account 
for those missing sequential numbers was to start at the very beginning of Canyon 
County, and that's what I did. And I accounted for quite a few of them. I think there 
were ten total missing. I just ran out of eyeballs before I got completely finished. 
Q. In other words, you looked- are you telling the Court that those herd districts are 
not - those legal descriptions are not in the county records, or are you telling the 
Court that you looked and you couldn't find them, but they could be there? 
A. I looked, and I could not find them. I accounted for what I was a~le to find." (Tr. 
p. 141, L. 9-25; p. 142, L. 1-4) 
Paul Kosterman testified for Defendant Guzman and described the difficulties he 
experienced in checking and reviewing legal notices in the 1982 editions of the Idaho Press-
Tribune. Kosterman determined that in 1982, there was a total of 10,367 pages in all the editions 
published by the Idaho Press-Tribune. 
"A. My understanding is it contained the front page of each publication and the legal 
notice section. 
Q. Now, did you create some notes on this task? 
A. I did. 
Q. Are these your notes? 
A. Those appear to be them. 
Q. How many pages were published by the Idaho Press-Tribune in 1982? 
A. I would have to add these up. I have this column summarized, but believe it was 
in the neighborhood of 11,000 - 10,800-something. 
Q. Did you prepare a summary for me? 
A. I did prepare a summary for you. 
Q. Is this the summary that you prepared? 
A. That is the summary that I prepared. To answer your question, it was 10,367. 
Q. Okay. So over 10,000 pages were published for the Idaho Press-Tribune in 1982 
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is what you determined based on your research? 
A. Correct." (Tr. p. 149, L. 19-25; p. 150, L. 1-13) 
Kosterman noted that Saetrum Law Offices provided only 678 pages and asserted that 
these were the number of pages for legal notices in the Idaho Press-Tribune editions. This means 
that 93 percent of the pages were not provided to the Court. 
"Q. How many pages were provided to us by the Saetrum firm containing the legal 
notices of the Idaho Press-Tribune? 
A. Per my count, there would be 678. 
Q. Would that be about 6 percent of the total? 
A. You know, I think it comes out, 6, maybe 7 percent. 
Q. So 93 percent of the newspaper pages have not been provided to the court? 
A. That's what the numbers say, yes." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 150, L. 14-23) 
While searching for legal notices at the Idaho State Historical Society, Kosterman 
struggled with very blurry, magnified microfiche images: 
"Q. If one is going to look at or look for legal notices in a newspaper maintained by 
the Idaho Historical Society, describe for the court the depth of that task. 
A. Would you like me to begin with finding the appropriate microfiche reel? 
Q. Let's assume you get there. 
A. It's pretty much you find your microfiche, start flipping through it page by page. 
They are very small pages when they are projected on the particular screen you are 
looking at. 
Q. If you are projecting the whole page, are you able to read easily the font? 
A. No. Particularly not the fonts of, for instance, a legal notice, which are typically 
very small font. You can generally make out the head-lines, you know, things of that 
nature, advertisements. 
Q. So how do you read the font of, let's say a legal notice? 
A. Once you find what you think is something you might be interested in looking at, 
you have to dial in and focus, which brings it up to where humans can see it I guess 
you might say. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that you zoom in? 
A. Zoom in, exactly. 
Q. Now, what kind of issues arise when you zoom in vis-a-vis other notices that 
might appear on that same page? · 
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A. Well, they become blurry and easily mixed. They are columnized, so to read one 
- at that point, once you zoom in where you can read it easily enough, you are then 
moving the apparatus by hand, which changes the position of the article, if you will, 
on the screen. It is very easy to become disoriented, I guess, if you will, where you 
are once you zoom back out to know exactly where you were within that page." 
(Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 151, L. 17-25; p. 152, L. 1-25; p. 153, L. 1-2) 
Kosterman searched for the December 24, 1976 herd district legal notice and initially 
could not find it: 
"Q. You knew that you had to look at December 24, 1976? 
A. Idid. 
Q. You looked at that paper? 
A. I did look at that paper. 
Q. You didn't find it? 
A. I did not find it. 
Q. Whynot? 
A. It was in a place where I would not have expected to find it. 
Q. What do you mean? 
A. Through my research, obviously there is a pattern, it seem repeated- well, legal 
notices are typically on one page together. If they are a spill-over legal notices, they 
will typically be joined together on a page near the other ones, as I recall. What was 
interesting about this one, it was found at the very, very bottom of a page full of K-
mart advertisements and a couple of articles totally unrelated to· anything I was 
looking for. The last item on the bottom left-hand side of the page, not something 
that would have caught my eye." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 154, L. 11-25; p. 155, 
L. 1-7) 
Kosterman stated searching for legal notices caused eye strain and was like looking for a 
needle in a haystack. He indicated he found one legal notice at the bottom of a K-mart ad. See 
Joint Exhibit #11. It was a very tiring a process to ascertain whether there were legal notices 
published in the newspaper: 
" ... together on a page near the other ones, as I recall. What was interesting about this 
one, it was found at the very, very bottom of a page full of K-mart advertisements 
and a couple of articles totally unrelated to anything I was looking for. The last item 
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on the bottom left-hand side of the page, not something that would .have caught my 
eye. 
Q. Did you go end up going back and verifying it was there? 
A. I did go back to verify it was there. 
Q. Is it a tiresome job to look for this stuff, these notices that we've been talking 
about? 
A. It is very tiresome. 
Q. Why? 
A. Again, because the script is so small, to begin with. You have to be very, very 
careful. Your eyes start to go a little haywire on you. You are going through literally 
hundreds of pages of items looking for one tiny, little item. It is kind of like a needle 
in a haystack proposition." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. p. 155, L. 1-20) 
Defendant Piercy admitted into evidence the deposition of E.G. Johnson. In that 
deposition, E.G. Johnson noted that he did not make it a habit of looking for legal notices in the 
newspaper on a consistent basis and that he did not have a practice back in 1982 of searching for 
and reviewing the posted notices for the Board of County Commissioners regarding their meeting 
agendas. See E.G. Johnson's October 26, 2008 Deposition Transcript p. 41, L. 11-25; p. 42, L. 
1-8. 
In short, Defendant Piercy has neither successfully rebutted the Idaho Code § 31-857 
presumption nor carried his burden of proof in this action. 
v. 
IT CANNOT BE PRESUMED THAT MERE SILENCE OF CERTAIN COUNTY 
RECORDS SHOWS THE COUNTY EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY OR 
DISREGARDED ORDER ENACTMENT REQUIREMENTS. 
It cannot be presumed from the mere silence in county records of a 1982 herd district 
petition that the 1982 herd district was not validly created. The Clerk has no duty to preserve 
herd district petitions. See Idaho Code§§ 31-708 and 31-709 discussed on page 8 of this brief. 
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Interestingly, Canyon County's 1982 herd district order uses the words "again review." There is 
no clue as to what definitely sparked the early review or how many reviews preceded the 
December 10, 1982 herd district order. 
A. Silence of Records. 
In Re Dist. No. 1, 26 Idaho 311, 143 P.299 (1914), the Idaho Supreme Court considered 
the issue of silence regarding matters not addressed in legislative records and the effect silence 
has on the authority of the legislature to enact laws in light of the presumption of regularity of 
legislative proceedings. The Court stated: 
"After reviewing the authorities, the unquestioned weight of authority is to the effect 
that, unless the journal affirmatively shows that some requirement of the Constitution 
in the passage of a bill has been omitted, the presumption is that such requirement 
has been complied with, although the journal be silent in regard thereto, except when 
the Constitution commands that such act be entered on the journal. 
As stated by Judge Cooley, it will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence 
of the journals, that the Legislature exceeded its authority or disregarded a 
constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative acts. The journal of the 
House, as above quoted, does not show that in the passage of said act the provisions 
of the Constitution, requiring it to be read on three several days in each House prior 
to its passage, had been dispensed with, but, since the provisions of the Constitution 
do not expressly require the entry of such suspension on the journal, it will not be 
presumed that the House disregarded said provisions of the Constitution in the 
passage of said act; but it will be presumed that said constitutional provision was 
complied with by the House in the passage of said act, and the rule laid down in the 
Cohn-Kingsley Case, supra, is hereby modified to the extent that the Legislature will 
be presumed to have done each act required by the Constitution in the passage of an 
act, unless it affirmatively appears by the journal that it has failed to do so. Since the 
journal of the House does not show affirmatively that said provisions of the 
Constitution were not complied with in the passage of the act under consideration, 
this court presumes that it did comply with said provisions in the passage of said act, 
and that said act was passed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
PIERCY/SUTTON CASE NO. CVOS-4848 
N:\CVL LIT\2007\Piercy-Sutton\PostTrial Brief.wpd 
Page 19 of 27 
898 
and is valid." (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 301, 302. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 
P.2d 743 (1934) affirmed the silence rule regarding legislative records and stated: 
"In re Drainage District No. 1, 26 Idaho, 311, 143 P. 299, L. R. A. 1915A, 1210, 
announces the rule that it will not be presumed in any case from the mere silence of 
the journals that either house has exceeded its authority or disregarded a 
constitutional requirement in the passage of a legislative act, unless the Constitution 
has expressly required the journal to show the actions taken, as, for instance, where 
it requires the yeas and nays to be entered. Citing 36 Cyc. p. 950." 
Id. at 746. 
No witness has come forward and declared that the 1982 herd district was created without 
a petition and published notice. Piercy has failed to produce cogent evidence overcoming the 
rebuttable presumption that the herd district was validly created. 
B. Metes and Bounds Description. 
Piercy complains that 1963 version of Idaho Code § 25-2402 required a metes and 
bounds description of the herd district in the herd district order. Idaho Code § 25-2402 merely 
states that the "commissioners shall make an order creating such herd district, in accordance with 
the prayer of the petition, or with such other modifications as it may choose to make." 
(Emphasis added.) If a metes and bounds description was provided in the petition, there is no 
necessity to have the same metes and bounds description noted in the order establishing a herd 
district. 
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C. Published Hearing Notice. 
Considering the complexities surrounding herd district boundaries, it does not seem 
unreasonable to require Piercy to definitively and positively establish that there was no hearing 
notice published in the newspaper. The record reflects that there were numerous editions of the 
Idaho Press-Tribune published in 1982. Searching for a herd district notice from 1982 was a 
tiring process using a microfiche machine as noted by Piercy's witnesses, David Wagner Lloyd 
and Karen Whychell; and Defendant Guzman's witness Paul Kosterman. An examination of 
Piercy' s Exhibit A-3, consisting of editions of the Idaho Press-Tribune, shows how minute the 
size of the font is for each of the pages and reveals the legal notices are unreadable. Also, Piercy 
did not submit unequivocal proof verifying that every page in every 1982 edition of the Idaho 
Press-Tribune was presented to the Idaho State Historical Society. Therefore, there is a lack of 
foundation for the evidentiary findings urged by Piercy. 
Also, there may be more items in the record than heretofore have heen discovered. Joint 
Exhibit #4 is the County Commissioners' minute book version of Canyon County's 1982 herd 
district order. It indicates that the County Commissioners, on December 10, 1982, established 
the specified herd district. See Joint Exhibit #7 which is a copy of the actual herd district order 
showing that the order was signed by the County Commissioners on December 10, 1982. 
However, a review of Joint Exhibit #5 reveals a resolution that was considered and adopted by 
the County Commissioners on December 2, 1982, indicating that a herd district order would be 
issued by the Board "as of December 14, 1982." 
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D. Effective Date of 1982 Herd District Order. 
When addressing the effective date of the County Commissioners' 1982 herd district 
order, it is necessary to examine the recent decision of District Judge Winmill for the District of 
Idaho in Rolando Perez Arguello v. 0. Larry Lee and Carolyn Lee, 2008 WL 4544477 (D. Idaho 
2008). There, the Court considered a motor vehicle accident involving a fatality and injuries. 
This accident occurred on a highway in Jefferson County, Idaho. The Defendants attempted to 
escape liability by arguing that the herd district in which the ineident occurred was invalidly 
created. The Arguello Court discussed the Defendants' claim that the 1930 herd district order 
was not valid because there was no specified time for the order to take effect. The Court rejected 
that contention and stated: 
Id. at 5. 
"However, "[t]he common rule in regard to legislation is that it shall take immediate 
effect unless otherwise provided, and this rule is applicable to ordinances." 5 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 15:36. It is not uncommon for a 
statute to prescribe that certain types of ordinances not take effect until a certain 
time-for example, 10, 20 or 30 days-after its approval. Id. Nevertheless, "invalidity as 
to the effective date of an ordinance ... does not render the ordinance void." 
E. Interpretation of Ordinances. 
The Arguello Court opined on the interpretation and enforcement of ordinances and noted 
courts are reluctant to strike down an ordinance that can be reasonably upheld. The Court 
declared: 
"This approach, to deem the ordinance valid but the effective date invalid, is 
consistent with general principles applicable to the interpretation and enforcement of 
ordinances. The power of a court to declare an ordinance invalid should be exercised 
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Id. at 6. 
cautiously, and, in fact, courts are reluctant to do so. 6 McQuillin, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations § 20:4 Thus, a court should not strike down any ordinance 
where that ordinance can be reasonably upheld, and the ordinance will be upheld if the 
validity of the ordinance is fairly debatable. Id. When an ordinance can be interpreted 
in two ways, one of which sustains its validity and the other which defeats it, a court 
will adopt the sustaining interpretation, "even if that construction is not the most 
obvious or natural." 6 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations 20:56. 
Significantly, "[c]ourts are loathe to construe an ordinance as invalid, where the 
ordinance has been in operation and unchallenged for many years, and where under 
it valuable rights have accrued which would be destroyed if the ordinance were held 
to be invalid." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court used the "reasonably upheld standard" and rejected the c~allenge that the herd 
district order was invalid for lacking an effective date. The same principle should apply to county 
ordinances and regulations. Efforts should be undertaken to seek interpretations which will 
sustain the validity of county regulations establishing herd districts. 
Also, Joint Exhibit #8 includes public hearing minutes and reveals on December 24, 1976, 
the Canyon County Commissioners created a herd district. The minutes date heading states 
"January 7, 1976" but the correct date is "January 7, 1977." This is clear because the minutes for 
the herd district hearing refer to newspaper publication dates of December 24, 1976 and January 
1, 1977. Joint Exhibit #9, the January 12, 1977 resolution of the County Commissioners, shows 
that the County Commissioners rescinded their January 7, 1977 order establishing a herd district 
because the procedures had not been referred to the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney for 
review. Old records must maintain their validity if they can be reasonably upheld. 
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. I 
F. Animals Regulated by the 1982 Herd District Order. 
Piercy contends that there was no mention in the 1982 herd district order of the animals 
that would be regulated by the herd district. A listing of animals to be regulated by a herd district 
is not required by Idaho Code§ 25-2404 to be contained in the order. Idaho Code§ 25-2404 
states the order creating a district should be in conformance with the prayer of the petition. It does 
not state that the actual order has to list the animals noted in the herd district petition. 
G. Open Range Consideration. 
Piercy attempts to characterize the Commissioners' action in this complex action as 
improperly attempting to include open range areas with the Board's December 10, 1982 order. 
The 1982 herd district order must be read in the context of the language of Idaho Code § 25-2402 
as it existed in the 1963 version of the statute. For that statute, see Exhibit #1 attached to the 
August 25, 2008 deposition of Glenn 0. Koch, published with the Court. Idaho Code§ 25-2402 
seems to state that the petition cannot include open range. However, the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 152 P.3d 558 ( 2007) cited to Maguire v. Yanke for a 
discussion of the history of laws relating to herd districts and the liability of the livestock owner 
regarding livestock straying on another's land and stated: 
"In Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978), this Court discussed the 
history of laws relating to the liability of a livestock owner for damage caused by his 
stock straying on another's land. Under common law, it was the duty of a livestock 
owner to fence in stock to keep them from causing damage ("fence in" rule), but Idaho 
and other western cattle states rejected that concept for a rule allowing livestock to 
roam freely and imposing the duty on landowners to fence livestock out ("fence out" 
rule). Maguire, 99 Idaho at 832, 5?0 P.2d at 88. As this Court noted,"''the 'fence out' 
rule prevails" in Idaho. Id. at 833, 590 P.2d at 89. There are important legislative 
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exceptions to the "fence out" rule and landowners may revert to a "fence in" rule by 
following statutory procedures to create a herd district. Id.; LC. §§ 25-2401, -2402." 
Id. at 690. 
The Court in Moreland, supra, seemed to imply that it was not until Adamson v. 
Blanchard, that it was clear, in regard to the definition of open range, there was "no third hybrid 
area for land outside cities and villages." Id. 
Piercy's deposition was filed with the Court by Guzman's attorney. An exchange occurred 
between Walton and Piercy at Piercy's deposition during which Piercy said that "everything is 
contained", meaning in Canyon County cattle are not roaming free outside of boundaries that 
contain livestock. See Dale W. Piercy May 10, 2006 Deposition Transcript p. 44, L. 2-25; p. 45, 
L. 1-5. Therefore, based upon the Maguire and Moreland decisions, supra, the County's 
December 10, 1982 herd district order was consistent with the governing law's identification of 
open range at that time. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The custom, norm, and practice and long recognition of herd district status throughout 
Canyon County cannot be ignored. Most importantly, Defendant Piercy has not successfully 
shouldered his burden to dissipate the power of the rebuttal presumption provided by Idaho Code 
§ 31-857. Defendant Canyon County respectfully asserts that Defendant Piercy has not carried his 
Idaho Code § 31-857 burden and the burden of proof and requests that Defendant Piercy' s 
Amended Action For Declaratory Relief be dismissed. 
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Dated this j__ day of December 2008. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision with a black bull occurring in the late 
evening hours of Sunday, March 20, 2005. Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton"), with Plaintiffs 
Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman (collectively "Plaintiffs") as passengers, was traveling 
northbound on Wamstad Road, just south of Parma. Upon approaching the Boise River bridge, 
Defendant Sutton's vehicle collided with a black bull. The bull was owned by Defendant Dale 
W. Piercy ("Piercy''). The bull involved in the collision was pastured in a field east ofWamstad 
Road, north of the Boise River bridge and south of Parma. 
Piercy claims that the herd district where the animal was pastured was invalidly enacted 
and is, accordingly, void. Piercy argues that the Order Establishing Herd District of December 
10, 1982, is invalid due to procedural irregularities in the ordinance's passage. Piercy claims that 
if the herd district ordinance at issue is invalid, the area would be open range and Piercy would 
not have any liability for the accident. 
Sutton argues that the 1982 herd district ordinance is valid. First, Piercy's action is 
barred by the statutes oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code§§ 5-224 and 5-221. Second, if the 
Court finds that the action is not barred by the aforementioned theory, Piercy has failed present 
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the ordinance's validity pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 31-857. 
The Bench Trial on the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance occurred on October 8, 
2008. The parties agreed to submit post-trial briefs in lieu of closing argument. On November 
17, 2008, Piercy filed his Closing Memorandum. The response to the arguments made therein is 
as follows. 
DEFENDANT JENNIFER SUTTON'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM- 2 
908 
II. FACTS 
On or about December 2, 1982, the Board of the Canyon County Commissioners 
approved a resolution establishing a herd district as set forth in the minutes: 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN 
CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the Canyon 
County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of December, 1982: 
Upon motion of Commissioner Hobza and the second by 
Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as follows: That because 
of the confusion that exists due to the over-lapping lines of herd 
districts and open range and because over ninety-five (95%) percent 
of the area of Canyon County is already designated a herd district the 
Board will issue an order designating all of Canyon County to be herd 
district as of December 14, 1982. Motion Carried Unanimously. 
(Joint Ex. No. 5.) 
On December 10, 1982, the Board of Canyon County Commissioners issued the 
following Order: 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT 
The Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd District 
Boundaries throughout the County and has determined, by resolution, 
that the time has come to simplify and unify the status of Herd 
Districts in Canyon County. In making this determination the Board 
has found the following: 
1. A survey map attached hereto, prepared by the Planning and 
Zoning Administrator designates the three small areas within 
the County which remain open range. 
2. That map shows that over 95% of the land within the County 
is now in Herd District status. 
3. Through the years confusion has existed because of 
overlapping boundary lines and indefinite District boundary 
descriptions. 
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4. Canyon County has reached the stage of urban development 
which destroys the original purpose and usefulness of the 
concept of open range. 
5. The mobility of our citizens has increased to the point at 
which it becomes necessary that Herd District status exist 
throughout the County. Therefore, 
(Joint Ex. No. 4.) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Board of Canyon County 
Commissioners on this 10 day of December, 1982, that a 
Herd District be established in the three remaining open range 
areas in Canyon County as shown on the attached survey map 
(marked in black), to the end that the entire land area of 
Canyon County be placed in Herd District status. 
On December 20, 1982, the Idaho Press Tribune published the following notice: 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN 
CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of 
December, 1982: Upon motion of Commissioner Hobza and the 
second by Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as follows: 
That because of the confusion that exists due to the over-lapping 
lines of herd districts and open range and because over ninety-five 
(95%) percent of the area of Canyon County is already designated a 
herd district the Board will issue an order designating all of 
Canyon County to be herd district as of December 14, 1982. 
Motion Carried Unanimously. 
(Joint Ex. No. 10.) 
At the time the 1982 herd district ordinance was enacted, the 1963 version of the Idaho 
Herd District Law was in effect. See Idaho Code§§ 25-2401, et. seq. The Herd District Law was 
subsequently amended in 1983, 1985, 1990 and 1996. 
The bull involved in the collision was pastured in a field east ofWamstad Road, north of 
the Boise River bridge and south of Parma. (Bench Trial ("Trial Transcript"), dated October 8, 
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2008, 113:7-114:6.) The parties agree that the field where the bull was pastured was not 
included in any of the legal descriptions of the herd districts created before 1982. (See Trial 
Transcript, 100:2-13; Joint Ex. No. 3.) However, the field at issue was included in the 1982 herd 
district ordinance. (Joint Ex. No. 4.) 
Defendant Sutton has previously raised the equitable defenses oflaches and estoppel to 
bar Piercy' s claim that the 1982 herd district ordinance is invalid. At the Bench Trial, Defendant 
Sutton again raised the equitable defenses and attempted to present evidence on the same. The 
Court denied Sutton's motion and denied ilie admission of evidence. (Trial Transcript, 167:5-
168:1.) Therefore, this brief will not address those issues. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENDANT PIERCY'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§§ 5-224 and 5-221. 
The limitations of action statutes apply to all actions and special proceedings. The 
declaratory judgment action constitutes a type of "action" limited by Idaho Code §§ 5-224 and 5-
221. 
1. Even assuming that there were procedural irregularities in the passage of the herd 
district ordinance. Piercy's claim is barred by Idaho Code§ 5-224. 
Idaho Code § 5-201 sets forth the general statute oflimitations provision: 
Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed 
in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued, except 
when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
IDAHO CODE § 5-201 (2008). There is no specific statute oflimitations that applies to either a 
declaratory judgment action, or to the underlying claim, therefore, the catchall provision applies. 
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Idaho Code§ 5-224 is the catchall statute oflimitations provision, which provides: 
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be 
commenced within four ( 4) years after the cause of action shall have 
accrued. 
IDAHO CODE§ 5-224 (2008). 
There is only one form of action in Idaho's civil courts: the "civil action." See I.R.C.P. 
2. An "action" is further defined in Title 5, Chapter 2 to mean: 
The word "action" as used in this chapter is to be construed, whenever 
it is necessary so to do, as including a special proceeding of a civil 
nature. 
IDAHO CODE § 5-240 (2008). 
An action seeking declaratory judgment is authorized pursuant to Rule 57 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 10, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, and constitutes "[a ]n action for 
relief ... " under Idaho Code§ 5-224. Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that the 
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to declaratory judgment actions. A declaratory relief claim is an 
"action;" the Sl,lpreme Court ofldaho has recognized this in writing "[t]his is a civil action, albeit 
for a declaratory judgment." Smith v. State Board of Medicine of Idaho, 74 Idaho 191, 194, 259 
P.2d 1033, 1034 (1953). Furthermore, the Supreme Court ofldaho awarded attorney's fees in 
favor of a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Freiburger v. 
J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423, 111 P .3d 100, I 08 (2005). Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
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The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is 
defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization, the state ofldaho or political subdivision thereof. 
IDAHO CODE§ 12-120(3) (2008)(emphasis added). Based on the above, the declaratory judgment 
action is a "civil action" under Idaho Code§ 5-201 .and "an action for relief ... " subject to the 
limitations set forth under Idaho Code§ 5-224. 
Where there is no fraud shown, neither the ignorance of a person of his rights to bring an 
action, nor the mere silence of a person liable to the action, prevents the running of the statute of 
limitations. Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354, 355 (1909). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the policy underlying statutes of limitation: 
"The policy behind statutes of limitations is protection of defendants against stale 
claims, and protection of the courts against needless expenditures ofresources." 
Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985). Statutes of 
limitation are designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to 
future litigation. 
Wadsworth v. Department o/Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996). Additional 
policy reasons for the imposition of statutory time limits for filing actions are set forth in Renner 
v. Edwards: 
It is eminently clear that statutes of limitations were intended to prevent the 
unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have 
been thrown off their guard for want of seasonable prosecution. They are, to be 
sure, a bane to those who are neglectful or dilatory in the prosecution of their legal 
rights. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, s 4, p. 8. As a statute ofrepose, they afford 
parties needed protection against the necessity of defending claims which, because 
of their antiquity, would place the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In such cases 
how resolutely unfair it would be to award one who has willfully or carelessly 
slept on his legal rights an opportunity to enforce an unfresh claim against a party 
who is left to shield himself from liability with nothing more than tattered or 
faded memories, misplaced or discarded records, and missing or deceased 
witnesses. Indeed, in such circumstances, the quest for truth might elude even the 
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wisest court. The statutes are predicated on the reasonable and fair presumption 
that valid claims which are of value are not usually left to gather dust or remain 
dormant for long periods of time. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 386, 19 L.Ed. 257; 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, supra, s 4; Spath v. 
Morrow, supra (174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581). To those who are unduly tardy in 
enforcing their known rights, the statute oflimitations operates to extinguish the 
remedies; in effect, their right ceases to create a legal obligation and in lieu 
thereof a moral obligation may arise in the aid of which comts will not lend their 
assistance. Cf. 34 Am.Jur., 'Limitation of Actions,' s 11, p. 20. 
Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838-839, 475 P.2d 530, 532 - 533 (1969), citing Wood v. 
Carptenter, 101 U.S. 135, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879). 
No matter how you look at the application ofldaho Code § 5-224, whether it applies to 
the declaratory judgment action itself, or to the underlying claim, there is no statute of limitations 
that would extend Piercy's right to bring the declaratory judgment action, or the underlying 
claim, nearly 25 years after the ordinance became effective. 
Under Idaho Code§ 5-224, an action "must be commenced within four (4) years after the 
cause of action shall have accrued." In this case, the cause of action accrued the date the herd 
district ordinance went into effect. 
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that the statute oflimitations in a case where the validity 
of an ordinance is challenged begins to accrue the date of the ordinance's passage. Canady v. 
Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21Idaho77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911). In Canady the Supreme Court 
held that the statute oflimitations barred an action to declare an ordinance null and void filed 
nine years after the ordinance's enactment. Id. In Canady, the city of Coeur d'Alene enacted 
two ordinances in 1900, and another ordinance in 19051, generally for the purpose of vacating 
10rdinance No. 71 was approved March 10, 1900; No. 75 was approved November 6, 
1900; and NO. 115 was approved March 29, 1905. 
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certain streets and alleys in the city, with the understanding that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber 
Company would establish and maintain a sawmill, planing mill and lumber yard on the vacated 
streets. Id. Thereafter, the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company expended funds to build the lumber 
manufacturing establishment. Id. at 830. Plaintiff had notice of the enactment of the ordinances 
and the expenditure of money in the construction of the plant and did not object at that time. Id. 
Plaintiffs husband owned certain lands bordering on or near the streets vacated by the 
ordinances. Id. at 832. At some point, plaintiff succeeded to the interest of her husband and 
brought action on June 15, 1909, to have the ordinances vacating the streets and alleys declared 
null and void, to compel the defendants to remove obstructions from the streets vacated by the 
ordinances, to enjoin the defendants from obstructing the streets in the future, and for damages. 
Id. at 831. Defendants answered the complaint and denied that plaintiff was damaged by the 
street vacation, denied that plaintiff's land was within the city limits, and asserted the statute of 
limitations and estoppel. Id. at 832. 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendants moved for a nonsuit, which was granted 
by the court. Id. at 832. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court and held, 
in part, that plaintiffs action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 830. In support of its 
decision, the Court concluded: 
We think, under the facts of this case, that this action is barred by the 
statute oflimitations: and that this action should have been brought 
at least within five years from the date such cause of action arose. We 
think it sufficiently appears that appellant sat by when Ordinances 
Nos. 71 and 75 were passed in 1900. and more than nine years before 
this action was commenced. and made no complaint of any damages 
having been sustained to her property by reason of said ordinances 
and the vacation of the streets. And, again, in 1905, when Ordinance 
No. 115 was passed, she made no protest or objection of any kind. 
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Id. at 835. 
She knew that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company was expending 
a great deal of money in establishing its lumber plant upon said 
blocks and a portion of one of the streets, and made no protest of any 
kind whatever to the city, and made no claim for damages to her 
property as resulting from the passage of said ordinances. The first 
time she complained of damage to her property, so far as the record 
shows. was when she commenced this action. June 15. 1909. 
Howard Co. v. Chicago &A. R. Co., 130 Mo. 652. 32 S. W. 651; City 
ofLogansportv. Uhl, 99 Ind. 531, 49 Am. Rep. 109. 
Under Canady, Piercy's declaratory judgment is barred by the statute oflimitations. The 
Order Establishing Herd District was enacted December 10, 1982, nearly 23 years before this 
action was commenced. Piercy did not raise this issue until after Guzman filed a Complaint 
against Piercy for damages arising from the collision between Sutton's vehicle and Piercy's black 
bull. Prior to the subject accident, Piercy never complained of any damages sustained by reason 
of the herd district ordinance. 
Piercy knew or had reason to know that the field where his bull was pastured was 
included in a herd district by virtue of the notice posted in the Idaho Press Tribune on December 
20, 1982, indicating that the resolution regarding herd district had been passed by the Canyon 
County Commissioners. (Joint Ex. No. 10.) 
Moreover, E.G. Johnson, a rancher in the area where the accident occurred and an owner 
of land that is within the description of the 1982 herd district ordinance, knew that the area in 
question was in a herd district. On or about July 1 7, 2007, Mr. Johnson executed an Affidavit for 
another case that was subsequently made part of the record in this lawsuit. Therein, Mr. Johnson 
stated "[ s ]ometime in either late 1982 or early 1983, I discovered that the above property had 
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been placed into the herd district created by the Canyon County Commissioners in December 
1982." (Affidavit of E.G. Johnson ("Johnson Aff."), dated July 19, 2008, if 5.) Mr. Johnson 
testified at his deposition in this case, that he does not believe that he became aware of the herd 
district status in 1982 or early 1983; rather Mr. Johnson testified that he had been aware that the 
property was a herd district "for at least the last 12-15 years." (Deposition of E.G. Johnson 
("Johnson Depo."), dated October 6, 2008, 15:14-15; see also 15:4-16:5.) Piercy by his own 
admission has been a cattle rancher in the area where the accident occurred for 50 years. 
(Deposition of Dale W. Piercy ("PiercyDepo."), dated May 10, 2006, 5:16-23; 41:4-7.)2 It 
would seem unlikely that Mr. Johnson would know that his land was in a herd district, but that 
Piercy would not know that same information. 
Furthermore, based on Piercy' s presumed familiarity with the roadway where the accident 
occurred, he was aware that there were no open range or cattle warning signs along that section 
of roadway. He was aware that there were no cattle guards or other devices separating open 
range land from herd district land. To Piercy's knowledge all livestock in Canyon County are not 
allowed to roam free and are contained by fences and/or natural geographic barriers. (Piercy 
Depo., 44:17-45:4.) 
The status and location of herd districts within Canyon County were ofrecord. (Joint Ex. 
No. 2.) The herd district map could be found in the Canyon County recorder's office and the 
Canyon County Commissioner's office. Court employees were instructed that if asked, all of the 
land in Canyon County was included in a herd district. (Deposition of Monica Reeves ("Reeves 
2 At the Bench Trial, Piercy testified that he had been a rancher in Canyon County for over 
30 years. (Trial Transcript, 116:10-12.) 
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Depo."), dated July 7, 2008, 16:16-17:3.) At the least, Piercy had constructive knowledge that 
the field where his bull was pastured was included in a herd district. 
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that failure to acquire knowledge within reach does not 
toll the statute oflimitation: 
While it is stipulated that the appellants did not know of their interest 
in those lots until about a year before this suit was brought, that 
makes no difference, for they had the means of acquiring that 
knowledge, as the deed conveying the title to said lots to their father 
was ofrecord during all that time in the office of the county recorder 
of Ada county, where said lots were situated. The means of acquiring 
this knowledge was open to them, and, under the facts of this case, 
that places them in the same position as though they had such 
knowledge. When one by his own carelessness or negligence fails to 
acquire knowledge that is within his reach, and such information is 
upon the proper records which impart constructive notice, the person 
cannot protect himself behind the plea that he did not know facts of 
which the law imputes knowledge to him and thus suspend the 
running of the statute. It was held in State v. Walters, 31 Ind. App. 77, 
66 N. E. 182, 99 Am. St. Rep. 244, that neither the ignorance of a 
person of his right to bring an action, nor the mere silence of a person 
liable to the action, prevents the running of the statute of limitation. 
Ala., etc., Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 19 South. 105, 55 Am. St. 
Rep. 488. See, also, Ames v. Howes, 13 Idaho, 756, 93 Pac. 35. 
Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354, 357 -358 (1909). 
Piercy has benefitted from herd district status, as his lands have not been subject to 
depredations from the at large cattle of his neighbors. Because he is required to fence his cattle 
in, fewer of his livestock (and the livestock of others) have been on the roadway and subject to 
injury or death because of collisions with automobiles. In the same way that third party 
automobile drivers have been protected since 1982 by a county-wide herd district, Piercy has 
benefitted from that protection in his travels on roadways throughout Canyon County. 
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The public benefits and influence on public and private behavior of Canyon County's 26 
year herd district status are significant. Cattle are not allowed on Canyon County roads, and the 
county's police and sheriffs officers have confirmed that repeatedly in deposition. For 26 years 
it has been a misdemeanor for a rancher in Canyon County to permit his cattle to run at large in 
Canyon County. See Idaho Code§ 25-2407. For 26 years a rancher in Canyon County has been 
strictly liable for damages caused by his livestock to the property of others. See Idaho Code § 
25-2408. For 26 years county commissioners have had the authority to order agricultural 
landowners in the vicinity of public domain where livestock are grazed to fence their land to 
prevent livestock in a herd district from entering onto their land. See Idaho Code§ 25-2405. 
Piercy should have acted promptly ifhe considered that his rights were invaded by the 
passage of the herd district ordinance. He should not have sat passively by and permitted the 
Canyon County officials and the citizens of Canyon County to order itself under the belief that all 
of Canyon County was in a herd district. See Canady, 120 P. at 832. 
As stated above, the purpose of statutes oflimitations is to prevent litigation of stale 
claims. See Wadsworth v. Department o/Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996); 
Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969). In this case, the sole living 
Commissioner from 1982, Glen Koch, is 80 years old and has no recollection regarding the 
details of the passage of the herd district ordinance. (Deposition of Glen Koch ("Koch Depo."), 
dated August 25, 2008, 19:23-20:10; 20:11-17; 21:18-22:1;23:6-10; 25:12-20; 26:2-25; 27:14-
22; 28: 10-22; 33 :5-14; 33: 15-34:4. See also, 36:5-16.) Similarly, the clerk of the district court 
and the commissioner's office from 1982 is now 73 and has no recollection regarding the passage 
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of the ordinance. (Deposition of Bill A. Staker ("Staker Depo."), September 22, 208, 14: 22-
15:6; 15:12-16; 17:11-16; 18:6-19:17; 20:6-21:8; 23:11-23.) 
There are strong policy reasons supporting statute oflimitations provisions for actions 
attacking the validity of an ordinance based upon alleged irregularities in the ordinance's 
passage. At some point a statute has to have finality. If ordinances can be attacked at anytime 
based on procedural irregularities, without limitation as to time, then the door is open to anyone 
to attack any ordinance no matter how old and no matter how much evidence has been lost by 
time. There is no policy rationale supporting turning over a now 26+ year old statute on grounds 
of procedural irregularity. After the passage of so much time, these types of issues are a waste of 
judicial economy and resources. 
Memories have lapsed, witnesses have died, and evidence has possibly been destroyed 
with the passage of time. Under the statute of limitations, Piercy should have brought his claim 
no later than December 10, 1986. Based on the above, Piercy's claim to set aside the ordinance 
based upon irregularities in its creation is barred by the application ofldaho Code § 5-224. 
2. In the alternative, Piercy's claim is barred by Idaho Code§ 5-221. 
Idaho Code§ 5-221 sets forth the limitation of actions against counties: 
Actions on claims against a county which have been rejected by the 
board of commissioners must be commenced within six (6) months 
after the first rejection thereof by such board. 
IDAHO CODE § 5-221 (2008). 
Sutton respectfully refers the Court to the arguments made above regarding whether a 
declaratory judgment action is an "action" subject to the aforementioned statutes oflimitations. 
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There is no case law on point that construes Idaho Code § 5-221. The Supreme Court of 
Idaho briefly addressed the application ofldaho Code§ 5-221 in determining whether the two-
year statute of limitations under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, or the six-month limitation of actions 
on claims against a county under Idaho Code§ 5-221, applied to a wrongful death action arising 
from an inmate's suicide. Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739 P.2d 290 (1987). In 
the Court's review ofldaho Code§ 5-221, it stated that the statute "has been on the books since 
1881 and has no counterpart with respect to suits brought against the state, cities or 
municipalities. This statute has never been discussed in any prior decision in Idaho, and 
therefore, the issue presented today is a question of first impression." Id. at 993. 
As discussed above, the Order Establishing Herd District was enacted December 10, 
1982. The time to bring an action seeking to void the herd district ordinance against the County 
would have been on or about June 10, 1983. Piercy failed to object until nearly 26 years after the 
ordinance was enacted. Therefore, the claim is barred by the application ofldaho Code§ 5-221. 
Sutton respectfully refers the Court to the public policy arguments made above. 
B. PIERCY HAS FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO REBUT 
THE PRESUMPTION OF THE HERD DISTRICT ORDINANCE'S VALIDITY. 
THEREFORE, THE PRESUMPTION STANDS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The Court's power to declare an ordinance invalid should be exercised cautiously. 6 
McQuillin Mun. Corp.§ 20:4 (3rd ed.). A Court should not invalidate an ordinance that can be 
reasonably upheld. Id. 
Id. 
[A]n ordinance will be upheld if the validity of the ordinance is fairly debatable; 
an ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any reason it is open to 
dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction 
that in no way involves constitutional validity. 
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1. Presumption of Validity of Herd District Ordinance. 
Idaho Code § 31-857 provides a rebuttable presumption as to the validity of a herd district 
after a lapse of two years: 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other 
district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be 
created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an 
order of the board of county commissioners in any county of the state 
ofldaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist. 
after a lapse of two (2) years from the date of such order, that all 
proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such 
order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant said 
board in making said order. and the burden of proof shall rest upon 
the party who shall deny. dispute. or question the validity of said 
order to show that any of such preceding proceedings or jurisdictional 
steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such prima facie 
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state of 
Idaho. 
IDAHO CODE § 31-857 (2008) (emphasis. added). 
The herd district was established December 10, 1982. Approximately twenty-six (26) 
years have passed since the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, Piercy has the burden of proving 
that any of the "preceding proceedings or jurisdictional steps" in creating the herd district "were 
not properly or regularly taken." (Id.) 
Rule 301(a) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence generally sets forth the effect of presumptions 
in civil actions and proceedings as follows: 
In all civil actions and proceedings, unless otherwise provided by 
statute, by Idaho appellate decisions or by these rules, a presumption 
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not 
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of 
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on 
whom it was originally cast. The burden of going forward is satisfied 
by the introduction of evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds 
DEFENDANT JENNIFER SUTTON'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM- 16 
922 
• 
to conclude that the presumed fact does not exist. If the party against 
whom a presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going 
forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved. If the party meets 
the burden of going forward, no instruction on the presumption shall 
be given, and the trier of fact shall determine the existence or 
nonexistence of the presumed fact without regard to the presumption. 
I.RE. 301(a)(emphasis added). 
There is Idaho authority standing for the proposition that a party seeking to invalidate an 
ordinance must overcome the presumption of validity by something more than preponderance of 
the evidence. The Supreme Court ofldaho has stated that "clear, convincing and uncontradicted 
evidence in opposition to the presumption will prevail as a matter oflaw over the presumption ... " 
Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 563, 468 P.2d 290, 295 
(1970)(additional citations omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court ofldaho stated that the 
presumption of validity may be overcome by "clear proof of great force." Simmons v. City of 
Moscow, 111Idaho14, 19, 720 P.2d 197, 202 (1986) citing 14 McQuillin, supra at§ 38.186. 
There is additional authority that suggests that the presumption can only be overcome by an 
affirmative showing of invalidity: 
The burden of proving facts to establish invalidity of an ordinance is sustained and 
the presumption of validity of the ordinance is overcome only by an affirmative 
showing of invalidity. To sustain the burden, one must overcome the presumption 
of the validity of the ordinance. One must prove the facts that make the ordinance 
invalid and do more than establish a mere suggestion of discrimination, not 
proved. One must make it clearly appear that an ordinance is invalid before a 
court will strike it down. If one asserts that the council has exceeded its powers or 
has acted in bad faith or has abused its discretion, the facts must be clearly 
established to sustain the assertion. 
6 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 20:8 (3rd ed.). 
The evidentiary presumption of the herd district ordinance's validity has the effect of 
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placing the burden of going forward on Piercy. Piercy's facts must be supported by evidence. 
Under the facts of this case, the absence of evidence to prove that certain procedural 
requirements under the Idaho Herd District Law did not occur, when such documents were not 
required by statute or policy to be kept, is not sufficient to overcome the presumption and shift 
the burden of going forward to Sutton. See Garrett Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 
576, 33 p .2d 743, 746 (1933). 
In general there is a presumption that the County substantially complied with the statutory 
requirements set forth in the Herd District Law. See LC.§ 31-857. Based on the aforementioned 
authority, in order to overcome the presumption, Piercy must make an affirmative showing of the 
County's failure to comply with the Herd District Law. Piercy has failed to make an affirmative 
showing sufficient to overcome the presumption of the ordinance's validity that the County did 
not substantially comply with the Herd District Law. 
2. Idaho Code provisions in effect on December 10. 1982. 
When the December I 0, 1982, Order Establishing Herd District was passed, the 1963 
version ofldaho Code§ 25-2402 setting forth the requirements for establishing a herd district 
was in effect, as follows: 
§ 25-2402. Petition for District. -A majority of the land owners in 
any area or district described by metes and bounds not including open 
range and who are also resident in, and qualified electors of, the state 
ofldaho may petition the board of county commissioners in writing 
to create such area a herd district. Such petition shall describe the 
boundaries of the said proposed herd district, and shall designate what 
animals of the species of horses, mules, asses, cattle, swine, sheep 
and goats it is desired to prohibit from running at large, also 
prohibiting said animals from being herded upon the public highways 
in such district; and shall designate that the herd district shall not 
apply to nor cover livestock, excepting swine, which shall roam., drift 
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or stray from open range into the district unless the district shall be 
enclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards in roads penetrating the 
district so as to prevent livestock, excepting swine, from roaming, 
drifting or straying from open range into the district; and may 
designate the period of the year during which it is desired to prohibit 
such animals from running at large, or being herded on the highways. 
Provided, any herd district heretofore established shall retain its 
identity, geographic definition and remain in full force and effect, 
until vacated or modified hereafter as provided by Section 25-2404, 
Idaho Code as amended. Open range means all unenclosed lands 
outside cities and villages upon which by custom, license or 
otherwise, livestock, excepting swine, are grazed or permitted to 
roam. 
1963 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 264, § 1, pg. 674. 
Idaho Code§ 25-2403 sets forth the herd district publication requirements, which statute 
has not been amended since 1907: 
§ 25-2403. Notice of hearing petition. --It shall be the duty of the 
board of county commissioners, after such petition has been filed, to 
set a date for hearing said petition, notice of which hearing shall be 
given by posting notices thereofin three (3) conspicuous places in the 
proposed herd district, and by publication for two (2) weeks previous 
to said hearing in a newspaper published in the county nearest the 
proposed herd district. 
IDAHO CODE § 25-2403 (2008). 
Finally, Idaho Code § 25-2404, sets forth the requirements for the Order creating the herd 
district. This statute has not been amended since 1953 and reads as follows: 
§ 25-2404. Order creating district.--At such hearing, if satisfied that 
a majority of the landowners owning more than fifty percent (50%) 
of the land in said proposed herd district who are resident in, and 
qualified electors of, the state ofldaho are in favor of the enforcement 
of the herd law therein, and that it would be beneficial to such district, 
the board of commissioners shall make an order creating such herd 
district, in accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with such 
modifications as it may choose to make. Such order shall specify a 
certain time at which it shall take effect, which time shall be at least 
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thirty (30) days after the making of said order; and said order shall 
continue in force, accordifug to the terms thereof, until the same shall 
be vacated or modified by the board of commissioners, upon the 
petition of a majority of the landowners owning more than fifty 
percent (50%) of the land in said district who are resident in, and 
qualified electors of, the state ofldaho. 
IDAHO CODE § 25-2404 (2008). 
Piercy has argued that the 1982 herd district ordinance is invalid because the Canyon 
County Commissioners improperly included "open range" land (§25-2402); did not act pursuant 
to a petition from a majority ofland owners in the district or area (§25-2402); failed to include an 
effective date in the Order (§25-2404); failed to publish notice of a public hearing (§25-2403); 
failed to adequately describe the metes and bounds of the proposed herd district (§25-2402); and 
failed to designate the animals to be controlled by the herd district (§ 25-2402). 
3. Piercy has failed to set forth any evidence indicating that the land subject to the 
1982 herd district ordinance included "open range" land. 
Piercy has argued that the December 10, 1982, Order Establishing Herd District is invalid 
because it improperly incorporated "open range" land in violation ofldaho Code §25-2402. 
Idaho Code § 25-2402 provides: "[a] majority of the land owners in any area or district described 
by metes and bounds not including open range and who are also resident in, and qualified 
electors of, the state of Idaho may petition the board of county commissioners in writing to create 
such area a herd district." Open range is defined therein to mean "all unenclosed lands outside 
cities and villages upon which by custom. license or otherwise. livestock, excepting swine, are 
grazed or permitted to roam." (Emphasis added). 
Prior to 1963 herd districts were allowed to be created in any part ofldaho. Maguire v. 
Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 836, 590 P.2d 85, 92 (1978). Idaho Code§ 25-2402 was amended in 1963 
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to add a definition of "open range" and provided that herd districts could not be created in such 
area. Id. In Yanke, the Supreme Court of Idaho interpreted the 1963 amendment to Idaho Code§ 
25-2402 as follows: 
Id. 
It is clear the amendment of LC. s 25-2402 by the inserting of a definition of 
"open range" was designed to protect the rights of livestock owners by prohibiting 
herd districts in areas where they historically grazed stock, rather than limiting the 
area where livestock owners were free to let their stock roam at large. Under our 
decision, herd districts may still be created in any area not within "open range" as 
defined in LC. s 25-2402. The passage of LC. ss 25-2402 and 25-2118, with their 
accompanying definition of "open range" in terms of historical use, was not 
intended to and does not change the law of this state that with the exception of 
cities, villages, and herd districts, livestock may run at large and graze upon 
unenclosed lands in this state. 
The Court interpreted the amendment to mean that herd districts could not be created in 
open range areas. Open range was a defined term. Therefore, herd districts could be created in 
areas where livestock were not grazed or permitted to roam by custom, license or otherwise, or in 
other words, areas that did not fall within the definition of open range. There is no evidence that 
the Legislature in 1963 intended to prevent the further elimination of open range, since open 
range was not defined until 1963. 
The December 10, 1982 Order evidenced an intent to establish a herd district in the three 
remaining open range areas in Canyon County as shown on an attached survey map. The County 
may have incorrectly used the term open range to mean land that was not in a herd district. 
Piercy has failed to put forth any evidence that the County commissioners used the term open 
range in the Order as defined in Idaho Code § 25-2402. Furthermore, there is simply no evidence 
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that the area in question constitutes open range by definition. There is no evidence, proving that 
the pastures in the area in question were used by custom, license or otherwise for roaming 
livestock. In sum, there is no evidence in the record that the 1982 herd district ordinance included 
"open range" land as defined and prohibited by the statute. Piercy has failed to present evidence 
to rebut the presumption of the ordinance's validity on this ground. 
4. Piercy has failed to present evidence that the Board of County Commissioners did 
not comply with the Idaho Code provisions governing the establishment of a herd 
district. Therefore, the ordinance is valid. 
Piercy argues that the 1982 herd district ordinance is invalid because the Order failed to 
contain specific information in contravention of the Idaho Code. First, Piercy asserts that the 
1982 herd district ordinance is invalid because the Canyon County Commissioners did not act 
pursuant to a petition from a majority ofland owners in the district or area. Second, Piercy argues 
that the herd district ordinance is invalid because it failed to include an effective date in the 
Order. Third, Piercy argues that the herd district ordinance is invalid because it failed to 
adequately describe the metes and bounds of the proposed herd district. Finally, Piercy asserts 
that the herd district ordinance is invalid because it failed to designate the animals to be 
controlled by the herd district. 
At the time the December I 0, 1982 Order Establishing Herd District was enacted, the 
1963 version of the Idaho Code required a written petition to be filed by a majority ofland 
owners to create a herd district. LC.§ 25-2402. Such petition required a metes and bounds 
description of the proposed herd district area, the boundaries of the herd district and a 
designation of what animals were to be prohibited from running at large. Id. 
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On the other hand, the Order creating the herd district does not require the same 
information as the petition. In fact, "the board of commissioners shall make an order creating 
such herd district, in accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it 
may choose to make." LC. § 25-2404 (emphasis added). In addition, the Order "shall specify a 
certain time at which it shall take effect, which time shall be at least thirty (30) days after the 
making of said order." Id. There is no requirement that the Order specifically reference the 
petition, contain a metes and bounds description of the proposed herd district, or designate what 
animals the petitioners desired to prohibit. 
Idaho Code § 31-709 sets forth, with specificity, which records must be kept by the 
Board of County Commissioners: 
The board must cause to be kept permanently and indefinitely, in 
accordance with the provisions of sections 9-331 and 9-332, Idaho 
Code: 
1. Minute records, in which must be recorded all orders and 
decisions made by them, and the daily proceedings had at all regular 
and special meetings. 
2. Allowance records, in which must be recorded all orders for 
the allowance of money from the county treasury, to whom made, and 
on what account, dating, numbering and indexing the same through 
each year. 
3. Road records, containing all proceedings and adjudications 
relating to the establishment, maintenance, change and 
discontinuance of roads, road districts, and overseers thereof, their 
reports and accounts. 
4. Franchise records, containing all franchises granted by them, 
for what purpose, the length of time and to whom granted, the amount 
of bond and license tax required. 
5. Warrant records, to be kept by the county auditor, in which 
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must be entered, in the order of drawing, all warrants drawn on the 
treasury, with their number and reference to the order on the minute 
book, with the date, amount, on what account, and name of payee. 
6. Ordinance records, containing all ordinances, stating the date 
enacted. 
7. Resolutions records, containing all resolutions, stating the date 
adopted. 
IDAHO CODE§ 31-709 (2008). 
A. Absence of a petition. or a reference to a petition in the Order. is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of the herd district ordinance's 
validity. 
Based on Idaho Code § 31-709, the Board of County Commissioners was not required to 
keep petitions for the formation of herd districts. Because the Commissioners were not required 
to keep herd district petitions, absence of such evidence offered as proof that the document did 
not exist is insufficient to overcome the presumption of the ordinance's validity. 
Additionally, there was no requirement that a reference to a petition be contained in the 
Order. None of the parties know whether the Canyon County Commissioners acted pursuant to a 
petition in creating the 1982 herd district. The meaning of the lack of a reference to the petition 
in the Order is purely speculative. Parsing the language of Joint Exhibits #4 and #5 without 
considering outside factors does not create evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. The 
notes taken by the clerk are gone. There is no evidence that the clerk who took the minutes was 
experienced or knowledgeable about the creation of herd districts. It is further possible that the 
clerk failed to mention the petition because she was not familiar with the Commissioners acting 
pursuant to a petition. The mere fact that the Commissioners signed a statement indicating that 
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the minutes were "read and approved and found to be a proper record of the proceedings of the 
Board of County Commissioners of Canyon County'' does not prove the absence of a petition. 
(Joint Exhibit No. 6). 
The burden of going forward is on Piercy. Sutton is not required to present evidence 
supporting the validity of the herd district ordinance until Piercy overcomes the presumption. A 
determination of whether or not a petition existed is pure speculation. Speculation cannot be the 
basis for overcoming the presumption. 
Piercy misconstrues the value of the testimony of Glenn 0. Koch and Bill A. Staker. 
Neither Mr. Koch nor Mr. Staker have any recollection, one way or the other, whether a petition 
was filed. Mr. Koch is the sole living commissioner from 1982 and is now 80 years old. He has 
been asked to recall specific events that occurred almost 26 years ago. Mr. Koch became a 
Canyon County Commissioner in March of 1982. (Koch Depo., 10:7). Mr. Koch expressly 
stated in his deposition that he did not recall one way or the other the passage of the 1982 herd 
district ordinance, the Idaho Code herd district provisions, whether a petition was filed, the 
meeting on December 2, 1982, whether a notice was published, whether it was the 
Commissioner's typical practice to include a reference in the minutes about a public notice, 
signing the December 10, 1982 Order, the herd district map, the effective date of the ordinance, 
and the designation of animals. (Id. at 19:23-20:10; 20:11-17; 21 :18-22:1; 23:6-10; 25:12-20; 
26:2-25; 27:14-22; 28:10-22; 33:5-14; 33:15-34:4. See also, 36:5-16.) 
The fact that Mr. Koch vaguely remembers a conversation about herd districts with 
Commissioners Hozba and Bledsoe, but does not remember whether a petition was filed does not 
prove anything. As noted above, Mr. Koch did not remember anything about the passage of the 
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herd district ordinance. Furthermore, there is no way of knowing when this conversation 
occurred. Simply because Commissioners Bledsoe and Hozba explained what a herd district was 
to Mr. Koch, that does not lead to the conclusion that the herd district was an idea formed and 
carried out by those Commissioners. 
Similarly, the testimony of Bill A. Staker, the clerk of the commissioner's office at the 
time the 1982 herd district was created, does not lead to the conclusion that the Commissioners 
failed to act pursuant to a petition. Mr. Staker is 73 years old and was asked to recall specific 
events that occurred almost 26 years ago. In his deposition, Mr. Staker was asked if he recalled 
"back in the late '70s and early '80s discussions amongst the Commissioners about the herd 
districts in Canyon County." (Staker Depo., 13:17-20.) In his response, Mr. Staker did not 
indicate with whom he discussed the issue, nor did he narrow down a time-frame in which the 
conversation occurred. (Staker Depo., 13: 17-14:25.) Furthermore, Mr. Staker testified that he 
did not have any personal knowledge as to whether a petition had been filed, whether a notice of 
hearing was published, the creation of the December 10, 1982 Order, and whether he had seen 
the herd district map. (Staker Depo., 14:22-15:6; 15:12-16; 17:11-16; 18:6-19:17; 20:6-21 :8; 
23:11-23.) In fact, Mr. Staker testified that it was not his signature, or his stamp on the 
December 10, 1982 Order Establishing Herd District and that he had never seen the Order before. 
(Staker Depo., 18:6-19:4.) 
The testimony of Mr. Staker and Mr. Koch should be given little weight in determining 
whether the Commissioners acted pursuant to a petition. 
Mr. Johnson's testimony does not prove whether a petition existed. While Mr. Johnson 
does not recall seeing a petition, he does not have any proof that a notice of hearing was not 
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published, or that a petition was not circulated. (Johnson Depo., 30:5-15.) Mr. Johnson could 
not recall whether the Cattlemen's Association or the Cattle Feeders Association had ever 
notified its members of the creation of a herd district, or the proposed creation of a herd district. 
(Johnson Depo. 31:11-19.) There is no evidence that Mr. Johnson's signature as a landowner was 
required in order to present the petition to the Commissioners. Again, the fact that Mr. Johnson 
did not see or hear about the petition is insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption. 
Assuming that the reason that Mr. Johnson did not see the petition was that one did not exist is 
pure speculation. Speculation is insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption. 
The burden of going forward is not on the County to provide evidence that a petition 
existed. The only evidence Piercy has presented to show that the Commissers failed to act 
pursuant to a petition is the absence of the petition, and lack of reference to a petition in the 
minutes. Such evidence is insufficient to show by 51 % that the petition did not exist. The fact of 
the matter is that the absence of a petition nearly 26 years after the fact to support a claim of 
technical irregularities in an ordinance's passage is unreliable evidence. 
B. The Idaho Code does not require the Order Establishing Herd District to 
contain a metes and bounds description. 
While the petition must contain a metes and bounds description, there is no requirement 
in the Idaho Code that the Order must contain such description. Nonetheless, the Commissioners 
made it clear in the Order which land it intended to be part of the herd district. The Order 
provides that "[a] survey map attached [to the Order], prepared by the Planning and Zoning 
Administrator designates the three small areas within the County which remain open range." The 
Order then provides that a "Herd District be established in the three remaining open range areas 
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in Canyon County as shown on the attached survey map (marked in black), to the end that the 
entire land area of Canyon County be placed in Herd District status." To everyone's knowledge 
there is only one herd district map. That being said, the Order references an attached survey 
map; however, that map has disappeared in the last 26 years. It is difficult to go back in time and 
to try and figure out what was done in 1982, when the supporting documents have since 
disappeared. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Code requires a metes and bounds description to be in the 
petition, however, the Idaho Code does not require the Board to maintain a copy of the petition. 
Furthermore, there is no requirement that a metes and bounds description appear in the Order. In 
sum, the absence of a metes and bounds description in the Order is insufficient to overcome the 
presumption of the herd district ordinance's validity. Too much time has passed and memories 
have faded. There is no evidence either way that a metes and bounds description was not 
included in the petition. Since there is no evidence to make the determination of whether a 
petition was filed or not, the mere assertion that such evidence is absent is simply insufficient to 
overcome the presumption. 
C. Lack of a date stating when the Order Establishing Herd District should 
have become effective is insufficient to render the Order invalid. 
Piercy argues that the Order Establishing Herd District never became effective because 
the Order lacked a date at which it became effective, rendering the herd district ordinance 
invalid. 
Generally, invalidity as to the effective date of an ordinance does not render the ordinance 
void. 5 McQuillin Mun. Corp.§ 15.36 (3rd ed.). "Where a definite time is prescribed before an 
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ordinance shall take effect or go into force, the ordinance is effective from the expiration of the 
time prescribed ... " Id. Idaho Code§ 25-2404 provides that the "order shall specify a certain time 
at which it shall take effect, which time shall be at least thirty (30) days after the making of said 
order ... " The plain reading of the statute indicates that if a time certain is not specified in the 
order, the effective date of the ordinance is 30 days after its passage. 
This issue is moot, since no one attempted to attack the validity of the ordinance after its 
passage, or within 30 days of its passage. 
Furthermore, the citizens of Canyon County were provided notice regarding the passage 
of a resolution relating to herd districts on December 20, 1982, when the notice was published in 
the Idaho Press Tribune. Additionally, the clerks of the court and local government have 
operated under the belief that the ordinance was enacted. As noted above, the failure to provide 
an effective date is not sufficient to void the ordinance. It can be assumed that the statute would 
have taken effect after the passage of thirty days. 
5. Piercy has failed to present any admissible evidence that the Board of 
Commissioners failed to comply with the notice of hearing requirements set forth 
in Idaho Code§ 25-2403. 
Piercy has failed to present any evidence showing that the notice requirements set forth in 
Idaho Code § 25-2403 were not complied with by the Board of Commissioners. As noted above, 
Idaho Code § 31-709 does not require the Board to maintain copies of the herd district hearing 
notices. 
Alternatively, after nearly 26 years, no one can recall, either way, whether hearing notices 
were published as required by the Idaho Code. Many of the people that were around in 1982 
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have since passed away, and memories of that particular ordinance have faded. Mr. Koch, the 
sole surviving commissioner from 1982 does not recall whether a notice was published or not. 
Furthermore, it appears that the Commissioners may have addressed the issue of the herd 
district prior to December 1982. The Order Establishing Herd District specifically states that 
"[t]he Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd District Boundaries throughout the 
County .... " (Emphasis added). The minutes from Book 22, dated on or about January 7, 1976, 
contain public hearing minutes related to the herd district: 
Chairman Craven called to order the Public Hearing at 9:00 a.m. He 
read aloud. the Notice of Public Hearing, which was advertised in the 
newspaper December 24. 1976 and January 1. 1977; stating that the 
purpose of this hearing was to determine whether or not all of the 
unincorporated area of Canyon County should be declared a Herd 
District. 
He further stated that it was the feeling of the Board of County 
Commissioners that in view of the fact, that approximately 94% of 
Canyon County was presently within a Herd District. That it 
would be a benefit to the general public to declare all of the 
unincorporated area of Canyon County to be within a Herd District. 
There being no one present to protect or no written testimony; 
Commissioner Pilcher made a motion that: All of the 
unincorporated area of Canyon County be declared as a Herd 
District, to prohibit animals from running at large in the 
unincorporated area of Canyon County, and that the animals 
referred to are as follows: Horses, Mules, Asses, Cattle, Swine, 
Sheep, and Goats; That said animals shall be prohibited from 
running at large at all times. 
The motion was seconded by Commissioner Craven, and passed. 
Commissioner Craven declared the Public Hearing adjourned at 
9:30a.m. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Even though the resolution indicates that the hearing notices published on December 24, 
1976, and January 1, 1977, were read aloud, only the December 24, 1976, notice was found. 
Therefore, the fact that hearing notices for the December 10, 1982, hearing on the herd district 
cannot be found is not dispositive of the fact that the notices did not get published. 
Ms. Whychell testified at the Bench Trial that she reviewed The Parma Review, The 
Idaho Press-Tribune, and the Idaho Statesman. (Trial Transcript, 68: 24-25). Ms. Whychell 
further testified that she did not print out the legal notices in the Idaho Statesman (Trial 
Transcript, 83: 15-21 ). She further testified that she did not personally verify whether the 
Historical Society had all of the issues of the Idaho Statesman. Id. Ms. Whychell also testified 
that it was possible that she could have failed to observe legal notices simply because of the sheer 
volume of documents reviewed and conditions under which she was researched. (Trial 
Transcript, 85:3-8). 
Lack of reference to the notices in the minutes is not dispositive. Minutes are an 
abbreviated summary, not a verbatim transcript. Because the minutes are not verbatim, relying 
on them for accuracy as to what occurred at the meeting is flawed. No one knows exactly what 
was said on the record. The Commissioners may have discussed everything that Piercy claims to 
have not occurred. In sum, the minutes do not inform us of everything that transpired during the 
meeting. 
Based on the above, Piercy has not met the burden of going forward and is not able to 
overcome the presumption of the validity of the herd district statute. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
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Sutton respectfully requests that the Court uphold the validity of the 1982 herd district 
ordinance. 
DATED this r ~ /- day of December, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:_.,_.tf_,·,,...._..Jt;_d_r ___ _ 
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this kl- day of December, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton U.S. Mail 
Chasan & Walton, LLC Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1069 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 v Facsimile 
Stephen E. Blackbum U.S. Mail 
Blackbum Law, P.C. Hand Delivery 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
-y Overnight Mail Meridian, ID 83642 Facsimile 
RyanB. Peck U.S. Mail 
Saetrum Law Offices Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 7425 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83 707 ~ Facsimile 
Charles L. Saari U.S. Mail 
Canyon County Prosecutor Hand Delivery 
Canyon County Courthouse 
J 
Overnight Mail 
1115 Albany Facsimile 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Joshua S. Evett 
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Rodney R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck, ISB: 7022 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
I 01 S. Capitol Blvd 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
DEC 1 5 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C. DOCKINS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS I. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S REPLY 
BRIEF 
The Court received approximately 89 pages of briefing from the other parties in this matter 
along with some last minute attachments. Amazingly, in those 89 pages of text there is not one 
paragraph, passage or period devoted to pointing to any evidence which would even infer that the 
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Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 properly followed mandatory statutory procedures for the 
creation of a herd district. All the actual evidence presented to the Court proves that the Canyon 
County Commissioners in 1982 failed to properly follow mandatory statutory procedures in 
attempting to create a herd district. 
Thus, the veritable well of ink splashed across those pages is a desperate attempt by the 
other parties to convince the Court that they do not need to provide any evidence. The other 
parties take an untenable legal stance by pinning all their hopes on a bare legal presumption of 
validity. It is not surprising therefore, that all their arguments amount to attempts to characterize 
a simple presumption as an unassailable legal truth and to take each piece of evidence in isolation 
and say it is not enough to overcome the presumption. 
The other parties' arguments are similar to a defending wartime general stating that if any 
one of an opposing forces navy, air force and ground troops attacked his position alone it would 
not be adequate enough to overrun his defenses; and then claiming that alone proves that a 
coordinated attack of all three forces would not be adequate to overrun those same defenses. 
When the Court takes into account all the evidence showing that the Canyon County 
Commissioners in 1982 failed to follow proper statutory procedures, there can be little doubt that 
this 1982 herd district was and always has been invalid. 
I. THE TRIAL EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE CANYON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
DID NOT ESTABLISH AV ALID HERD DISTRICT 
A. The Presumption of Validity is Overcome by a Preponderance of the Evidence 
The law regarding the presumption of validity in this case is clear. The Idaho Legislature 
provided us with the presumption in I. C. § 31-857. The law regarding legal presumptions is 
similarly set forth in I.R.E. 301 (a), which states: "a presumption imposes on the party against whom it 
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is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption ... " I.RE. 
30l(a). The Rule also states that, "If the party meets the burden of going forward, no instruction on 
the presumption shall be given, and the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of 
the presumed fact without regard to the presumption." I.R.E. 30l(a). This Rule governs 
presumptions unless otherwise provided by statute, Idaho appellate decisions and other rules. 
Nothing in the language ofl. C. § 31-857 suggests that the presumption of validity is any stronger than 
a general presumption interpreted under I.RE. 30l(a). 
This is supported by the Idaho Appellate decisions on point regarding general municipal 
ordinances. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hendricks v. City of Nampa dealing with an annexation 
order describes the bounds of these types of presumptions stating: 
[I]f the complaining party comes forward with satisfactory, substantial competent evidence 
to show that the particular tract of land is greater in extent than five acres, and that the 
present owner, proprietor or person action with his authority or acquiescence has not laid 
off, subdivided or platted the land into lots or blocks of more than five acres each, and that 
the present owner, proprietor or person acting with his authority or acquiescence has not 
sold or begun to sell the land by metes and bounds in tracts not exceeding five acres, then 
such party will have satisfied the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to 
rebut the presumption of validity. Thereafter the burden of coming forward with other 
evidence to show that the ordinance in fact is valid will devolve upon the municipality. 
Hendricks v. City of Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 99, 456 P.2d 262, 266 (1969). 
The Idaho Supreme Court confirmed its position one year later by stating, "Once the 
respondent overcame the presumption of validity of introducing evidence tending to show that the 
ordinance in question had been unreasonably applied to his property, the burden was then shifted to 
Boise City to come forward with evidence to rebut the respondent's evidence and to show that the 
ordinance was valid." Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 563, 468 
p .2d 290, 296 (1970). 
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It is true that in this action Mr. Piercy would maintain the ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. 
However, that ultimate burden of persuasion is also defined by the Idaho Supreme Court which held, 
"If the evidence were in a state of equilibrium, then under the presumption of validity attached to the 
ordinance, the party attacking its validity would lose." Id. If the person attacking the ordinance 
establishes that the evidence tips the scales in their favor beyond mere equilibrium, then the 
presumption of validity is overcome and the burden of persuasion is met. The party defending the 
ordinance at that point cannot just sit back and do nothing, but must come forward with evidence to 
restore the equilibrium of the evidence or the ordinance will be held to be invalid. As the Court 
stated, the burden is upon Mr. Piercy to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
ordinance is invalid. 
The other parties have not cited to any authority suggesting that the presumption of validity in 
I. C. § 31-857 places a greater burden upon Mr. Piercy than a preponderance of the evidence. Mr. 
Guzman inappropriately contends that City of Lewis v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80 (1984) stands for the 
proposition that a city ordinance must be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. No 
where in Knieriem can that holding be found. The holding actually states, "the presumption in favor 
of validity can be overcome only by a clear showing that the ordinance applied is confiscatory, 
arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious." City of Lewis v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 83, 685 P.2d 821, 
824 (1984). A "clear showing" is not equivalent to "clear and convincing." The former is 
synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard and the latter is a completely different 
standard of proof. 
Further, Knieriem is fundamentally different from the present case as it involved zoning 
ordinances which are not included in the statutory presumption found in I. C. § 31-857. The cases 
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involving zoning ordinances involve different standards and facts than the present case and their case 
holdings are not applicable in this matter. 
Mr. Guzman also cites to Simmons v. City of Moscow, 111Idaho14 (1986), which holding is 
similarly confusing and inapplicable in this matter. The Supreme Court in Simmons states, "Only 
"clear proof' of great force will warrant a conclusion that an assessment is erroneous so as to 
overcome the presumption of validity." Simmons v. City of Moscow, 111 Idaho 14, 19, 720 P.2d 
197, 202 (1986). Citing McQuillin, the Court seems to state a standard that is not apparently 
equivalent to either the preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and convincing standard. 
The Supreme Court, however, was dealing with an assessment of a public improvement's benefits. 
This case is not analogous to the present case and is of no benefit in determining the proper standard 
of care when challenging a herd district ordinance. 
B. The Evidence Establishes That Canyon County Failed to Take Proper Jurisdictional Steps 
in Attempting to Enact the 1982 Herd District 
Mr. Piercy has provided conclusive and persuasive evidence that several of the procedures 
and steps set forth in I. C. §§ 25-2402-2404 were not followed by the Canyon County Commissioners 
in 1982 when attempting to form the subject herd district. The Canyon County Commissioners: (1) 
did not act pursuant to a petition; (2) failed to publish notice of a public hearing regarding the 
formation of the 1982 herd district for two weeks prior to the hearing; (3) failed to designate the 
animals to be controlled by the herd district; ( 4) failed to adequately describe the metes and bounds of 
the proposed herd district; (5) failed to include in the order an effective date and (6) impermissibly 
included open range in the proposed herd district. 
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1. The Canyon County Commissioners did not act pursuant to a petition. 
In Mr. Piercy's initial closing brief the evidence is set forth establishing that there was no 
landowner petition. Mr. Piercy provided documents and witness testimony showing that the Canyon 
County Commissioner's were acting on their own in attempting to create the 1982 herd district. Not 
only do the minutes of the meetings of December 2 and December 10, 1982, state that the 
Commissioners were acting pursuant to a motion and not a petition, but Mr. Johnson, who was a 
landowner in the effected area at the time, has testified that he never received a petition and he would 
have known about it if one had been going around. 
In the face of all the evidence, the other parties have one unified response. They state that 
they do not have any evidence of a petition and do not need to supply any evidence of a petition. 
Strangely, the other parties want to use the complete lack of evidence of a petition to claim that Mr. 
Piercy cannot prove there was not a petition. The main argument stated by the other parties is that 
because Canyon County was not statutorily required to keep a copy of the petition Mr. Piercy cannot 
prove a petition did not exist. This argument simply attempts to avoid the ample evidence that there 
was no petition. 
Under I. C. § 31-709(1 ), the Board of County Commissioners is required to keep minute 
records which are to include, "the daily proceedings had at all regular and special meetings." It is 
these required minutes that give strong evidence that there was no landowner petition. Mr. Piercy is 
not relying solely on the lack of mention of a petition, but on the affirmative statements in the minutes 
to show the lack of a petition. 
Joint Exhibit #3 contains several copies of the official Canyon County Commissioner's 
meeting minutes regarding the formation of herd districts throughout Canyon County's history. 
These minutes uniformly identify in the first line of the minutes that the proposed herd district was 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S REPLY BRIEF - 6 
945 
being proposed pursuant to a petition of a landowner. These minutes also use the language that they 
are granting a petition. 
The language of the minutes in regard to the passage of the 1982 herd district affirmatively 
state that the commissioners were passing a resolution that came from a motion of Commissioner 
Hobza. 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners on the 2nd day of December, 1982: Upon motion of Commissioner Hobza 
and the second by Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as follows: That because of 
the confusion that exists due to the over-lapping lines of herd districts and open range and 
because over ninety-five (95%) percent of the area of Canyon County is already designated 
a herd district the board will issue an order designating all of Canyon County to be herd 
district as of December 14, 1982. Motion Carries Unanimously. 
(Joint Exhibit #5 at l.)(Emphasis added) These minutes do not mention a landowner petition, but 
instead indicate that this action was pursuant to a motion by Commissioner Hobza. It would not be 
necessary for a commissioner to malce a motion when acting pursuant to a petition. The 
commissioners would simply grant or allow the petition. This shows that the commissioners were 
not acting pursuant to a petition, but rather had come up with this course of action on their own. 
The other parties try to confuse the issue by claiming that perhaps there were prior minutes 
that discussed the petition. This argument should be completely disregarded. As stated above, 
Commissioners are required to keep records of their minutes. Mr. Piercy requested in discovery and 
pursuant to depositions duces tecum any minutes relating to this county-wide herd district in Canyon 
County. The minutes the Court has were all that were provided or found. The idea that there are 
other minutes out there regarding the 1982 herd district is pure speculation. 
The testimony of certain witnesses further shows that the commissioners were not acting 
pursuant to a petition. It is true that it is more difficult for a person to remember that something did 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S REPLY BRIEF - 7 
946 
not exist versus something that did. Therefore, Mr. Koch and Mr. Staker cannot say for sure that a 
petition did not exist, but that is to be expected from someone trying to remember the non-existence 
of a document. The testimony of these two would likely not be enough to establish the 
non-existence of a petition, but this testimony is supported by the testimony of Mr. Johnson. 
Mr. Johnson was an interested person who owned a large amount ofland in the effected area 
of the 1982 herd district. Mr. Johnson states that he did not see or even hear of a petition regarding 
establishing a herd district in his area and that he would have remembered it had he seen or heard of it. 
This testimony is compelling considering that it would have been a significant and memorable event 
if certain people had been attempting to obtain enough landowner signatures to reach the over 50% 
mark required by the statute to create a herd district. This would especially be true if the effort was 
to secure enough signatures to place all of Canyon County into one herd district. It defies reason to 
suggest that a petition was being circulated without Mr. Johnson being made aware personally, by a 
neighbor or through his connections at the cattle associations. 
The absence of any statement of a petition in the record is evidence that no petition existed. 
Canyon County and Mr. Guzman rely on two cases to convince the Court it should ignore the lack of 
mention of a petition in the record. These cases are In re Drainage District No. 1, 26 Idaho 311, 143 
P. 299 (1914 ), which was then cited for the relevant holding in Garrett Transfer & Storage Co. v. 
Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 P.2d 743 (1933). These cases are simply not applicable to the present case. 
Both cases dealt with the identical issue of a whether the silence oflegislative journals was sufficient 
evidence by itself to prove that a legislative action was not taken. The relevant holding is that, "it 
will not be presumed in any case from the mere silence of the journals that either house has exceeded 
its authority or disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of a legislative act, unless the 
Constitution has expressly required the journal to show the actions taken, as, for instance, where it 
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requires the yeas and nays to be entered." Garrett Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 579, 
33 P.2d 743, 746 (1933); quoting: In re Drainage District No. 1, 26 Idaho 311, 143 P. 299 (1914). 
These two cases are dealing with the Idaho Legislative body and not a County Board of 
Commissioners enacting herd districts. Mr. Piercy has found no case law suggesting that these 
holdings go beyond there specific application. In fact, following the original statement of this rule in 
1914, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Catlin, 33 Idaho 437, 195 P. 628 (1921) and Smith v. 
Canyon County, 39 Idaho 222, 224, 226 P. 1070, 1072 (1924), provide the opposite requirement. 
These cases provide that in regards to county commissioners enacting herd districts the requirements 
must be set forth in the record. Id. This standard has not been overruled. Where the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not specifically overrule either case in the later Garrett Transfer case, it is certain 
that the holding does not apply to the record of the county commissioners when enacting herd 
districts. The more specific holdings in Smith and Catlin should apply to the present case. 
Finally, if there had been a petition it would have been evident in some County record or 
someone's recollection. We have the minutes of the meetings which do not even infer by the style of 
the minutes that there was a petition let alone mentioning one. All the living witnesses presented 
recall the event, but do not recall a petition. And a significant landowner in the effected area never 
saw a petition. All the evidence weighs in favor of the conclusion that there was no petition. 
2. The Canyon County Commissioners failed to publish notice of a hearing on the 
proposed creation of the 1982 herd district. 
The Canyon County Commissioner's failure to publish notice of the hearing on the 1982 herd 
district is evident from the uncontested testimony at the trial along with Exhibits A-2 and A-3. The 
Idaho Code in 1982 as quoted above requires that the commissioner's notify the public of a hearing 
on the petition "by publication for two (2) weeks previous to said hearing in a newspaper published in 
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the county nearest the propo'sed herd district." LC.§ 25-2403 (1963). The common sense meaning 
of this requirement is that for the two weeks immediately preceding the hearing on the herd district, 
the commissioner's should publish notice of the hearing in the newspaper. 
The other parties fail to recognize the significance of this requirement. The only relevant 
time frame for looking for notice of a petition would be the two weeks leading up to the December 2, 
1982 meeting and the two weeks leading up to the December 10, 1982, meeting. This time frame 
would take in most of December and the latter half of November. In providing evidence that no 
notice was published in Canyon County in 1982 regarding the creation of the herd district, Mr. Piercy 
went far beyond what was necessary. Mr. Piercy embarked on that research because it was intimated 
by the other parties during the motion for summary judgment proceedings on this issue that perhaps 
there were other meetings regarding the formation of this herd district that occurred earlier in 1982. 
There is absolutely no evidence that there were any other meetings in 1980, 1981or1982 by the 
county commissioners regarding this herd district. Therefore, the only time frame that is currently 
relevant is December and November of 1982. 
The other parties spent much time ~rying to disregard the uncontroverted evidence submitted 
by the Ms. Whychell and Mr. Lloyd. The other parties point to their statements that the newspaper 
print was small or that their eyes would get tired to suggest perhaps they missed a notice. Because 
the other parties supplied no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Whychell or Mr. Lloyd missed a notice, 
there discussions are nothing but speculation. The fact that Ms. Whychell and Mr. Lloyd were 
cognizant that there eyes would get tired and that the print was small supports the veracity of their 
research. Because of their recognition of the difficulties they could compensate for the difficulties 
by taking breaks and making sure nothing was missed in the small print. 
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Ms. Whychell provided copies of all the legal notices posted in the Idaho Press Tribune and 
the Panna Review for 1982. The other counsel could not even point to one legal notice or newspaper 
edition that was not contained in the exhibits provided to the Court in order to discredit Ms. 
Whychell's research. As the record stands, the Court can verify through the exhibits that no notice 
of the December hearings were published in either of the two papers circulating in Canyon County in 
December and November of 1982. The other parties have not shown the Court any evidence to 
doubt the testimony of Ms. Whychell and Mr. Lloyd. Mr. Guzman's own researcher supports the 
testimony that there was no notice published. 
A recent decision by Judge Winmill in the case of Arguello v. Lee shows the importance and 
significance of the testimony provided by Ms. Whychell and Mr. Lloyd in this matter. In Arguello, 
the Defendant on Summary Judgment argued that a herd district ordinance established in 1930 was 
invalid. Mr. Piercy at one time made this case known to this Court due to the federal land issues 
being litigated. Since this Court already ruled on the federal land issues in the present case that part 
of Arguello is no longer relevant. The Defendant also argued that the proper procedures were not 
taken to create the herd district. The Defendant presented evidence that one newspaper, the Rigby 
Star did not have a published notice. To prove this the Defendant submitted evidence that they had 
looked at preserved editions of the Rigby Star not unlike the evidence presented before this Court. 
The Judge did not find fault with the means or methods of the proof, but the Plaintiffs provided 
evidence to contradict the Defendant's findings. 
The Plaintiffs in that case provided the following evidence. A public record showing that the 
petition for a herd district was presented to the Jefferson County Commissioners on October 14, 
1929. The record also showed that the commissioners ordered that notice of hearing be issued in 
conformity with Idaho law. It was established that another newspaper, the Roberts Sentinel, which 
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was distributed closer to the effected area, was being published at the time. Receipts were provided 
showing that the commissioner's office paid for printing in the Roberts Sentinel, including the days 
leading up to the hearing. The Defendants were unable to provide copies of the Roberts Sentinel as it 
was not available from any known source. Faced with this convincing evidence, the Judge stated 
that he found the notice had been published. 
In the present case, the other parties have failed to provide any evidence showing that notice 
of a hearing was published in 1982. Interestingly, the Plaintiffs in Arguello were able to find proof in 
the minute record of both a petition and that notice was published. No such evidence was provided 
by the other parties in this matter. Mr. Piercy has provided evidence regarding all the newspapers 
being published in Canyon County during November and December of 1982. Mr. Piercy's 
researchers have provided unchallenged evidence that no notice was published regarding the hearing 
for the 1982 herd district. 
3. The Canyon County Commissioners did not accomplish obvious requirements to properly 
form a herd district 
As more fully covered in our initial briefing, the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 
failed to follow the simplest of requirements for the formation of a herd district. They did not 
properly include a metes and bounds description, they did not include an effective date in the order 
and they did not include the names of the animals that were going to be restricted. These oversights 
emphasize and establish that the Canyon County Commissioners were not attempting to follow 
statutory procedure, in that they failed to accomplish the simplest ofrequirements. 
Admittedly proof of one such error would likely not be sufficient to overturn an ordinance. 
In Arguello, the Court found that a missing effective date alone did not invalidate the ordinance in 
light of all the evidence the Plaintiff provided that they had followed several of the procedures. In 
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the present case, unlike Arguello, the Canyon County Commissioners not only failed to put an 
effective date on the ordinance, but failed to give notice, failed to act pursuant to a petition, failed to 
include the names of animals and failed to include a proper metes and bounds description. 
The other parties suggest that the statute does not require the Commissioners to include a 
metes and bounds description or the designation of animals in the order. This suggestion comes 
through a strained interpretation of LC. § 25-2404. This section states: "the board of 
commissioners shall make an order creating such herd district in accordance with the prayer of the 
petition, or with such modifications as it may choose to make." (Emphasis added) LC. § 25-2404. 
The other parties ignore the emphasized language. This language mandates that the commissioners 
include all the elements of a herd district that are required in the petition. The subsequent language, 
simply gives the commissioners the right to make some modifications, but would not allow them to 
completely ignore one of the necessary elements, such as designating what animals would be 
controlled by the herd district. 
4. The Canyon County Commissioners improperly attempted to include open range areas in 
their 1982 ordinance. 
In 1963 the italicized language was included to the following portion of LC. § 25-2402: "A 
majority of the land owners in any area or district described by metes and bounds not including open 
range and who are also resident in, and qualified electors of, the state ofidaho may petition the board 
of county commissioners .... " This version of LC.§ 25-2402 was being used in 1982. The 
language forbids landowners in open range areas from petitioning for a herd district to include open 
range. The Idaho Legislature in 1963 intended to prevent the further elimination of open range. 
The Canyon County Commissioners in their 1982 order specifically say that they are 
attempting to eliminate all open range areas. The other parties attempt to claim that the 
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commissioners did not mean what they were saying. They have absolutely no evidence to even 
suggest that the commissioners meant something other than what they stated in the order. The 
testimony of Glenn Koch on that issue was clear. The commissioners were attempting to eliminate 
open range from Canyon County. This was an impermissible action at the time. This fact alone 
establishes that the commissioners were not properly following the statutory mandates for creating a 
herd district. 
Mr. Piercy has provided undisputed and overwhelming evidence that the Canyon County 
Connnissioners in 1982 did not properly form a herd district. The other parties have failed to 
provide one piece of evidence that would suggest that the commissioners did anything right in 
attempting to form the 1982 herd district. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton spent considerable effort in attempting to raise a statute of 
limitation defense, which is addressed below. 
II. ANALYSIS OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
In order to analyze this defense, we must include a brief procedural history of this matter. 
This case began as a lawsuit against Mr. Piercy on May 10, 2005. Mr. Piercy raised the issue of the 
validity of the 1982 herd district as an affirmative defense in his Answer filed on June 20, 2005. Mr. 
Piercy then pursued the issue of the validity of the 1982 herd district as a motion for summary 
judgment on May 5, 2007. As part of the Court's ruling on Mr. Piercy's motion for summary 
judgment issued October 9, 2007, the Court ordered that Ms. Sutton bring in Canyon County as a 
party in the action. Ms. Sutton complied by filing an Action for Declaratory Relief against Canyon 
County on October 16, 2007. Canyon County filed its Answer on November 8, 2007, but did not 
plead a statute of limitations defense. Mr. Guzman did not file any pleading in response to the 
Action for Declaratory Relief. 
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In order to simplify the pleadings the parties entered into and filed a Stipulation to Amend 
Pleadings and Scheduling on September 3, 2008. This stipulation included the following provision: 
"That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waive any defenses they may have regarding the 
timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief." 
The Amended Action for Declaratory Relief was filed by Mr. Piercy on September 10, 2008. 
Mr. Guzman filed his Answer on September 18, 2008. Mr. Guzmanpled a statute of limitations 
defense as an affirmative defense. Ms. Sutton filed her Answer on September 23, 2008. Ms. 
Guzman pled a statute oflimitations defense as an affirmative defense. Canyon County filed its 
Answer on September 24, 2008. Canyon County did not plead a statute of limitations defense. 
A. The Statute of Limitations Arguments are Moot 
Both Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton spend considerable space in their briefing arguing that Mr. 
Piercy's declaratory action is barred by a statue of limitations. These arguments are moot because 
Canyon County did not raise or argue for a statute oflimitations defense. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( c) states: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively ... statute oflimitations .... " Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) states: "In 
pleading the statute of limitations it is sufficient to state generally that the action is barred, and allege 
with particularity the Session Law of the section of the Idaho Code upon which the pleader relies." 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "Under the civil rules, compliance with the 
governing statute oflimitations is not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the time 
bar of the statute oflimitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived ifit is not pleaded by the 
defendant." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct.App. 1999). 
Canyon County waived any statute oflimitation defense it had by failing to plead the defense 
in answer to either the Action for Declaratory Relief or the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief. 
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Therefore, Mr. Guzman's and Ms. Sutton's attempt to raise a last minute statute of limitations 
defense is moot. Any ruling by the Court will bind Canyon County and a ruling that the 1982 herd 
district is invalid will be the law in Canyon County. This ruling will, therefore, apply to Mr. 
Guzman's underlying action against Mr. Piercy. 
B. Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton Waived any Statute of Limitation Defenses 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waived any statute oflimitation defense both by agreement of 
the parties and by failing to timely assert the defenses. Neither Mr. Guzman nor Ms. Sutton raised 
statute oflimitations arguments prior to impermissibly including them in their Answers to Mr. 
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief The Action for Declaratory Relief was filed on 
October 16, 2007. This action was filed by Ms. Sutton and she did not raise a statute oflimitations 
defense. Similarly, Mr. Guzman did not respond to the Action for Declaratory Relief. This has 
been an issue in the case for over a year and both Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman have failed to raise a 
statute of limitations defense. 
Finally, the parties determined that it made better sense to have Mr. Piercy be the Plaintiff in 
the declaratory action. After some discussion, Mr. Piercy agreed that Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton 
could be defendants in the action so that they could appropriately appear at the trial of this matter. 
Partially in exchange for that concession, the attorneys for Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman signed the 
stipulation agreeing to waive any defenses that resulted from the timing of the filing of the Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief This provision of the stipulation includes any statute oflimitation 
defenses. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton both voluntarily waived any statute oflimitations defenses, but 
also waived them through not raising them timely. 
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C. The Statute of Limitations Def ens es do not Have Merit 
Finally, the statute oflimitation defenses raised by Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton do not have 
merit in that one is inapplicable and the other is not available in this type of case. 
Ms. Sutton raises the defense under LC. § 5-221. This provision is not applicable as Mr. 
Piercy is not making a claim against Canyon County .. Mr. Piercy is asking the Court to declare that 
the 1982 herd district ordinance was invalid and void. LC. § 5-221 is clearly a tort claim limitation. 
The one case cited by Ms. Sutton even suggests that this is a tort claims provision. Further, Ms. 
Sutton does not have standing to argue a defense that would only be a defense for Canyon County. 
Canyon County itself has not raised this defense. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton also make a claim under LC. § 5-224. This provision was not 
designed to bar claims that a ordinance is invalid. If one wishing to contest an ordinance only had 
four years until being barred, then the case of Brown v. Board of Education would never have been 
litigated. Also unjust voting laws would have been protected under the guise of claims being stale. 
Further, this is an action that includes proof that the Canyon County Commissioners failed to give 
proper notice to the citizens of Canyon County. This is unlike the Canady case, where the Plaintiff 
had knowledge of the case and its effect prior to the action taking place. The Plaintiff watched as the 
lumber company expended a lot ofresources in reliance upon the city's actions. This is not so with 
Mr. Piercy. Canyon County failed to give the required notice and prejudiced Mr. Piercy' s ability to 
respond to the proposed action. 
The statute oflimitations arguments are moot, waived or not applicable. Mr. Piercy requests 
that this Court mle that the 1982 herd district is void based upon the evidence presented. 
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DATED this 15th day of December 2008. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
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